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Introduction
The way to hunt is for as long as you live against  
as long as there is such and such an animal.
—Ernest Hemingway, Green Hills of Africa
This is a short book with a straightforward premise. i argue that the 
major animal-protection treaties of the early twentieth century are best 
understood as international hunting treaties rather than as conservation 
treaties. By and large, prominent hunters and ex-hunters (“penitent butch-
ers,” in the words of their critics) were the guiding force behind the trea-
ties, and these hunters were often far more concerned with the protection 
of specific hunting grounds and prized prey than with the safeguarding 
of entire habitats, ecosystems, or bioregions. Over time, wildlife managers 
and conservationists tried to tweak these treaties into full-fledged animal-
protection agreements. They discovered, however, that the hunting ethos 
embedded in the treaty texts hampered their efforts, and after 1946, they 
began to push for new approaches based on new premises. The strengths 
and weaknesses of these early treaties and the impact they had (often in-
advertently) on subsequent animal-protection accords comprise the main 
subject matter of this book.
 Wildlife conservationists owe a large debt to Aldo Leopold’s pioneering 
Game Management (1933), for it was this book more than any other that first 
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articulated the parallels between sustainable agriculture and sustainable 
hunting. “Game management,” he wrote, “is the art of making land 
produce sustained annual crops of wild game for recreational purposes.” 
A professional forester, an avid hunter, and an innovative ecologist, Leopold 
took a practical approach to wildlife conservation in the United states: 
game animals should be cultivated, like wheat and corn, their numbers 
augmented for human consumption. “There are still those who shy at this 
prospect of a man-made game crop as at something artificial and therefore 
repugnant,” he noted. “This attitude shows great taste but poor insight. 
Every head of wild life still alive in this country is already artificialized, in 
that its existence is conditioned by economic forces.”1
 Farmers had long ago developed a variety of techniques—seeding, 
weeding, irrigating, fertilizing, fallowing, and the like—to maximize 
their annual yields. “Game cropping,” by contrast, was still in its infancy 
and the tools of the trade largely still experimental and in flux. “history 
shows that game management nearly always has its beginnings in the con-
trol of the hunting factor,” Leopold observed in the staccato-like prose 
for which he was famous: “Other controls are added later. The sequence 
seems to be about as follows: 1. Restriction of hunting. . Predator control. 
3. Reservation of game lands (as parks, forests, refuges, etc.). 4. Artificial 
replenishment (restocking and game farming). 5. Environmental controls 
(control of food, cover, special factors, and disease).”2
 More than seventy years after it first appeared, Game Management is 
still widely read by wardens and foresters—and with good reason, for it 
is both a practical guide for preserving game animals and an early his-
tory of wildlife administration. Like many game managers before and 
since, however, Leopold largely overlooked one of the key tools of animal 
conservation: international treaties. Few game species reside solely within 
the borders of a single country. Most are mobile creatures that crisscross 
national frontiers according to their needs, living at certain times of the 
year in colder and more temperate regions and other times in warmer 
and equatorial ones. hunting laws, predator control, forest reserves, game 
farming, and habitat manipulation are all indispensable tools of conserva-
tion, but they often have little practical value if neighboring countries do 
not take similar measures. Effective game management depends on inter-
regional links, transnational cooperation, and international agreements.
 Governments worldwide have signed nearly fifteen hundred environ-
mental treaties and agreements over the past century, fully half of which 
address the question of wildlife protection directly or indirectly. Many are 
simple bilateral fishing agreements designed to protect a shared river or 
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a common delta. Others entail complex multinational initiatives that at-
tempt to protect individual species or animal groups across many contigu-
ous and noncontiguous countries. still others handle habitat protection 
across thousands of miles, sometimes affecting regions far removed from 
human settlements. Big or small, comprehensive or limited, bilateral or 
multilateral, each treaty testifies to the importance of transnational coop-
eration in the effort to protect the world’s wildlife. Animals recognize no 
political borders: they feed and breed wherever they find suitable niches, 
and they move about the earth according to the dictates of habitat and 
climate, not human whim.3
 This book analyzes several key animal-protection treaties that were 
signed in the first half of the twentieth century. Each was designed to pro-
tect one or more of the world’s most commercially valuable migratory spe-
cies. Each exerted a powerful influence on other treaties in other parts of 
the world. And each had a lasting impact on nature protection worldwide. 
First, i analyze the two treaties that led to the creation of Africa’s nature 
parks: the Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds, and 
Fish in Africa (1900) and the Convention Relative to the Preservation of 
Flora and Fauna in Their Natural state (1933). Then, i examine the two trea-
ties that brought a halt to the slaughter of game birds in North America: the 
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds (1916), signed between 
the United states and Canada, and the Convention between the United 
states of America and the United states of Mexico for the Protection of 
Migratory Birds and Game Mammals (1936). Finally, i look at the three 
failed attempts to protect the world’s whale stocks: the Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling (1931), the international Agreement for the 
Regulation of Whaling (1937), and the international Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (1946). That many of the world’s species today en-
joy a modicum of protection from overhunting (or “overharvesting,” as 
Leopold would prefer) is largely due to the collective impact of these trea-
ties. That many species still hover on the brink of extinction is also largely 
a consequence of the collective limitations of these treaties.4
 The first half of the twentieth century marked the heyday of species-
protection treaties, at least as measured by the sheer number of such trea-
ties that were negotiated, signed, and ratified. But these treaties are only 
explicable within the context of the scientific-technological revolution (or 
“second industrial revolution”) that began in Europe and North America 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The ever-increasing de-
mand for coal, petroleum, lead, copper, tin, ivory, rubber, coffee, bananas, 
tropical oils, and hundreds of other natural resources spawned a great 
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amount of competition among the European powers, pushing them in 
the direction of global imperialism. so did the construction of railroads 
and canals, the development of steel-hulled ships, and the invention of 
nitroglycerin. The result was a “scramble for Africa” that brought the 
sub-saharan regions almost completely under European domination, a 
land rush that turned much of the western United states and Canada into 
cities and irrigated farmland, and a mad dash to Antarctica by the largest 
whaling companies. New killing techniques played a major role as well. 
One thinks here especially of the breech-loading and magazine rifles that 
Europeans took with them to Africa, the double-barreled shotguns that 
U.s. citizens pointed toward the skies of North America, and the grenade-
tipped harpoon gun that Norwegian whalers used with such devastating 
effect on the high seas. Collectively, these forces initiated what can aptly be 
described as a war of extermination against the world’s wildlife.
 No doubt, subsistence and recreational hunters had a modest impact 
on the world’s wildlife stocks in the early twentieth century, but it was 
market hunters who caused the bulk of the devastation. Market hunting 
was (and, on the high seas, remains to this day) essentially an extractive 
industry. Market hunters depleted species the way miners depleted ore 
seams, moving to new sites after exhausting the old ones, thinking only of 
today’s profit and not tomorrow’s patrimony. Behind the killing frenzy in 
Africa was the enormously lucrative trade in ivory, skins, and feathers, with 
ivory commerce alone accounting for most of the profit. Behind the avian 
slaughter in North America were the millineries and meatpacking indus-
tries, which turned millions of birds each year into hats and meat. Behind 
the boom in whale hunting was the demand for edible fats, with millions 
of pounds of blubber ending up as lard and margarine in the kitchens 
of Europe. The wastage was phenomenal. Elephant hunters took only the 
tusks, leaving the carcasses to the buzzards. Bird hunters would sometimes 
wipe out entire rookeries and flocks in a single day, with little thought to 
future migrations. And whalers could lose as much as one-fourth of their 
catch to the treacherous waters of the Antarctic. What made Leopold’s 
Game Management so important was that it called for a more sensible 
model of wildlife conservation, one that replaced the mining mentality of 
the market hunter with the more sustainable model of farming. The goal 
of farmers is not depletion but maximum yield.
 Today, it is relatively easy to distinguish a market hunter from a sport 
hunter or a subsistence hunter, but a hundred years ago, the lines were 
still a bit blurry. sport attracted thousands of Europeans and Americans to 
Africa on safari (Arabic and swahili for “journey” or “caravan”) each year, 
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but few of these hunters showed any qualms about recouping part or all of 
their travel costs by selling tusks and other animal products on the open 
market. similarly, a western settler in the United states or Canada might 
kill one bird species for subsistence, another for sport, and a third for the 
market—sometimes all on the same day. Whaling was more recognizably 
divided into market and subsistence hunting (sport hunting was all but 
nonexistent), but even here, there were crossovers: subsistence hunters of-
ten sold or traded what they did not consume, either to nearby communi-
ties or to faraway markets. By helping to establish different regulations for 
market, sport, and subsistence hunting, the treaties discussed in this book 
played a modest role in the creation of more distinct lines. And by promot-
ing recreational over market and subsistence endeavors, they also helped 
create a hunting hierarchy.
Three words in the title of this book require clarification: game, conserva-
tion, and migratory. The term game derives etymologically from gaman, 
Old high German for “amusement,” a connotation that it still carries 
today. Any activity engaged in for pleasure or diversion—from profes-
sional soccer to church bingo—can be considered a game so long as the 
players adhere to an agreed-upon set of rules. Games are almost always 
associated with a certain amount of levity and frivolity, even if the play-
ers take their pursuit with utter seriousness. Only later did the word game 
become associated with hunting. No doubt this newer usage evolved from 
the amusement that European aristocrats derived from sport hunting, but 
game nowadays refers to any animal that humans hunt on a regular basis, 
whether for pleasure or for subsistence.
 One of the chief purposes of any hunting law or treaty is to spell out 
the “rules of the game” in order to ensure that the prey remain plenti-
ful for future generations of chasers. Fowl-hunting regulations in North 
America offered a success story in that regard. in other cases, however, 
laws and treaties turned out to be “games” in a different sense: they were 
diplomatic “diversions” that provided a legal framework behind which the 
carnage continued. Elephant and rhino hunting in Africa is one prominent 
example, and pelagic whaling in the Antarctic another, for no international 
agreement has ever successfully curtailed the hunt for ivory tusks, rhino 
horns, blubber, and whale meat. The game metaphor can certainly be car-
ried too far, but surely it is worth noting that up to the mid-twentieth 
century, a large portion of ivory tusks were turned into billiard balls (and 
what is more frivolous than a game of pool?); that one of the principal 
motives for killing birds all over the world was to obtain their plumage 
6  | The Game of Conservation
(and what is more frivolous than fashion?); and that whalers often jok-
ingly referred to their annual sojourn to the Antarctic krill grounds as 
the “whaling Olympics” (and what is more frivolous than to declare the 
enterprise that massacred the most whales in the shortest period of time as 
the winner?).5
 Game is a highly problematic term, for there has never been universal 
agreement as to which animals should be targets and which should not. 
Most hunters and conservationists would probably agree that antelopes 
and ducks are game, but what about robins? New England bird-watchers 
always tended to see them as beautiful songbirds, but in the impoverished 
southern United states, they were once considered the main ingredient in 
“robin soup.” Captains of industry could readily defend the use of elephant 
tusks and whale baleen in a wide variety of commodities before the inven-
tion of plastics, but what about afterward? The demand for ivory and ba-
leen continued long after there were readily available substitutes. similarly, 
what genuine economic justification was there for the enormously expen-
sive annual expeditions to the Antarctic, when many common plants—
including palm, coconut, and flax (linseed)—produced edible oils that 
were all but identical to blubber oil? Did whales have to face near extermi-
nation so that there would be one more oil source on the world market? 
The answers to these questions are more political than ecological: the pow-
erful decided what was “fair game”; the powerless did not.
 Game also has a problematic antonym—vermin—defined as any ani-
mal that deserves eradication because it competes in some way with the 
spread of human settlements or agricultural growth. This term has some 
elasticity (elephants are game when hunted for their tusks but vermin 
when they trample crops), but there was always a good deal of consen-
sus about which animals were meant: predators, such as crocodiles, lions, 
bears, wolves, and coyotes, that competed with humans for the same game 
animals or fed on domestic herds. if game and vermin have come to have 
an old-fashioned ring today, this is largely because the term wildlife (origi-
nally wild life) gradually supplanted them. But in the early decades of the 
twentieth century, game and vermin were more commonly invoked in ev-
eryday speech and diplomatic discourse than was wildlife; moreover, there 
was a much greater tendency to see animals as good or bad based on their 
behavior rather than in terms of their contribution to a stable ecosystem. 
(Who today divides feathered species into “game birds,” “birds useful to 
agriculture,” and “crop pests”?)
 The term game law also has an antithesis—lawlessness, better known 
as poaching and (for whaling) pirating. Latin law, upon which both the 
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European and U.s. legal systems were based, viewed a wild animal as res 
nullius, an entity that belonged to no one until it was captured or killed. 
When European and U.s. governments later decided to regulate free-
roaming animals, they were in effect asserting some level of proprietary 
rights over these animals while they were within their territory, much in 
the same way that property owners typically think of animals on their land 
as theirs. Enforcement, however, is no easy matter, so the effectiveness of 
game laws depends in large part on the willingness of most citizens or 
subjects to obey them, as well as on the willingness of authorities to imple-
ment them with force. When there is widespread resentment to a law—
or an easy way to evade it—it will prove ineffective. The battle between 
enforcers (“wardens”) and resisters (“poachers”) is a longstanding one, 
and it is a battle laden with class and ethnic conflict. The introduction 
of game laws in early modern Europe pitted peasants against aristocrats, 
subsistence hunters against sport hunters, and local officials against gov-
ernment regulators. When game laws were introduced in North America, 
many settlers resented the fact that their everyday activities, such as hunt-
ing to put meat on one’s table, had suddenly become criminal acts. When 
Europeans later foisted game laws on their African colonies, the locals 
responded much as European peasants and American settlers had before 
them: they ignored and evaded the laws as best they could. “Every African 
is a poacher,” Kenya’s chief game warden, William hale, would summarily 
pronounce in 1953, without a hint of irony or self-reflection.6
 Environment and ecology are the buzzwords of wildlife protection to-
day, but a century ago, the terms preservation and conservation reigned 
supreme, especially in the Anglo-American world. Preservation is typi-
cally associated with any effort to protect a specific species or a specific 
landscape from economic development or exploitation. This is often seen 
as a “hands-off” attitude to wilderness, but in practice, it was more of a 
“light-touch” approach, since most preservationists fully expected people 
to visit the protected sites and to use them for hiking, recreation, leisure, 
and touring. Conservation, by contrast, implies a commitment to the use of 
natural resources—animals, trees, water, land, minerals, and so forth—in 
a sustainable (typically dubbed “wise”) manner. Preservation was the term 
of choice in the nineteenth century, but conservation began to supplant 
it in the United states and elsewhere during the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt (1901–9).
 Whether a change in terminology brought with it a genuine trans-
formation in attitudes from “hands-off” to “wise-use” is not all that clear 
even in the United states, where the terms were in widespread use. it is 
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even less clear at the international level. The 1900 London Convention, for 
instance, was cast in the language of species preservation, but its chief pur-
pose was to create a sustainable basis for the trade in ivory tusks, animal 
skins, and bird feathers, an idea more associated with conservationism. 
The 1933 London Convention, by contrast, was couched mostly in con-
servationist terminology, but its most lasting impact was to promote the 
establishment of nature parks and game reserves, one of the chief goals of 
the preservationists. similarly, the bird treaties of 1916 and 1936 were long 
on species preservation and short on habitat protection—despite the wise-
use rhetoric that dominated the thinking of U.s. legislators at the time. 
The whaling agreements of 1931, 1937, and 1946 also belie the notion that 
conservationist rhetoric always translates into wise use: these treaties 
offered no protection to individual species until they had already become 
“commercially extinct” (that is, too rare to hunt profitably), while at the 
same time sanctioning the overexploitation of still-plentiful whale species 
under the guise of sustainability. in this book, the terms preservationist and 
conservationist will largely be used interchangeably, much as they were in 
international discourse during the first half of the twentieth century.
 All animals move about in search of food and shelter, but not all are 
considered migratory. Biologists reserve that term to describe species that 
move with the seasons in search of suitable habitat and sustenance. Africa’s 
wet and dry seasons largely dictate the movement of elephants, zebras, 
wildebeests, and other game mammals, most famously on the savannas 
of East Africa (modern-day Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania). in North 
America, heat and cold dictate the movement of swans, ducks, geese, and 
hundreds of other avian species. They “summer” in the northern latitudes 
of the United states and Canada and then “winter” (a well-entrenched mis-
nomer, since they actually move southward to continue their summer) 
in the more equatorial latitudes of the southern United states, Mexico, 
Central America, and south America. This summer-winter pattern is also 
present on the high seas: whales typically feed in the Arctic and Antarctic 
regions when it is warmest there (July in the Arctic, January in Antarctica) 
and then head toward equatorial waters to breed when the poles become 
too cold.
 Diplomats use a more restrictive definition of migration than do bi-
ologists: only those species that regularly cross national borders in their 
seasonal movements come under their purview, whereas those that stay 
within the confines of a single state remain dependent on domestic (or co-
lonial) legislation for protection. This restrictive distinction is often incon-
sequential. Zebras, for instance, inhabit Tanzania’s serengeti National Park 
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during the wet season (November to May) and then move to Kenya’s Masai 
Mara National Reserve during the dry season (June to October). similarly, 
the Canada goose oscillates between its namesake nation and Mexico each 
year, and the American golden plover cycles between northern Alaska and 
the tip of south America. The gray whale, meanwhile, travels nearly ten 
thousand miles between its feeding grounds in the Bering and Chukchi 
seas and its breeding grounds in Baja California, the longest known mi-
gration of any mammal in the world. Animals that migrate thousands 
of miles typically cross many borders on their journey, making them the 
legitimate subject matter of treaty making. Occasionally, however, the term 
migratory has given rise to diplomatic ambiguities and legal challenges. in 
United States v. Lumpkin (191), for example, a federal judge in Georgia 
had to decide whether mourning doves were migratory and therefore sub-
ject to the terms of the 1916 U.s.-Canadian bird treaty or whether they 
were nonmigratory because some flocks never flew far enough north to 
reach Canada during the summer months. (The judge took a pragmatic 
position, ruling that mourning doves were migratory because the treaty 
said so!)
The treaties analyzed in this book cover a wide variety of species over 
a diverse range of animal habitat—on land, on sea, and in the air. The 
African treaties were quintessential colonial accords: they were written by 
European administrators, not African leaders, and they reflected the pri-
orities of colonial officials, not the indigenous populations. On the positive 
side, these treaties attempted to rein in the export trade in animal prod-
ucts and to establish protected sites for females and their young. On the 
negative side, they turned black Africans into poachers and permitted the 
removal of the Masai and other groups from territories designated as na-
ture parks. The North American bird treaties were written mostly by U.s. 
conservationists and ornithologists, and they reflected the needs of U.s. 
hunters more than Canadian and Mexican ones. On the positive side, they 
helped bring an end to the commercial market in food and feathers, which 
was wreaking havoc on avian species worldwide at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. On the negative side, they did little to preserve habitat 
along North America’s four great migration routes (known as the Atlantic, 
Mississippi, Central, and Pacific flyways), and as a result, many protected 
birds today have trouble finding adequate places to feed and rest on their 
journeys. The whaling treaties were conceived and written by the major 
whaling nations, and they were designed to protect the business of whal-
ing. On the positive side, they offered protection to those species that had 
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gone commercially extinct, thereby saving remnant populations of rights, 
bowheads, and grays from complete extermination. On the negative side, 
the international Whaling Commission (iWC)—the regulatory agency es-
tablished in 1946 to protect the stocks for future generations—sat idly by 
as the major whaling companies brought many other whale species (blues, 
fins, and humpbacks, among others) to the brink of commercial extinc-
tion. A treaty that protects a species only after it has been decimated is 
hardly one that can be held up as a positive achievement.
 Despite differences in scope and substance, the African, North 
American, and Antarctic treaties all had much in common. Each began 
as a national endeavor and then evolved into an international agreement. 
Germany (and later Great Britain) was the driving force behind the African 
treaties, the United states behind the bird treaties, and Norway behind the 
whaling treaties. Each treaty also originated as a piece of domestic (or 
colonial) legislation and then grew into something transnational. The 
German East African Game Ordinance of 196—designed to regulate the 
trade in ivory, skins, and feathers in modern-day Tanzania—jump-started 
the establishment of Africa’s nature parks and game reserves. U.s. legisla-
tion, most notably the Lacey Act of 1900 and the Weeks-McLean Law of 
1913, provided the backdrop for the North American bird treaties. And the 
Norwegian Whaling Acts of 199 and 1935 provided almost all of the ver-
biage for the 1931 and 1937 whaling agreements.
 Each treaty also began as a purely utilitarian effort to maximize game 
stocks for the benefit of future generations of hunters and then evolved (for 
better or for worse) into a more all-encompassing conservationist treaty. 
Few diplomats would have predicted, in 1900, that nature parks and game 
reserves would one day become the backbone of African conservationism, 
let alone that these protected areas would attract millions of camera-toting 
tourists each year in search of Eden. Even fewer thought, in 1916, that the 
U.s.-Canadian bird treaty would set the tone for avian protection in North 
America for the rest of the century and even act as a spur for similar bi-
lateral treaties between the United states and Japan (197) and the United 
states and the soviet Union (1976). And no one foresaw, in 1946, that the 
iWC—the lapdog of the major whaling nations—would one day be trans-
formed into an antiwhaling institution, though in fact that is what hap-
pened in 19.
 As the earliest industrial nation and the largest colonial power, Great 
Britain played a central role in formulating most animal-protection trea-
ties in the first half of the twentieth century. The British Colonial Office 
hosted both the 1900 and 1933 African conventions, and British conserva-
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tionists took the lead in establishing many of Africa’s most famous nature 
parks and reserves. The British Foreign Office represented the Dominion of 
Canada (which was still a semicolony) in the negotiations with the United 
states over the 1916 bird treaty. British diplomats also exerted an immense 
influence over the terms of the whaling treaties, in part because Britain 
was a major whaling power (second only to Norway) and in part because 
a British-based consortium, Unilever, enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the 
global whale-oil trade. The U.s. presence deserves to be highlighted as well. 
President Theodore Roosevelt was actively engaged in the movement for 
African conservation, even if his safari excesses were a matter of interna-
tional consternation. The United states played the lead role in the 1916 and 
1936 bird treaties, and it hosted the 1946 whaling conference.
 The strong presence of British and U.s. diplomats in the treaty-
making process meant that Anglo-American notions of animal preser-
vation and conservation tended to emerge victorious. it also meant that 
Anglo-American nongovernmental organizations were able to influence 
the terms of the treaty to a large degree. in Africa, the principal organiza-
tion was the society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire 
(also known as the Fauna society), created in 1903 to lobby for the creation 
of larger game reserves and stricter game laws. it was nominally indepen-
dent, but virtually all of its founding members were prominent states-
men and colonial administrators (not to mention big-game hunters) who 
maintained close ties to the British Foreign and Colonial offices. in North 
America, there were a variety of organizations—including the American 
Ornithologists’ Union, the National Association of Audubon societies, and 
the American Game Protective and Propagation Association—pushing for 
greater international cooperation to protect birds. These organizations 
too were dominated by avid hunters and ex-hunters who were now trying 
to save the animals they had shot with such gusto a few years earlier. The 
first successful international organization—the international Union for 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (iUCN)—also had a 
strong British and U.s. presence; it was active in whaling issues in the 1950s 
and 1960s, though it became active too late to help formulate the treaties 
themselves.
 The lobbying effort of these “penitent butchers” helps explain why 
so many countries around the globe were willing to sign and implement 
these treaties. But the prominence of hunters in the negotiating process 
also helps explain some of the treaties’ inherent weaknesses. They were 
largely designed to establish uniform game regulations across national 
borders so as to provide a level playing field for hunters and to reduce the 
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illegal transport of products across borders (via fencing and smuggling). 
They tended to focus almost exclusively on game animals to the neglect of 
other species. And all too often they paid inadequate attention to habitat 
protection. Africa’s earliest nature parks and game reserves were placed 
in areas that were considered to be economically useless, with little or no 
thought given to the migration routes; as a result, they often provided only 
part-time protection to game animals. similarly, North American game 
hunters and legislators often showed more interest in setting aside land as 
public and private shooting grounds than as bird preserves, an obviously 
self-defeating policy in the long haul. The whaling nations, meanwhile, 
were quite open about the fact that they were willing to accept almost any 
restriction on hunting except the two that made the most sense from the 
perspective of conservation: a species-by-species annual quota based on 
stock size and reproduction rates, and large sanctuaries in key feeding and 
breeding grounds.
 The economic liberalism and political decentralism of the Anglo-
American tradition further limited the efficacy of the treaties. As an ex-
ample, the British government focused almost entirely on the export mar-
ket, and it put its funds into game wardens and customs officials in Africa. 
it largely ignored the import trade, even though the London commodities 
market (where a large portion of the world’s tusks, skins, and feathers were 
auctioned) was headquartered in the same city as the Foreign Office and 
Parliament. similarly, states’ rights advocates in the United states did ev-
erything they could to thwart the bird treaties on the grounds that they 
would augment the power of the federal government at the expense of 
the states; they had a misplaced faith in the willingness of the individual 
states to create a sufficient number of reserves on their own. Though states’ 
righters were ultimately defeated, they did manage to thwart the establish-
ment of the National Wildlife Refuge system for many decades. And by 
that time, farmers had drained many of North America’s premier wetlands, 
the very sites that migratory birds depended upon for their sustenance. 
The U.s. government repeated this mistake at the international level: it 
balked at the prospect of putting real regulatory teeth into the 1946 whal-
ing treaty, relying instead on the so-called free market (which was actually 
a sheltered market) and on the goodwill of the major whaling nations and 
whaling companies—a mistake that proved nearly fatal to animal conser-
vation in the Antarctic.
 issues of sovereignty also played a key role in determining the relative 
efficacy of these treaties. The European colonial powers were willing and able 
to work out agreements with each other, but they had trouble convincing 
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the swahili Arabs who still controlled some of the trade routes that the 1900 
and 1933 African treaties were worth paying attention to; further, they failed 
to bring Africa’s two independent regions, Liberia and Abyssinia (until 
1935), on board. Many corrupt traders and colonial officials (including 
game wardens) were therefore able to circumvent the treaty restrictions 
by utilizing swahili Arab middlemen to smuggle ivory, skins, and feathers. 
similarly, Canada, the United states, and Mexico were able to work out an 
amicable arrangement for protecting birds in North America, but they were 
never able to bring the Caribbean, Central American, or south American 
states into the fold. Bird species with migratory routes that included the 
southern hemisphere were therefore only protected during certain times 
of the year. The whaling treaties were even more problematic. Enforcement 
would have been much easier if one country had controlled all of Antarctica 
or if the waters around that continent were under the jurisdiction of the 
League of Nations or the United Nations. But Antarctica was a continent 
without a people or a government, and the oceans around it belonged to 
no one, so it was child’s play for whaling enterprises (legitimate and pirate 
ones alike) to circumvent the restrictions.
 Given the hurdles, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these trea-
ties is that they came into being at all and that they managed to place some 
restrictions on hunting, even if (as was the case with whales) they could 
not bring a complete halt to the slaughter. “To keep every cog and wheel,” 
Aldo Leopold wrote in Round River, “is the first precaution of intelligent 
tinkering.”7 Judged by this standard, all of the treaties—even the whal-
ing ones—can be judged modestly successful: no African land mammals, 




The word “ivory” rang in the air, was whispered, was sighed.  
You would think they were praying to it.
—Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness
Hermann von Wissmann was one of Germany’s most renowned af-
rican explorers. a travel writer and big-game hunter, Wissmann was best 
known for having traversed the southern Congo basin on behalf of Leopold 
II, king of the Belgians, in the early 1880s. Chancellor otto von Bismarck 
later asked him to govern German east africa (which he did intermittently 
from 1888 to 1896), not least because he was skilled at suppressing colonial 
revolts. outwardly, there was little about Wissmann’s career that distin-
guished him from other african imperialists of his day—richard Burton, 
John Speke, Cecil rhodes, Frederick Courteney Selous, H. m. Stanley, and 
Carl Peters among them—except in one regard: he was the primary cham-
pion of an international conference that would result in the London Con-
vention for the Preservation of Wild animals, Birds, and Fish in africa in 
1900 (hereafter the 1900 London Convention).1
 all of africa’s major colonial powers attended the conference and 
signed the 1900 London Convention: Great Britain, France, Portugal, 
Spain, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. The first four had colonized prior to 
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the 1880s, mostly along the african coastline. Britain’s historical strong-
hold lay in the Cape Colony (the nucleus of today’s republic of South af-
rica), on the continent’s southern tip. The Suez Canal, completed in 1869, 
also gave Britain a toehold in egypt, though that region was still nominally 
under the ottoman empire’s control. algiers (algeria) was France’s most 
important colony, but some of the coastal towns and hinterlands of west-
central africa (the nucleus of Senegal, Gabon, and a few other regions) 
were also within its orbit. Portugal controlled angola on the atlantic side 
of the continent and mozambique on the Indian ocean side. The Spanish 
influence was largely limited to the Canary Islands and a couple of specks 
(Ceuta and Fernando Po) along the northern and western coastline.2
 Belgium, Germany, and Italy were new colonial powers. The Belgian 
presence began in the mid-1880s when Leopold II took possession of the 
Congo Free State (later Zaire and now the Democratic republic of the 
Congo), deep in the heart of africa, and ruled it as his personal fiefdom. a 
brutal overlord even by european standards, Leopold II turned his Congo 
colony into a rubber-, copper-, and ivory-producing sweatshop until his 
death in 1909, when it was turned over to a much-embarrassed Belgian 
government to administer. Germany’s presence in africa also began in the 
mid-1880s, when Bismarck took possession of German east africa (roughly 
Tanzania minus Zanzibar), German Southwest africa (namibia), Togo-
land (Togo and part of Ghana), and the Cameroons (Cameroon and part 
of nigeria). The Italians seized most of Somaliland (Somalia) in 188.3
 The colonization of africa proceeded slowly until the 1880s, but once 
the parvenu powers arrived, european statesmen began meeting periodi-
cally to settle their differences and forge common policies. at the Berlin 
Conference (1884–8), they established the rules of the game for future 
landgrabs, agreeing that colonizing governments had to take real posses-
sion of the land they claimed with settlers and troops, not just take paper 
possession through fanciful maps and colorful flags. Following the prin-
ciple of so-called free trade, they also banned import and transit duties in 
the colonized territories and set up the framework for future consultations 
among the colonial powers. Four years later, at the Brussels Conference 
(1889), they decided to stamp out the internal slave trade, which was still 
extant in Zanzibar and some other arab-controlled regions of africa. They 
also decided to restrict the types of firearms and ammunition that could be 
sold to black africans between the twentieth parallel north and twentieth 
parallel south (roughly south of the Sahara and north of Boer territory) and 
to sanction the introduction of colonial gun licenses and big-game hunting 
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restrictions. a few years later, the Congo Free State, France, and Portugal 
met separately to sign and ratify the Congo Basin Convention (1892), which 
created uniform export duties on elephant tusks in the regions under their 
control. The 1900 London conference was the last of these meetings to oc-
cur before the outbreak of World War I. It was designed to create uniform 
hunting ordinances throughout colonial africa and to jump-start a net-
work of nature parks and game reserves.
 The Berlin Conference triggered a “scramble for africa,” a frenzied at-
tempt by leaders of the various colonizing powers to lay claim to as much 
territory as possible before the other powers beat them to it. By 1900, most 
of sub-Saharan africa (excepting ethiopia and Liberia) was under euro-
pean suzerainty. The Brussels Conference, meanwhile, made it easier for 
europeans to suppress colonial revolts by depriving local africans of access 
to modern european weaponry. It also had the inadvertent consequence 
of forcing african hunters to rely on “traditional” hunting techniques and 
equipment (spears, pits, traps, poisons, outdated muskets, and the like), 
while allowing europeans to use “modern” ones (such as high-powered 
rifles, machine guns, modern ammunition, and scopes). The Congo Basin 
Convention, finally, created an economic bond among the Congo colo-
nists, one based largely on the ivory trade. For decades thereafter, Belgium, 
France, and Portugal thwarted all efforts to curb the commerce in tusks.
 on the positive side, these diplomatic agreements suggested that 
european colonists shared a common vision about economic develop-
ment, natural-resource use, and conservation. on the negative side, the 
europeans arrived as conquerors, not as equals, and they showed little 
understanding of, or sympathy with, african cultures and traditions. 
Contradictions abounded. The europeans made it illegal for africans 
to acquire modern weaponry—and then demonized them for using 
“primitive” hunting techniques. They usurped pastoral and agricultural 
space for their own cattle and fields—and then looked askance when af-
ricans relied on wild animals (“bush meat”) for their daily sustenance. 
They turned traditional hunting grounds into nature parks and game 
reserves—and then complained when africans continued to hunt there. 
Policies that stigmatized the traditions of indigenous peoples under the 
banner of conservation and modernization were not ones that promised 
much compliance, at least not in the short run.
 Today, the full spectrum of species that once roamed freely across 
africa is preserved only in the continent’s three-hundred-some national 
parks and natural reserves. although these parks and reserves include only 
a small fraction of tropical africa’s landmass, they are nonetheless not 
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small in themselves, especially when compared to other protected regions 
in the world today.4 The largest national park in the United States, Denali 
(in alaska), is around ,400 square miles in size. By contrast, Kruger na-
tional Park in South africa is nearly 8,000 square miles; the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park, which straddles South africa, mozambique, and Zim-
babwe, is 13,00 square miles; and the Selous Game reserve in Tanzania is 
over 19,000 square miles. 
Figure 1.1  Map of Africa with major national parks and nature reserves today.  
(Source: Oliver and Crowder,  Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa)
Figure 1.1. map of africa with major national parks and nature reserves. adapted from 
roland oliver and michael Crowder, eds., Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 313.
Figure 1.2. national parks and nature reserves in east africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanza-
nia). L. a. Lewis and L. Berry, African Environments and Resources (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988), 18. reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis.
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Figure 1.2  National parks and nature reserves in East Africa (Kenya, 
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 These parks are a direct legacy of european colonial rule, and they 
cater mostly to european and american tourists, so it is not surprising that 
black africans today often refer to them as “white man’s parks.” equally 
apt, however, is the less frequently heard name “apartheid parks,” for the 
parks were established along the same model used in the United States and 
elsewhere: indigenous populations were, for the most part, removed from 
the protected areas and new groups forbidden to migrate there, the only 
permanent inhabitants being animals and plants. The pecking order out-
side the parks was white settler, indigenous black african, and wild animal, 
with the indigenous populations being only slightly above the wildlife in 
the minds of many colonists. The pecking order inside the parks was tour-
ist, animal, and indigenous black. racism allowed the european colonists 
to view africans as a part of the “natural” landscape and thus subject to the 
same brute-force relocations and control technologies they employed to 
subjugate the nonhuman world.
 Just as europeans carved up the african continent with little regard for 
its geographic, climatic, and faunal divisions (or its linguistic, ethnic, and 
traditional frontiers), they paid scant attention to the migratory patterns 
of african wildlife when they established these parks. european political 
and economic needs, not ecology, determined the border lines: an ideal 
nature park or game reserve, in the eyes of most colonial administrators, 
was one located on land that was deemed economically useless because it 
was disease infested, devoid of minerals and other resources, unsuitable 
for agriculture, or otherwise ill-adapted for white settlement. Few asked 
whether game animals were actually plentiful in these locations, whether 
there were sufficient food and water resources within the park boundaries, 
or even whether the areas were large enough to sustain the migratory pat-
terns of the animals that were allegedly being protected. The end result was 
a hodgepodge of poorly placed, ill-designed “megazoos” that offered only 
part-time protection for migrating herds.
 When Bernard Grzimek (director of the Frankfurt Zoo), for example, 
undertook the first comprehensive aerial survey of animal populations in 
Serengeti in the 190s, he discovered that there was almost no congruity be-
tween the park’s borders and animal-migration routes: at no time of the year 
were all of the Serengeti herds inside the park, but at certain times of the 
year, there were virtually none.5 Similarly, the proximity of nairobi Park 
to Kenya’s capital city made it a favorite destination for tourists after it 
was created in the 1940s, but its small size (a mere forty square miles) made 
it wholly unsuitable for protecting africa’s mammals (though lions used the 
park as an entry point into the city suburbs, much to the consternation of the 
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inhabitants!).6 other parks faced variations on these problems. For the eu-
ropeans to have created something more viable, they first would have had 
to remove their political and cultural blinders and create protected areas that 
were feasible from an ecological and cultural point of view. Yet at no time 
did the colonists seriously contemplate leaving vast tracts of african land 
to the local peoples and the indigenous animals or minimizing the impact 
of their own disruptive presence—even in the newly colonized regions of 
africa where there were still few european settlers. a pecking order along 
the lines of indigenous african, indigenous wildlife, and white colonist did 
not conform to their racialized worldviews.
 Ill-conceived or not, these national parks and natural reserves were 
created through a considerable amount of european diplomacy, and they 
remain to this day, as the Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa (1981) has suc-
cinctly noted, “the backbone of nature conservation in africa.”7 Wissmann 
was the first to champion an international hunting convention, but he was 
merely giving voice to what many other imperialists were themselves com-
ing to realize: that africa’s animal herds migrated at will across the newly 
created frontiers of the British, French, Portuguese, German, Belgian, and 
Italian colonies; that Swahili arab, Indian, and european traders bought 
and sold animal products throughout the continent, following the dictates 
of international commerce and not the requirements of sustainable game 
cropping; and that no individual colonial government could hope to regu-
late the trade in ivory, skins, and feathers by itself. even Great Britain’s 
leaders, who controlled the lion’s share of african colonies and (by way 
of the London auction houses) much of the ivory trade, understood the 
limits of unilateralism. That is why they quickly seized the initiative from 
the Germans; hosted the two major conferences on wildlife conservation; 
and became the driving force behind countless african game ordinances, 
tsetse fly conferences, and wildlife-management projects in the first half of 
the twentieth century.
Africa’s “Big Game”
european colonists had been fascinated by the broad spectrum of wild 
fauna that flourished in the forests and savannas of sub-Saharan africa—
elephants, rhinos, buffaloes, lions, leopards, giraffes, hippos, apes, baboons, 
and gazelles, to name but a few—long before Leopold II and others seized 
control of the continent’s interior in the late nineteenth century. So large 
were their numbers and so great their variety that each new wave of immi-
grants tended to view the continent as a vast animal eden, a realm shaped 
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by nature rather than culture. But the supposedly pristine africa that so 
many europeans saw when they arrived on the continent was the africa of 
myth: the continent was, in reality, a cultural landscape, a terrain shaped 
and reshaped over millennia by human agency. Indigenous africans con-
stantly transformed the ecosystems through their daily activities, most es-
pecially through cattle keeping, agriculture, and fire setting. Fire was used 
to destroy tsetse fly habitat, to thwart forest growth, to clear pastureland, 
and to promote the spread of the game-rich savannas. many of the grass-
filled plains that europeans mistook for natural were in fact culturally pro-
duced landscapes, game-cropping regions created and maintained by an 
annual fire regime.8
 Yet africa’s animal populations were so hearty and the continent’s 
terrain was so varied and spectacular that successive generations of eu-
ropean intruders could easily convince themselves they had arrived in 
a pristine place. and the sense of cultural superiority they carried with 
them was so strong and their prejudices against the indigenous africans 
were so deep that they readily overlooked the role of human agency in the 
regions they encountered. When former president Theodore roosevelt 
visited africa in 1909 on safari, he saw a landscape awash in nature but 
not teeming with people:
In these greatest of the world’s great hunting grounds there are 
mountain peaks whose snows are dazzling under the equatorial 
sun; swamps where the slime oozes and bubbles and festers in 
the steaming heat; lakes like seas; skies that burn above deserts 
where the iron desolation is shrouded from view by the waver-
ing mockery of the mirage; vast grassy plains where palms and 
thorn-trees fringe the dwindling streams; mighty rivers rushing 
out of the heart of the continent through the sadness of endless 
marshes; forests of gorgeous beauty, where death broods in the 
dark and silent depths.9
Similarly, when Sir Julian Huxley went to africa for the first time in 1929, 
he saw “a continent which had hardly changed in the last five hundred 
years.”10 and as late as the 190s, Bernard Grzimek would claim: “africa 
belongs to all who take comfort from the thought that there are still wild 
animals and virgin lands on earth.”11
 Colonists tended to classify africa’s mammals through the hierarchy of 
the hunt. at the top were the so-called trophy animals, most importantly the 
“big five”: the lion, leopard, elephant, rhino, and (Cape) buffalo, all highly 
22  | The Game of Conservation
prized because they were rare, elusive, or dangerous. other trophy animals 
included the zebra, giraffe, and eland. Though not as difficult to hunt as 
the big five, they were still prized for their skins, antlers, or heads. Below 
them were the “pot” animals—most notably, the smaller antelopes—that 
seemed ready-made for shooting, if more for the meat than for the acco-
lades. at the bottom were the “vermin”—a group that included the baboon, 
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Figure 1.3  Ivory exports from the Congo colonies 
between 1888 and 1909. Total annual exports grew nearly 
every year, from 101,746 kilograms in 1888 to 379,465 
kilograms in 1909.  (Source: Kunz, Commerce of Ivory)
1888 54,812 18,658 28,276 
1889 113,532 3,601 9,284
1890 180,605 6,305 9,412
1891 141,775 16,661 7,469
1892 186,521 4,815 3,205
1893 185,993 3,142 1,287
1894 252,083 7,238 1,192
1895 292,232 24,381 101
1896 191,316 50,738 464
1897 245,824 53,908 477
1898 215,963 84,402 254
1899 291,731 78,800 103
1900 262,665 118,434 117
1901
1902 249,307 133,491 160
1903
1904 166,948 132,406 21
1905 211,338 152,986 40
1906 178,207 131,424 74
1907 203,583 143,355 369
1908 228,757 138,345 411
1909 243,823 135,237 405
 YEAR  WEIGHT WEIGHT WEIGHT
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Figure 1.3. Ivory exports from the Congo colonies between 1888 and 1909. Total annual 
exports grew nearly every year, from 101,46 kilograms in 1888 to 39,46 kilograms in 
1909. George Frederick Kunz, Ivory and the Elephant in Art, in Archaeology, and in Sci-
ence (Garden City, nY: Doubleday, 1916), 463.
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wild dog, and hyena, as well as the lion and leopard (two of the big five). 
many colonists favored their wholesale extermination because they fed on 
domesticated livestock or competed with hunters for the same game, even if 
it meant that the big five would one day become the big three.12
 africa’s mammals can be more scientifically divided into three broad 
groups: primates, carnivores, and ungulates (hoofed animals). africa’s 
primates (humans aside) include the ape, monkey, bush baby, and lemur, 
most of which prefer the continent’s tropical rain forests and mountains to 
its open savannas. only the gorilla and the chimpanzee (both apes) were 
prized targets in the early twentieth century, and they were also the only 
primates to receive some protective status in the african treaties of 1900 
and 1933. The second group, carnivores, are (as their name suggests) meat-
eating predators that live on other animals. not surprisingly, the list of 
africa’s carnivores—mongoose, hyena, leopard, lion, cheetah, fox, jackal, 
wild dog, weasel, and otter—is all but identical with the category of so-
called vermin mammals. Few of these animals received any sympathy from 
colonial settlers—or, for that matter, protection from turn-of-the-century 
conservationists.13
 The third broad group—ungulates—can be subdivided into rumi-
nants and nonruminants. ruminants are even-toed ungulates that feed 
on plant tissues and fibers, and they include the antelope, buffalo, and 
giraffe. antelope (hollow-horned members of the Bovidae family) are by 
far the most plentiful ruminants; they come in a wide variety of sizes and 
shapes, including the duiker, steenbok, gazelle, springbok, reedbuck, wa-
terbuck, rhebok, roan, sable, oryx, hartebeest, topi, blesbok, bontebok, wil-
debeest (gnu), impala, bushback, kudu, bongo, and eland. ruminants tend 
to be niche-specific: they have a highly specialized diet (such as the leaf of 
a specific tree species) that limits their breeding range. But their general 
preference for grasslands and their proclivity to run in groups and herds 
for safety make them one of the most common animals on the african 
savannas. The nonruminant ungulates are older (in evolutionary terms) 
than the ruminants and also better adapted to eating a broader variety of 
vegetation and tolerating a wider variety of habitats. They include some of 
the most coveted trophy animals—the hippo, rhino, zebra, and elephant 
(a near ungulate)—as well as some less desirable ones, such as the bushpig 
and warthog.14
 no animal is more identified with the continent than the african 
elephant (Loxodonta africana), the world’s largest land mammal and also 
the world’s main source of ivory. an herbivore, it uses its tusks—elongated 
teeth that continue to grow throughout its lifetime at a rate of nearly one 
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Figure 1.4 Weight in kilograms of ivory 
auctioned at Antwerp and London from 
1886 to 1913. (Source: Kunz, Commerce of 
Ivory)
Figure 1.4. Weight in kilograms of ivory auctioned at antwerp and London from 1886 
to 1913. George Frederick Kunz, Ivory and the Elephant in Art, in Archaeology, and in Sci-
ence (Garden City, nY: Doubleday, 1916), 46.
Africa’s Apartheid Parks  | 2
pound per year—to grub roots and to strip bark from trees. elephants are 
famous for bulldozing their way through forest and brush (not to men-
tion plantations and fields) as they migrate long distances in search of food 
and water. Their natural range includes all of sub-Saharan africa, though 
hunting and habitat loss have severely restricted their movements today.
 There are two subspecies of african elephant. The bush elephant is 
the larger of the two: it can attain a weight well over ten thousand pounds 
and reach a height of eleven feet. Its tusks, especially when small, are “soft,” 
making them ideal for carving. mature tusks become long and heavy (in 
the 1890s, an average tusk in east africa weighed nearly sixty pounds).15 
The forest elephant has a round ear and is smaller than a bush elephant, 
averaging around seven thousand pounds and attaining a height of nine 
feet. Its tusks are also shorter and characteristically “harder” (more brittle). 
Its range is largely confined to the Congo basin and West africa, though it 
can be found as far east as Uganda.16
 elephant herds are matriarchal. The oldest breeding cow is the leader, 
and the herd has around ten members, mostly calves, adolescents, and 
adult daughters. The twenty-two-month gestation period is unusually 
long for a mammal, as is the two-year suckling period. a cow can produce 
ten or more children across a lifetime that averages fifty to sixty years, so 
many females spend a considerable amount of their adulthood gestating 
or lactating. Females stay with the herd for life, but males strike off on 
their own upon reaching puberty at twelve to fifteen years, though they 
may join other herds for periods of time. When the matriarch is injured 
or killed, the rest of the herd is reluctant to abandon her, an instinct that 
often proved fatal to the entire herd in an era when get-rich-quick ivory 
predators roamed the continent.17
 Before the widespread use of high-powered rifles and scopes, elephant 
hunting was a hazardous enterprise. many africans simply left these ani-
mals alone and sought their protein from more easily procured sources, 
but some groups specialized in killing elephants for subsistence and (once 
there was a thriving export market) for profit. The main obstacles to a 
successful hunt were the elephant’s intimidating size, sharp tusks, good 
sense of smell, and thick hide, which, taken together, made it difficult to get 
close enough to land a deadly blow. The Waata (of Kenya) overcame these 
hurdles by using a powerful poison derived from the acocanthera tree. 
Hunters placed the poison on the tips of their arrows, covered themselves 
with elephant dung to disguise their smell, and then crept into the herd be-
fore taking their shots. once an arrow pierced the hide, the poison would 
flow into the intestinal cavity, inducing cardiac arrest almost instantly. The 
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nyoro (of Uganda) used a different tactic: they attached a trip wire to a 
large and heavy iron spear, which they positioned along an elephant trail; 
once the elephant’s foot struck the wire, the spear would plunge into its 
neck or spinal cord. other groups used rope traps, designed to lasso a leg. 
once the lasso brought the animal to a standstill, it could be speared or 
hacked to death. Still other groups employed a pitfall, a deep pit lined with 
upward-pointing spears. Setting a fire to induce a directed stampede was 
an indiscriminate but often effective method as well. many africans also 
acquired firearms and ammunition, typically in exchange for ivory; for the 
most part, however, these were old-fashioned muzzle-loaders, often used 
in conjunction with, rather than instead of, traditional methods.18
 Belgian  French  Portugese
  Congo  Congo  Congo 
Figure 1.x Ivory Exports from the Congo Colonies of Leopold II 
(Belgium), France, and Portugal.  The total annual exports grew 
steadily, from 101,746 kilograms in 1888 to 379,465 kilograms in 
1909, suggesting that efforts to control the ivory trade were 
almost entirely ineffective.  Data for 1901 and 1903 were not 
available.  Source: Kunz, Commerce of Ivory, pp. 463-64.  
1896 1,091,100 $2,226,804 $2.04
1897 1,028,800 2,048,863 1.99
1898 1,000,200 1,990,838 1.99
1899 993,900 1,959,499 1.96
1900 988,900 1,933,334 1.95
1901 882,500 1,628,160 1.84
1902 1,082,100 1,931,332 1.78
1903 924,100 1,648,438 1.78
1904 904,500 1,754,293 1.94 
1905 1,055,000 2,058,469 1.95
1906 985,500 1,978,042 2.01
1907 1,078,700 2,718,693 2.52 
1908 934,500 2,094,700 2.24
1909 1,155,500 2,590,215 2.24
1910 1,120,000 2,397,833 2.14
Totals 15,225,300 $30,959,513 $2.03
   WEIGHT  VALUE AVERAGE VALUE  
 YEAR IN POUNDS IN DOLLARS PER POUND
Figure 1.5 Total imports of animal ivory into Great Britain from 1896 to 
1910.  Belgium, France, and Egypt were Britain's major suppliers. 
(Source: Kunz, Commerce of Ivory)
Figure 1.5. Total imports of animal ivory into Great Britain from 1896 to 1910. Bel-
gium, France, and egypt were Britain’s major suppliers. George Frederick Kunz, Ivory 
and the Elephant in Art, in Archaeology, and in Science (Garden City, nY: Doubleday, 
1916), 4.
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 The europeans did not create a new trade in african ivory in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century: rather, they usurped the already existing 
trade that Swahili arab and Indian merchants pursued with local african 
groups. The principal trading center was the island of Zanzibar (now part 
of Tanzania) in the Indian ocean, which was then under the control of the 
sultans of the omani dynasty. The island specialized in three interrelated 
“products”: slaves, ivory, and cloves. The slave trade itself peaked in the 
1860s and then gradually declined, but Swahili arab and Indian merchants 
continued to rely on slave labor to transport tusks from africa’s interior to 
Zanzibar and also to work the clove plantations. Hamed bin muhammad 
el murjebi, better known by the nickname “Tippu Tip” (meaning “The 
Sound of Guns”), was the most famous of these Swahili arab merchants, 
but there were hundreds of lesser-known figures with equally menacing 
nicknames (“The Locust,” “The oppressor,” “The Finisher”) who plied in 
“black and white ivory” alongside him. more often than not, the europe-
ans who opened up africa’s interior to exploitation were merely follow-
ing the slave-and-ivory routes that Swahili arab and Indian traders had 
long ago blazed (richard Burton, John Speke, David Livingstone, H. m. 
Stanley, and e. Lovett Cameron all launched their expeditions from Zan-
zibar). at first, the Swahili arab and Indian traders found plenty of ivory 
in the coastal regions, but as hunters decimated one herd after the next, 
the ivory-and-slave routes began to stretch deep into the interior. The first 
merchants reached Lake Tanganyika in the mid-1820s, Uganda a few years 
later, and the Lualaba river (Upper Congo basin) a few years after that, 
creating three intermediary ivory marts at nyangwe, Ujiji, and Kazeh along 
the way.19
 If Zanzibar was controlled by arabs, the global ivory trade was handled 
mostly by Indian merchants. They shipped tusks from Zanzibar to Bom-
bay (now mumbai), at that time the world’s ivory entrepôt, and from there 
to other parts of India or to China, europe, and the United States. In India, 
the hollow middle part of the tusk (known as bamboo ivory) was highly 
valued, as it was ideal for the production of Hindu wedding bracelets (ban-
gles). In europe and the United States, the solid tip was most valuable, as 
it could be transformed into billiard balls. Ivory was also used around the 
world in the production of artistic figurines, as well as in the production of 
piano keys, knife handles, buttons, and other common items.
 By the 1880s, european ivory traders—H. m. Stanley, emin Pasha, and 
alfred Swann among them—had begun to eclipse Tippu Tip and his fellow 
merchants. Tippu Tip lost his hunting grounds in the Congo to the Belgian 
king, in Tanganyika to Germany, and in Uganda to Great Britain, all during 
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the “scramble.” even Zanzibar itself fell into British hands in 1890. To the 
victors went the spoils: mombasa (in British-controlled Kenya) and Dar 
es Salaam (in German east africa) replaced Zanzibar as ivory trading cen-
ters, just as London and antwerp replaced Bombay as world auction sites.20 
From then on, europeans arrived en masse to hunt in africa, dreaming of 
ivory glory. They came in steel-hulled ships with plenty of cargo space for 
tusks; they built railroads to connect the ivory interior to the ivory ports; 
and they carried “elephant guns,” rifles so powerful that one well-placed 
shot to the head or the heart sufficed to bring an animal down (though 
“bang bang” shooters far outnumbered crack shots).
 many observers assumed the end was near. “The question of the disap-
pearance of the elephant here and throughout africa is, as everyone knows, 
only a question of time,” Henry Drummond, the author of Tropical Af-
rica, lamented in 1889: “The african elephant has never been successfully 
tamed, and is therefore a failure as a source of energy. as a source of ivory, 
on the other hand, he has been but too great a success.”21 Carl Schilling, 
author of the popular With Flashlight and Rifle, made a similar declara-
tion in 190: “The day is not far distant when it will be asked, ‘Quid novi 
ex Africa?’ [What’s the news from africa?] and the reply will be, ‘The last 
african elephant has been killed.’ ”22
 That their predictions did not come true—in regard to elephants or 
any other big game—was largely due to the willingness of european states-
men and conservationists to curb the slaughter before it was too late.
Wildlife Conservation before 1900
It is paradoxical that africa’s modern conservation movement began with 
the european scramble for africa, for the white colonists were more de-
structive on a larger scale over a shorter period of time than any group 
that preceded them. The southern african experience offered a foretaste of 
things to come. The Dutch Boers (meaning “farmers”) who founded Cape 
Town in 162 named the regions they settled after the animals they found 
there: elandsberg, rhenoster, oliphant’s river, Quagga Fontein, Gemsbok, 
Leeuw Spruit, and the like.23 By the time Britain took control of the Cape 
Colony in 1814 (and the Boers trekked to the natal, Transvaal, and orange 
Free State in the 1830s), the place-names, as the missionary-explorer David 
Livingstone later observed, were already beginning to become but cruel 
reminders of the eland, rhinos, elephants, quagga, gemsbok, and lions 
that had once abounded there. most of these animals could still be found 
in southern africa, albeit in greatly diminished numbers, but not all of 
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them had survived the colonists’ assault. The blaauwbok (Hippotragus 
leucophaeus), an antelope with a blue velvet coat, was last seen at the end of 
the eighteenth century; indigenous to southern africa, it was a favorite tar-
get for hunters before it went extinct. The quagga (Equus quagga quagga), 
a subspecies of the plains zebra found only in southern africa, died out in 
1883; its demise came at the hands of farmers, who saw it as a competitor 
to their sheep and who turned its hide into grain sacks. meanwhile, two 
once-common animals were well on their way to becoming regionally ex-
tinct: the Cape lion (Felis leo melanochaitus), which could no longer be 
found south of the orange river by the end of the nineteenth century, 
and the Southern Burchell’s zebra (Equus burchelli), which disappeared 
from southern africa early in the twentieth century. other species, notably 
the Cape mountain zebra (Equus zebra), the bontebok (Damaliscus pygar-
gus), and the white-tailed gnu (Connochaetes gnu), were endangered. The 
South african wild ostrich (Struthio camelus)—hunted for its feathers and 
eggs—would have been endangered but for the fact that the local colonists 
domesticated it for commercial profit.
 Like most farmers and pastoralists, the colonists had an ambivalent re-
lationship to the local wildlife. on the one hand, they did everything they 
could to eradicate these creatures from areas under cultivation (“clean-
ing” the land, in Boer terminology). Wild animals were deemed nuisances 
or vermin: lions and leopards ate sheep, elephants and zebras marauded 
crops, and antelopes and gazelles competed for grazing space with cattle. 
on the other hand, many of these same farmers also depended on the con-
sumption or sale of elephant ivory, rhino horn, hippo teeth, ostrich feath-
ers, and antelope meat for their economic well-being, and so, the pros-
pect of complete extinction was cause for alarm. To ensure a modicum 
of sustainability, the Cape Colony introduced game legislation (a closed 
season, protection for immature animals, antitrespassing measures) for the 
elephant, hippopotamus, and bontebok in 1822. In the Transvaal, the first 
game-protection measure came in 1846, and more legislation followed in 
188, 1891, and 1894.24
 For the most part, these early game laws served the colonists poorly as 
conservation measures: they protected only those species that were impor-
tant for subsistence hunting (“for the pot,” in the language of the day) or 
had a well-recognized commercial value, while at the same time singling 
out any species that trampled crops or preyed on game for complete eradi-
cation. They did, however, accomplish one thing: they fostered a network 
of early game reserves (some of which later became national parks), which 
offered a measure of protection for a wide variety of species that were 
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neither game nor vermin. The natal established the Hluhluew, St. Lucia, 
and Umfolozi reserves in 189. The Transvaal established the Pongola Game 
reserve in 1894 and the Sabi reserve in 1898. a volksraad proclamation of 
189, which gave rise to the Sabi reserve, told the tale:
The undersigned, seeing that nearly all big game in this 
republic have been exterminated, and that those animals 
still remaining are becoming less day by day, so that there is 
a danger of their becoming altogether extinct in the near fu-
ture, request to be permitted . . . to discuss the desirability of 
authorizing the Government to proclaim as a Government 
Game reserve, where killing of game shall altogether be pro-
hibited, certain portions of the district of Lydenburg, be-
ing Government land, where most of the big game species 
are still to be found, to wit the territory situated between the 
Crocodile and the Sabi rivers.25
Ironically, the crocodiles in the Crocodile river received no protection. 
They were “vermin” and therefore worthy of eradication.
 South african colonists managed to wreak much of their eco-havoc 
with the use of inaccurate and slow-firing muzzle rifles. By the time a new 
influx of europeans colonized africa in the 1880s, breech-loading and maga-
zine rifles were in common use. These were high-velocity weapons powerful 
enough, owing to their accuracy and rapid-fire capabilities, to obliter-
ate entire herds in a short period of time. moreover, though colonists still 
hunted primarily for meat and profit, the ritualized sporting enterprise—
the safari—had come into vogue among europe’s privileged classes.26 The 
most fashionable safari sites were British east africa (Kenya) and German 
east africa (Tanzania), though British Uganda and many other colonies 
saw an upswing in visitors as well. Safari enterprises, mostly headquartered 
in nairobi and Dar es Salaam, proved enormously profitable and helped 
spur the colonial economy: a typical two-month safari in 1910 cost $1,00 
(roughly equal to $30,000 today) and employed thirty or more black ser-
vants as headmen, gun bearers, cooks, butlers, horse boys, and porters.27
 While rich europeans went on safaris, the less well to do sojourned in 
africa to prospect for gold and diamonds; to establish coffee, cotton, and 
banana plantations; or to pursue dozens of other commercial and industrial 
enterprises. The influx of whites in turn fueled a railroad-building craze 
reminiscent of that in the american and Canadian West a half century ear-
lier. The Germans built the Central railway from the port of Dar es Salaam 
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to Kigoma (Lake Tanganyika), while the British built the Uganda railway 
from the port of mombasa to Kisumu (Lake victoria). The railroads made 
it possible to establish new white settlement communities—in the Kenyan 
Highlands, for example—at the expense of game territory and black afri-
can hunting grounds. railroads also made it possible for white hunters to 
enjoy an ersatz safari in the african interior. “Thanks to the Uganda rail-
road, many government roads and bridges, and a network of well-defined 
native paths,” richard Tjader, a big-game hunter, wrote in 1910, “most parts 
of the country are now easily, comfortably, and safely reached, so that even 
ladies may greatly enjoy a short sojourn in the Protectorate.”28
 europeans used terms such as the white man’s burden, mission civilisa-
trice (civilizing mission), and Kultur (culture) to justify their presence, but 
local blacks (and medical historians) remember the years from 1890 to 1930 
more as a time of epidemic disease rather than enlightenment and pros-
perity. outbreaks of cholera and smallpox hit eastern africa in the 1890s, 
decimating indigenous populations. rinderpest, a cattle virus, as well as 
many lesser-known animal diseases, attacked domestic and wild herds at 
the same time. many wild species were immune to rinderpest, but the buf-
falo, eland, kudu, and zebra were not, and they succumbed to the disease 
in large numbers. Cholera, smallpox, and rinderpest had immediate social 
consequences, for the pathogens sapped the military strength and economic 
viability of the masai, ngoni, and other african groups and starved the sur-
vivors into submission. “Through all this great plain we passed carcasses of 
buffalo,” Frederick Lugard, one of Britain’s most celebrated elephant hunt-
ers, wrote in his diaries as he traveled through Kavirondo, “and the vast 
herds of which I had heard, and which I hoped would feed my hungry 
men, were gone! The breath of the pestilence had destroyed them as utterly 
as the Westerners of Buffalo Bill and his crew and the corned-beef factories 
of Chicago have destroyed the bison of america.”29 It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the masai used the word Emutai (derived from a-mut, meaning 
“to finish off”) to describe their experience with this devastation.30
 It is highly unlikely that any single east african species was in danger of 
extinction at the beginning of the twentieth century. The white population 
of east africa was minuscule compared to that of South africa. Kenya had 
just 600 white settlers in 190, a number that would grow to just 9,61 settlers 
by 1921. as late as 1946, the white population was still under 2,000.31 In 1911, 
Germany’s four africa colonies (east africa, Southwest africa, Cameroons, 
and Togoland) had a white population of 20,000 in a lebensraum of 1 million 
square miles.32 Safaris, moreover, were an exclusive adventure of the rich, 
and even in the 1920s (the peak decade for their popularity), they accounted 
32  | The Game of Conservation
for only a small fraction of the total game killed. Though rinderpest deci-
mated the buffalo and eland population in the 1890s, Uganda administrators 
felt compelled to remove buffalo from the endangered list a scant decade 
later, the herds having multiplied so fast that they had become “not only a 
constant nuisance, but also a serious danger to the people.”33 nonetheless, 
Wissmann and many other colonial administrators understood that the cu-
mulative impact of extravagant safaris, white settlements, and disease posed 
a long-term danger to the herds, and they moved the issue of african game 
conservation to the top of their colonial agendas.
 The most important of the new colonial laws was the German east af-
rican Game ordinance of 1896, which Wissmann wrote and promulgated. 
Though the measure was short-lived (Wissmann’s successor as governor 
lifted it a couple of years later), it nevertheless served as a model for game 
laws and natural reserves elsewhere in africa and also as a focal point for 
international negotiations. “I have too often seen how every european who 
possesses a gun on board a Congo steamer fires in the most reckless fashion, 
especially at hippopotami, without having any regard as to whether or not 
he can possess himself of the animal when killed,” Wissmann wrote in 189 
to Baron oswald Freiherr von richthofen (head of the German Colonial 
office from 1896 to 1898). “I have seen so much big game killed or mortally 
wounded in this wanton fashion, and, indeed, only by europeans.”34 He 
convinced the Colonial office that the time had come not just to restrict 
hunting but also to “turn some of the game-rich areas of German east 
africa into a national park.” Wissmann’s model—despite a nominal nod to 
Yellowstone, the world’s first national park—was more akin to a european 
hunting estate than a U.S. national park: he envisaged large game reserves 
that protected females and young during the critical breeding season, while 
still permitting the possibility of seasonal hunting for the privileged few. 
Wissmann himself picked the first two sites—one along the rufiji river in 
the south and the other west of the famed Kilimanjaro—where hunting 
would be banned year-round, at least to most hunters, black and white 
alike. at the same time, he introduced a licensing system for the hunting 
of elephants and rhinos elsewhere in the colony, and he made it illegal to 
shoot elephants with tusks under three kilograms. The killing of females 
and young was prohibited year-round. He also outlawed certain hunting 
techniques, mostly indigenous ones (such as the use of fire to flush game), 
on the grounds that they were contrary to the “hunter’s ethos.” many of 
these stipulations would find their way into the 1900 and 1933 treaties.35
 Wissmann’s role was important, but officials in other colonial states 
introduced measures on their own, both before and after him, and for 
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much the same reason: they were concerned about the long-term viability 
of their game stocks, most especially the elephants. The Congo Free State 
promulgated an elephant-protection measure in 1889. German Southwest 
africa gave protection to ostriches and other game in 1892. Hunting laws 
came to British east africa (Kenya) in 189, through the personal interven-
tion of Lord Salisbury, Britain’s prime minister and foreign secretary. “my 
attention,” he told Commissioner arthur Hardinge and Commissioner e. 
J. L. Berkeley of the east africa and Uganda colonies, “has recently been 
called to the excessive destruction, by travellers and others in east africa, 
of the larger wild animals generally known as ‘big game.’ There is reason to 
fear that unless some check is imposed upon the indiscriminate slaughter 
of these animals, they will, in the course of a few years, disappear from the 
British Protectorate.”36 In his response to Lord Salisbury, Hardinge divulged 
his sly strategy for game protection in British east africa: “Keep as close as 
possible to the German regulations, but make our own slightly more fa-
vourable to wealthy sportsmen who bring money into the territory.”37
 a colony-by-colony approach to game protection, however, proved 
difficult to implement in the absence of transborder cooperation. Thus, 
when German Southwest africa banned the sale of female ostrich feathers 
in 1892, traders just smuggled their goods across the borders to Portuguese 
and British towns and ports, where they were able to exchange the feathers 
for ammunition and other goods. The Germans felt compelled to lift the 
ban a few years later and impose in its stead a nominal export duty of four 
German marks per kilogram on feathers.38
 The need for uniform regulations was even more obvious in east af-
rica, where elephant, zebra, gnu, giraffe, eland, and other herds migrated 
between the frontiers of the German and British protectorates.39 British 
game laws, for instance, mandated the confiscation of elephant tusks un-
der five kilograms. Custom authorities, however, discovered the laws were 
impossible to enforce at ports such as mombasa, Kanga, and Kismayu be-
cause traders could easily transport their contraband across the unguarded 
German and Italian frontiers without fear of confiscation.40 When British 
authorities urged the Germans to adopt Britain’s tusk-size regulations, the 
German authorities refused on purely practical grounds. “If the natives 
found that by crossing the ruvuma they could find a ready market for 
their ivory,” Paul Kayser (head of the German Colonial office from 1890 
to 1896) told Lord Salisbury, “all the ivory trade on the east coast would 
be diverted to the Portuguese possessions.”41 a few years later, when Ger-
man east africa finally did enact stringent tusk-size laws, Kayser’s predic-
tion came true: “every prohibition to export,” Governor Gustav adolf von 
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Götzen lamented in 1903, “is an incentive to smuggling, and this will not 
cease so long as the Zanzibar market is not also closed to small ivory.”42
 If concern over the disappearance of east africa’s big game led the 
German and British colonial administrators in the direction of game laws, 
the logic of the export trade finally pushed them in the direction of inter-
national cooperation. When Wissmann floated the idea of an international 
agreement in 189, Lord Salisbury not only concurred but also insisted that 
London host the conference (Wissmann wanted the conference to be held 
in Brussels). The British Foreign office drafted a treaty and invited pleni-
potentiaries from Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium. 
The conference commenced on april 24, 1900, and the delegates signed the 
London Convention on may 19.43
The 1900 London Conference: Environmental Laissez-Faire
The 1900 London Convention did not cover as much landmass as its gran-
diose title (Convention for the Preservation of Wild animals, Birds, and 
Fish in africa) might suggest. article I delineated the twentieth parallel 
north (the same demarcation used at the 1889 Brussels Conference) as 
the northernmost limit of the treaty’s jurisdiction. This demarcation line 
corresponded roughly to the faunal and political divisions that separated 
Saharan and sub-Saharan africa, so it made sense from a conservationist 
perspective (though it did open up the potential for new smuggling routes 
along what was largely an unguarded border). more problematic was the 
conference organizers’ decision to invite only the european colonists to 
meet in London, not the two remaining indigenous powers of africa—
Liberia, which had lost some territory during the “scramble” but had re-
mained independent, and abyssinia (ethiopia), which had survived Italy’s 
colonization bid in 1896. Both countries were located below the twentieth par-
allel north and were therefore within the purported jurisdiction of the treaty.
 The southern demarcation zone, which followed the twentieth paral-
lel south, made no sense whatsoever from the perspective of africa’s flora 
and fauna. This line was dictated solely by what the conference delegates 
delicately called the ongoing “difficulties” there, diplomatspeak for the 
anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). It excluded a considerable amount of afri-
can territory, including all or parts of German Southwest africa (namibia), 
Portuguese east africa (mozambique), Bechuanaland (Botswana), South-
ern rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and madagascar, as well as the Cape Colony, 
natal, orange Free State, and Transvaal (Union of South africa). after the 
war ended, the Germans, Portuguese, and British extended the zone south-
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ward to the Cape, but resistance to wildlife protection in the new Union of 
South africa was evident for many decades thereafter.44
 article II and the schedules (which were appended to the treaty) 
spelled out the chief goals of the 1900 conference: to facilitate the creation 
of uniform game regulations by enumerating the animals to be protected, 
establishing closed seasons, and creating a licensing system. Section  of 
this article prohibited the “hunting of wild animals by any persons except 
holders of licenses issued by the Local Government.” Since the vast ma-
jority of indigenous hunters could not afford these licenses (even if they 
were available for purchase deep in the african interior), this stipulation 
for all intents and purposes turned subsistence hunting into poaching. at 
the same time, Section 8 prohibited the “use of nets and pitfalls for tak-
ing animals,” two trapping methods that africans traditionally had used 
as means of subsistence and commercial hunting. (Subsequent game laws 
would ban still more traditional techniques, including foot snares, pits, 
traps, weighted harpoons, and poison-tipped arrows.) The putative rea-
son for banning these techniques was that they were cruel to animals, but 
the actual reason was that the “passive” techniques of african hunters in-
terfered with the “active” hunting methods of europeans: horses fell into 
pits, and safari hunters got snared, trapped, and harpooned.45 meanwhile, 
the delegates reaffirmed the provisions of the Brussels Conference, which 
forbade the supply of modern arms and ammunition to african blacks. 
This too ensured that the onus of the treaty fell harder on the indigenous 
populations than on the europeans. The convention deprived black afri-
cans of their right to use traditional hunting methods without lifting the 
ban on the use of european weaponry.46
 The schedules gave only a small number of species any real protection, 
nearly all of them central to sporting and commercial enterprises. Sched-
ule I accorded full protection to eight animals “on account of their rarity 
and threatened extermination”: the giraffe, gorilla, chimpanzee, mountain 
zebra, wild ass, white-tailed gnu (black wildebeest), eland, and Liberian 
(pygmy) hippo. Four birds were singled out for preservation “on account 
of their usefulness” to agriculture: the vulture, secretary bird, owl, and rhi-
noceros bird (oxpecker). Schedule II proscribed the killing of immature 
elephants, rhinos, hippos, zebras, buffaloes, ibexes, chevrotains, and vari-
ous antelope and gazelle species. Schedule III prohibited “to a certain ex-
tent” the killing of females of these species “when accompanied by their 
young.” Schedule Iv set limits to the number of these animals (and a dozen 
or so others, including pigs, monkeys, cheetahs, and jackals) that could be 
hunted each year. Kill limits were also placed on several birds: the ostrich, 
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marabou, egret, bustard, francolin, guinea-fowl, and “other ‘Game’ birds.” 
In regard to fish, there was only one reference in the entire treaty: article II, 
Section 9 prohibited “the use of dynamite or other explosives, and of poi-
son, for the purpose of taking fish in rivers, streams, brooks, lakes, ponds, 
or lagoons.”
 Whereas Schedules I through Iv protected specific species, Schedule v 
had the opposite goal of eradicating so-called vermin species: lions, leop-
ards, hyenas, (wild) hunting dogs, otters, baboons and “other harmful 
monkeys,” large birds of prey (except the vulture, secretary bird, and owl), 
crocodiles, poisonous snakes, and pythons. The eggs of some animals—
crocodiles, pythons, and poisonous snakes—were also singled out for de-
struction. The vermin clauses were designed to augment herbivore herds 
by controlling predators and to stop diseases (such as rinderpest) from 
jumping from wildlife to domestic herds. Wissmann, who attended the 
conference as an expert for the German government, advocated a policy of 
complete extermination, but edwin ray Lankester, director of the British 
natural History museum, called attention to the problematic nature of 
such a decision: “Certain species of animals, even if they are dangerous, 
should not be entirely exterminated because they are useful from other 
perspectives, such as preventing the excessive multiplication of other spe-
cies.” on Lankester’s advice, the conference decided to permit a policy of 
animal control if it was “desirable for important administrative reasons,” 
but it chose the phrase “reduce the numbers within sufficient limits” in-
stead of “exterminate.”47 Still, it was odd that a preservationist document 
listed as vermin almost as many animals as it accorded the status of “full 
protection.”
 The debates over Schedules I through v proceeded smoothly, until dis-
cussion turned to the most lucrative area of african commerce—the trade in 
feathers, skins, and tusks. The British and German governments, in their origi-
nal Draft of Suggested Bases for Deliberations of an International Conference 
for the Protection of Wild animals, Birds, and Fishes in africa (hereafter the 
British-German Draft) included a sweeping prohibition on “wholesale trade in 
the hides, horns, and tusks of wild animals and skins and plumage of birds.”48 
The French and Portuguese, however, made it clear that they would not even 
attend the conference unless this clause was removed, so the British Foreign 
office replaced it with a much milder restriction when it submitted its sec-
ond draft, the avant-Projet d’acte Général (hereafter the avant-Projet), at the 
conference itself. The reformulated text simply called for the “establishment of 
higher and more uniform tariffs for the exporting of the hides, skins, and tusks 
of wild animals, and the carcasses and feathers of birds.”49
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 During the conference debates, the French and Portuguese delegates 
assaulted this reformulation as well, especially the phrase “higher and 
more uniform tariffs.” The British delegates, for example, argued that the 
marabou stork should receive complete protection on the grounds that it 
was disappearing from the skies of West africa (“It is a regular business in 
the Cassamance,” one report read, “to give a native a gun with dust-shot 
cartridges and send him into the interior to shoot small birds for the milli-
ners in Paris”).50 But the French representative, Louis Gustave Binger, com-
pelled the removal of marabou from the fully protected list on the grounds 
that these birds were still plentiful in Senegal and “their feathers are an 
object of commerce.”51 The irony of the French position was not lost on the 
other plenipotentiaries: a conference whose avowed purpose was to stop 
“the destruction of animals for the purpose of pecuniary gain,”52 it was 
noted, was scratching marabou off the full-protected list on the grounds 
that “their feathers were an object of commerce.”
 The French also fought hard to protect their ostrich-feather enterprises. 
When Wissmann suggested placing a duty on feather exports, Binger coun-
tered, “Such a scheme would have the effect of putting the French Colo-
nies at a grave disadvantage vis-à-vis the Cape Colony, which could avoid 
establishing an export tax and where energetic measures have been taken 
for the preservation of ostriches. We are entirely committed to protect-
ing the species but cannot accept an export tax on feathers.”53 a compro-
mise was then agreed upon. ostriches were added to Schedule Iv (giving 
them partial protection) and a clause was added to article II guaranteeing 
“the protection of the eggs of ostriches” from wanton predation, but no 
export duty was imposed on feathers. This compromise too was fraught 
with irony: the French refused to regulate the trade in wild ostrich feathers 
because it would benefit southern africans, who had established a sustain-
able feather-farming industry based on domesticated ostriches.
 The Portuguese and French delegates then joined forces against the 
proposal to impose an export tax on all animal hides and tusks. “The es-
tablishment of ‘higher and more uniform tariffs’ on hides exported from a 
part of africa,” claimed the Portuguese plenipotentiary Jayme Batalha-reis, 
“could result in damage to existing european industries, for example Por-
tuguese firms that rely on hides of african origin. The zone demarcated by 
article I is only a part of the natural region where african animals should 
be protected. We might therefore be pressed to invoke article II, section 9, 
in such a way that the trade be restricted in areas situated outside of this 
designated zone, where export tariffs are lower or absent.” Binger agreed: 
“If we handicap commerce in african hides by the establishment of higher 
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and more uniform tariffs, then hides of american provenance would have 
a competitive advantage. It would suffice, and also be more useful, if we 
just enumerate certain hides whose export would be forbidden.”54 In the 
end, the French and Portuguese prevailed. The final text imposed export 
duties only on certain specified products—“on the hides and skins of giraffes, 
antelopes, zebras, rhinoceroses, and hippopotami, on rhinoceros and an-
telope horns, and on hippopotamus tusks.”
 Conspicuously absent from this list was the elephant tusk! The avant-
Projet foresaw a high export tax on tusks that weighed less than five ki-
lograms. The rate would increase ad valorem on tusks between five and 
fifteen kilograms. all tusks above fifteen kilograms would be subject to a 
uniform tax. But France, Portugal, and Belgium—the three parties to the 
1892 Congo Basin Convention—closed ranks and refused to modify their 
existing arrangements. “We will not achieve important results from the 
point of view of animal protection by imposing tariffs, even high ones, on 
large elephant tusks, which will still have a considerable commercial value,” 
Binger stated. “But since small tusks are less valuable, one could shut down 
legitimate commerce on them completely just by imposing heavy tariffs on 
them.”55 Bowing to the inevitable, Wissmann proposed a total ban on the 
export of tusks that weighed less than five kilograms but no export duty at 
all on heavier tusks. This compromise proved acceptable to a majority of 
the delegates. article II, Section 11 of the convention thus simply proscribed 
“hunting or killing young elephants” and imposed “severe penalties against 
the hunters, and the confiscation in every case, by the Local Governments, 
of all elephant tusks weighing less than  kilogrammes.” This was a small 
victory for the British, who placed special importance on the protection of 
immature elephants. But it was a major victory for the Belgians, French, 
and Portuguese, who were determined to defeat all efforts to impose ex-
port duties on mature ivory tusks.
 article III foresaw the establishment of game reserves within eighteen 
months of the treaty’s ratification. The convention defined reserves as “suf-
ficiently large tracts of land which have all the qualifications necessary as 
regards food, water, and, if possible, salt, for preserving birds or other wild 
animals, and for affording them the necessary quiet during the breeding 
time.” Within the reserve, it was to be “unlawful to hunt, capture, or kill any 
bird or other wild animal,” except vermin. The avant-Projet text called for 
the establishment of animal sanctuaries in all colonies encompassed by the 
convention, but Binger reworded article 2, Section  to read: “establishment, 
as far as possible, of reserves” within the convention zone. “The creation of 
reserves does not appear to be viable in certain very populous colonies, 
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such as Gambia,” he explained.56 Batalha-reis, the Portuguese plenipoten-
tiary, expressed even greater hesitancy about nature reserves. He demanded 
the assurance that local administrators would have the right to create re-
serves solely for the protection of specific species (such as the elephant or 
zebra), the prerogative to alter the boundaries of the reserve as they saw 
fit, and the authority to disband the reserves entirely if they so desired.57 
all of these demands were duly written into the treaty text—a significant 
watering down of the treaty, as it left the reserves hostage to the changing 
whims of colonial administrators. Finally, the delegates inserted an elastic 
clause into article III to permit the suspension of the treaty’s stipulations 
as “necessitated by temporary difficulties in the administrative organiza-
tion of certain territories.”58 This clause was designed to give administra-
tors leeway during times of civil strife and disease epidemics, but of course, 
it also provided them wiggle room for reneging on their promises.
 The plenipotentiaries signed the 1900 London Convention at the con-
ference’s end, with the understanding that it would be valid for fifteen years, 
after which it could be renewed, modified, or allowed to lapse. Problems 
with ratification, however, arose even before the ink had dried. First and 
foremost, the French representative announced at the concluding session 
of the conference that France would not ratify the treaty unless abyssinia 
and Liberia also came on board. neither of these countries, however, had 
even been invited to the conference (and when later asked to sign, the 
Liberian government blandly replied that its people “would most certainly 
resent any attempt to prevent their shooting, or otherwise destroying, the 
elephants which trample down their crops, or the leopards which carry off 
their sheep and goats”).59 Leopold II’s representative then announced that 
Belgium would not ratify the convention unless France did so first. For its 
part, Portugal held out until all of southern africa was on board (which 
would not occur until 1902).60
 Ultimately, the refusal of the Congo powers to declare themselves whole-
heartedly in favor of the London Convention doomed its ratification. The 
treaty bounced around for a dozen years or so, before being quietly shelved 
when World War I broke out in 1914. Still, the conference partially achieved 
two of its primary objectives. First, nearly all the colonial governments re-
wrote their game ordinances to conform to the principles laid down in 
the convention, which included laws mandating closed seasons, minimum 
tusk weights, licenses, and protection for immature animals and endan-
gered species. Second, many governments at least made a nod in the direc-
tion of setting up protected areas, and several of them established extensive 
networks of national parks and nature reserves.61 To their credit, France, 
40  | The Game of Conservation
Belgium, and Portugal were among those countries that rewrote their 
game laws and established protected areas in conformity with the conven-
tion. They did not, however, enforce the five-kilogram minimum on tusks 
or do much to regulate the trade in hides and feathers.
The British Experience, 1900 to 1933
The most immediate consequence of the 1900 London Convention was 
that it spurred the creation of the British-based Society for the Preservation 
of the Wild Fauna of the empire. The Fauna Society, as its supporters af-
fectionately called it, was founded in 1903 to lobby for the creation of larger 
game reserves and stricter game laws. For the next thirty years, it would 
be the single most important force for nature protection, not just in British 
colonies but in all of sub-Saharan africa and much of asia as well. It was 
nominally independent, but virtually all of its founding members were 
prominent statesmen and colonial administrators who maintained close 
ties to the British Foreign and Colonial offices. Because most of its mem-
bers also happened to be big-game hunters or former hunters, detractors 
quickly dubbed them the penitent butchers.62 It is an apt term, but it could 
be applied equally to nearly everyone involved with the 1900 London Con-
vention or, for that matter, to nearly everyone involved in animal conserva-
tion in that era around the globe.
 efforts to establish similar lobbying groups on the continent met with 
some success, though none became anywhere near as powerful as the 
Fauna Society. The Wildschutzkommission der deutschen Kolonialgesell-
schaft (Game Protection Commission of the German Colonial Society), 
established in 1911, went defunct after World War I when Germany lost its 
african colonies to Britain and France. In Belgium, the Institut des Parcs 
nationaux du Congo Belge (Institute of national Parks in the Belgian 
Congo) and the Fondation pour Favoriser l’Étude Scientifique des Parcs 
nationaux du Congo Belge (Foundation to Promote Scientific Study of the 
national Parks of the Belgian Congo) were the driving forces in african 
affairs, and France’s most important wildlife institution was the Société 
d’acclimatation et de Protection de la nature (Society for the acclimation 
and Protection of nature). other european nationals founded similar organi-
zations in their own countries, even if they possessed no african colonies.
 Paul Sarasin (founder of the Swiss League for the Protection of nature) 
and P. G. van Tienhoven (founder of the netherlands Committee for In-
ternational nature Protection) attempted time and again to bring these 
national organizations under one roof, but they had only limited success. 
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The first International Congress for the Protection of nature was held in 
Paris in 1909, and seventeen european nations signed the act of Founda-
tion of the Consultative Commission for the International Protection of 
nature in Bern in 1913, but World War I broke out before the Consultative 
Commission ever had a chance to meet. after the war, the congress met 
twice in Paris (in 1923 and 1931), out of which the International office for 
the Protection of nature emerged in 1934. However, it did not survive the 
impact of World War II. It was not until 1948 that a viable international 
organization was established—the International Union for the Protection 
of nature, in morges, Switzerland (renamed the International Union for 
the Conservation of nature and natural resources in 196 and renamed 
anew the World Conservation Union in 1991). as a result, during the pe-
riod between the two african conventions (1900 to 1933), the Fauna Society 
reigned supreme, as did British notions of nature protection.
 The various national organizations spent much of their time lobby-
ing for national parks and game reserves, and by 1933, they had achieved 
many successes. German east africa (renamed Tanganyika Territory after 
the League of nations placed it under British mandate) created eleven re-
serves, including the famous Serengeti, Kilimanjaro, and Selous reserves. 
The Union of South africa established a total of eighteen protected areas, 
including the etosha Game reserve of former German Southwest africa 
(which South africa absorbed after World War I). The anglo-egyptian Su-
dan created six reserves, the Gold Coast one, nigeria five, nyasaland four, 
northern rhodesia five, Southern rhodesia five, and Uganda six. British 
east africa (renamed the Kenya Protectorate after World War I) possessed 
just two protected areas—the northern and Southern reserves—but they 
were large, totaling around forty-eight thousand square miles together, 
about equal in size to the whole of england. The French established seven-
teen reserves in French West africa, eleven in algeria, ten in madagascar, 
seven in French equatorial africa, and four in the Cameroons. Portugal 
created ten reserves in angola and four in mozambique. The Italian colo-
nies had a total of eight. The Belgian Congo created thirteen protected 
areas, including the Parc national albert (now virunga national Park) in 
192, the first in africa to be called a national park rather than a game 
reserve (though colonial park was more apt). South africa followed suit, 
turning the Sabi Game reserve in the Transvaal into the Kruger national 
Park in 1926 and adding three more parks in 1931.63
 The British government took the lead in creating game departments 
to police the reserves and enforce the game laws, though personnel short-
ages and minuscule budgets hobbled all efforts at effective administration. 
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revenues from game licenses and export duties contributed nearly 10 per-
cent of the Kenya Protectorate’s yearly budget (£68,069 in 1899–1900 and 
£121,692 in 1904–), but only a small fraction of that money ever found its 
way to the Game Department, so the chief wardens were able to hire only 
a handful of assistants.64 Under those circumstances, as one of Kenya’s first 
game wardens, r. B. Woosnam, wryly observed, the new game laws had 
little impact on the behavior of hunters, “except that it gave birth to the 
ivory-smuggling trade.”65
 enforcement improved over time, but even as late as 1939, the Game 
Department employed only five european officers and seventy african 
game scouts to patrol the entire perimeter of the Kenya Protectorate, 
which had a landmass of two hundred and twenty-five thousand square 
miles. The wardens, moreover, placed almost all of their personnel into the 
Southern reserve, leaving the northern reserve to the Somali poachers 
who fenced tusks at nearby Italian-controlled ports. The port of Kismayu 
was a particular problem for the fencing of elephant ivory and rhino horn: 
“There is no possibility of suppressing the killing of the animal concerned 
so long as a free market exists over our borders,” the Game Department 
concluded.66 assistant Game Warden K. F. T. Caldwell was even more blunt 
about the problems British officials were having with Italy: “any specially 
protected animal can be immediately disposed of across the neighbouring 
border. once such trophies have crossed the frontier they can be openly 
sold; in fact to state that they were obtained from a neighbouring territory is 
accepted as a defence to any charge of their being illegally acquired.”67 In 1932, 
the British and Italian governments finally agreed to a joint effort to halt 
the poaching, but neither country sent enough game wardens and scouts 
to enforce the laws; when British troops seized Somaliland from Italy dur-
ing World War II, they uncovered a still-booming business in illicit ivory 
and animal skins.68
 British colonial administrators had to contend with discontent among 
indigenous africans as well. “In Unyoro and Toro particularly, and in a less 
degree in other parts of the Protectorate, the Game regulations have not 
been observed by the natives,” the Uganda commissioner admitted to the 
Foreign office in 1903:
The business of procuring ivory is too lucrative not to tempt 
the Chiefs, and it is encouraged by the petty traders. . . . Before 
we took over the country, the necessities of the Chiefs and peo-
ple, both in revenue and food, lay in the killing of elephants. 
This we have prohibited, giving them but little or nothing in re-
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turn, and still expect them to be honest. all the Chiefs of Sazas 
get from the Government is 10 per cent on the cash which they 
collect for the hut tax, which in many cases does not amount to 
100 rupees a year—too small a sum on which to keep up their 
position—whilst as regards the people at large, we have given 
them absolutely no return whatever.69
 Six years later, the next Uganda governor wrote to the secretary of state 
for the colonies, this time to voice concerns about the newly created Toro 
and Bunyoro reserves. “The chiefs of Toro complained bitterly to me of the 
ravages of elephants, and begged for some relief,” he wrote:
They asserted that the plantations were so frequently destroyed 
that the people are being forced to abandon the country. The 
elephants have become so fearless that they do not even hesitate 
to destroy habitations that stand in their way. They even attack 
travellers on the roads, and I was assured that, during the past 
year, no less than 16 persons have been killed by these animals 
in Toro alone. Under the game laws a peasant whose garden is 
being ravaged by elephants is not allowed to attempt to shoot 
them. He can only send to his chief, who is empowered to act 
in such cases, and is advised, in the meantime, to try to frighten 
the animals off by shouting and beating drums. The chief may 
take two or three days to reach the spot, and by the time he 
arrives on the scene the elephants are probably 30 or 40 miles 
off, and quite out of reach. The subject is one that bristles with 
difficulties, and while it would not be right to allow natives to 
kill elephants, save under exceptional circumstances, the fact 
remains that the animals are being protected to such a degree 
that they are devastating a populous and promising country.70
These complaints and dozens like them over the next decade prodded 
Uganda’s colonial authorities to establish the elephant Control Depart-
ment (later renamed the Game Department) in 1923 and to embark upon 
extensive culling campaigns inside the reserves.71 These efforts created the 
odd situation of having a game department that spent more of its time and 
money killing elephants than protecting them.
 Yet another matter undermined all efforts to enforce colonial game laws 
and promote the establishment of protected areas: the tsetse fly problem. 
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at issue was whether the new game reserves were harboring tsetse flies and 
therefore promoting the spread of the disease trypanosomiasis. Trypano-
somiasis is endemic in africa and is better known as sleeping sickness when 
it infects humans and as nagana (a Zulu word) when it infects cattle. There 
are four organisms involved in the disease cycle: trypanosomes, which are 
flagellated protozoan blood parasites; wild animals, especially antelopes, 
buffaloes, warthogs, and bushpigs, which carry pathogenic trypanosomes 
in their bloodstreams but are immune to their effects; the tsetse fly (Glos-
sina), a blood-sucking insect that feeds on large vertebrate animals; and 
a host, either a human being or a domestic animal. What made the tsetse 
fly central to this cycle was that it was the organism that transmitted try-
panosomes from wild animals to people and domestic livestock through 
its bite. Different types of tsetse flies transmit different types of trypano-
somes to different hosts, but only Trypanosoma gambiense and Trypanosoma 
rhodesiense are typically fatal to humans.72
 Scientists did not understand the trypanosome life cycle well in 1900, 
but local africans, european settlers, and colonial scientists all knew from 
personal experience that outbreaks of trypanosomiasis in humans and 
livestock were linked in some way to the simultaneous presence of wild 
animals and tsetse flies. This knowledge made many of them reluctant to 
set aside special areas as parks and reserves, when they might only promote 
the spread of the fly and the disease. Sensitive to this concern, colonial ad-
ministrators convoked a series of tsetse fly conferences (in 190, 1920, 192, 
1933, 193, and 1936) and sought the advice of prominent scientists, includ-
ing David Bruce, Charles Francis massy Swynnerton, robert Koch, and r. 
H. T. P. Harris. Unfortunately, these efforts resulted only in contradictory 
opinions and a hodgepodge of policies. In some areas, the tried-and-true 
practice of indigenous africans—burning undergrowth and thicket, the 
favored habitat of the tsetse—was successfully employed. more often, as 
in the Tanganyika Territory, human populations were forced to move out 
of tsetse-infested regions and were resettled elsewhere, following the prin-
ciple of human-animal segregation. Some governments had success with 
the Harris fly trap, which (as the name implies) reduced tsetse fly numbers 
by luring them into traps, but this was a labor-intensive and costly ap-
proach to tsetse control. more far-fetched was the British-German Treaty 
on the Combat of Sleeping Sickness in east africa (1908), which declared 
war on crocodiles and crocodile eggs on the grounds that they were the 
main vectors of disease transmission. all of these efforts, whether effective 
or not, had the same basic goal: to intercept at some point the three-way 
link between wild animals, the tsetse fly, and human settlements.73
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 many proposed a more draconian solution—the complete eradication 
of game from infected areas. “my honest conviction is that the presence 
and increase of game is entirely responsible for the presence and increase 
of tsetse, and that our game regulations are mainly, if not wholly, respon-
sible for the increase of game,” rev. George Prentice wrote to the acting 
governor of nyasaland in 1910:
I hold that those who are responsible for the game laws are 
responsible for the presence of tsetse, and that the victims of 
trypanosomiasis are martyrs to the foolish policy of game pro-
tection. any official, high or low, or any member of the Society 
for the Preservation of the Fauna of the empire, who, in the 
face of known facts, asserts the contrary may prove the sincer-
ity of his assertion by allowing us to experiment upon him with 
our local forms of tsetse. Until he does so, either his sincerity 
or his courage is open to question. But perhaps nothing is to 
be gained by going over past policy. What concerns us is the fu-
ture and the present. There is a danger that from former state-
ments that “there’s no increase of tsetse,” “there’s no increase 
of game,” and other equally stupid and childish assertions, we 
move to the opposite extreme and say “the infested area is too 
extensive,” “the sacrifice of game would be too great.” No mat-
ter what the size of the tsetse-infested area, it must be tackled 
now. No matter what the sacrifice of game, it must be made now. 
Slackness, delay, vacillation in the past have already produced 
disastrous results. Further delay would be criminal.74
 The eminent British entomologist David Bruce concurred. “my advice 
is to clear out the game,” he told the Interdepartmental Committee on Sleep-
ing Sickness (a British investigatory team) in 1914, when asked what policy 
he thought the Colonial office should follow in tsetse regions: “It would 
be quite as reasonable to allow mad dogs to run about english villages and 
towns under the protection of the law as to allow this poisonous big game to 
run about in the fly country of nyasaland.”75 Following this advice, the gov-
ernments of Southern rhodesia and natal (two regions where resentment 
toward the parks and nature reserves was high anyway) undertook massive 
animal-eradication campaigns over the next several decades, which resulted 
in the slaughter of perhaps three-quarters of a million wild animals.76
 The tsetse fly question put the Fauna Society on the defensive almost 
from its creation. although game-eradication policies did not violate the 
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letter of the 1900 convention (article III permitted eradication programs 
as long as they were “desirable for important administrative reasons”), 
they violated the spirit of the convention and called into question the ap-
propriateness of game reserves and national parks. edward north Buxton, 
the Fauna Society’s first president, acknowledged to the Colonial office in 
190 that “the tsetse fly disappears” in regions “where game has been totally 
destroyed,” but he pointed out that “the danger of tsetse fly” was being 
invoked to justify the “wholesale destruction of game” even in areas where 
there was no problem:
now I do not think that is fair; it is as if you took a dozen men, 
one of whom you know had committed a crime, and put them 
all in prison. Who knows which species of animals are the 
“hosts” of the bacillus which is carried by the tsetse fly? It seems 
to me unjust that you should bring them all in guilty before 
you know, and kill them all because some of them may harbour 
the bacillus. Science has not yet arrived at the point that you 
can justly condemn all species; and we deprecate its being used 
as an excuse for the destruction of game generally—because 
all the species are held, without proper investigation, to be re-
sponsible for the continuance of horse-sickness.”77
 a few years later, Buxton again wrote to the Colonial office:
The game is spread over the country, but the fly—Glossina 
morsitans—is confined to very limited areas. It is not the case 
that the fly follows the game in their migrations, except for 
very short distances. These observers tell me that there is no 
general and obvious connection between the various species of 
big game and the fly, except that the latter are blood-suckers. 
The fly has been found plentiful in districts where the observ-
ers have seen no game, and there are large areas where game is 
abundant and there is no fly. The question which, as it seems 
to us, remains to be proved is by what species the trypanosome 
of nagana is really nurtured—if it can maintain existence in 
the blood of all, or only a few, or only one? If by all warm-
blooded creatures, there is no proof that even the destruction 
of big game would meet the case. The infinitely more numer-
ous small mammals, reptiles, and birds might continue to serve 
as the hosts of the trypanosome, and the larger animals might 
have been extinguished in vain.78
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 The Fauna Society had to deal with other park-related problems as 
well. an ideal game reserve, as defined by the 1900 London Convention, 
had to be large enough to incorporate the migratory patterns of the herds 
and have sufficient water holes, salt, and food for the migrating herds. The 
rough-and-tumble of colonial affairs, however, made it impossible even 
to remotely approach this ideal anywhere in africa and most especially in 
the southern region. President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal, for instance, 
declared the area around the Pongola river a game reserve in the 1890s 
because it was malaria-infected and sparsely populated by whites and be-
cause it was situated along a disputed border with Great Britain (Kruger 
thought he could use the reserve as a bargaining chip in his negotiations 
with the British). Pongola was never rich in game in the first place, and the 
game that did roam there had been largely depleted by its game warden 
and by soldiers during the anglo-Boer War. The reserve was even depro-
claimed and reproclaimed several times before it finally ceased to exist in 
1921.79 The Sabi reserve, also in Transvaal, had a far more fortunate fate: it 
became Kruger national Park in 1926, the second protected area in africa 
to get the park designation. But for the first two decades of its existence, 
Sabi’s first game warden (James Stevenson-Hamilton) spent most of his 
time doing battle with farmers who wanted to graze domestic cattle in its 
borders, with mining companies interested in the region’s resources, with 
the builders of the Selati railroad, and with soldiers (during the anglo-
Boer War and World War I) involved in guerrilla warfare.80 Similar prob-
lems beset park wardens elsewhere.
The 1933 London Conference and the Apartheid Solution
In 1930, the Fauna Society sent r. W. G. Hingston to africa on a fact-finding 
mission to determine how to address interrelated problems of ivory smug-
gling, animal cullings, and tsetse fly infestations. He concluded that the 1900 
London Convention was functioning like bad “brakes” on the “destructive 
machinery” of colonial conservation and that, as a result, “african fauna is 
steadily failing before the forces of destruction brought to bear against it.”81 
There were, he argued, four main causes of the destruction. The first cause 
was the spread of cultivation, which put farmers in increasing conflict with 
wild animals. “man, once he cultivates an acre of soil, will not tolerate 
wild animals in his vicinity,” he argued. The second cause was the trade in 
tusks, skins, and hides, which required the killing of the animals to obtain the 
products. The third cause was the hunting practices of indigenous africans, 
who employed “methods that are wholesale and indiscriminating in their 
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destructiveness.” The fourth cause was the tsetse fly menace, which made 
so many colonists hostile to game protection.82
 “How can this complex problem be dealt with in such a way as to lend 
some hope of preserving the species far into the future?” he asked rhetori-
cally. “There would appear to be only one way. The human life and the wild 
life must be separated permanently and completely.” as long as humans 
and animals were forced to live side by side, he argued, there would be 
demands to exterminate the local wildlife: “In one place the complaint will 
be that the crops are ruined, in another that the wild life kills domesticated 
stock, in another that it terrorizes the district, in another that it spreads 
disease.” He concluded that the only solution to these problems was to sepa-
rate humans and animals into “two completely distinct compartments.” 
For animals to survive in modern africa, he declared, they “must be segre-
gated in a sanctuary.”83
 Hingston proposed the immediate establishment of a network of per-
manent nature parks large enough to offer genuine long-term protection 
to the whole gamut of the continent’s animals. He noted:
The weak point about the reserve is its insecurity and want of 
permanency. It is brought into existence by a Proclamation 
in the local Government Gazette, provided that the Secretary 
of State agrees. It can be removed by the same easy means. 
Should at any time a demand arise for a portion or the whole 
of a game reserve to be allocated to some other purpose, as for 
instance, agricultural development, it is not easy for even the 
Home Government to resist the demand and in practice it is 
not always resisted. In point of fact the game reserves of africa 
are from time to time contracted, abolished, or altered in some 
way by this type of legislation. It is only a matter of time before 
a public demand will arise for the reserves or some portion of 
them to be thrown open, and there is no guarantee that any 
game reserve in africa will last over an extended period.84
a policy of animal segregation, he argued further, would help wean afri-
cans from the “primitiveness” of subsistence hunting and thus allow eu-
ropeans to teach them “the meat-securing methods which are practiced 
by more cultured races,” namely, the “keeping and breeding of domestic 
animals such as cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, fowls and ducks.”85
 nudged by the Fauna Society, the British government asked its eco-
nomic advisory Council in 1931 to explore the possibility of a new interna-
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tional accord that would focus on making nature parks a permanent part 
of the african landscape. at Britain’s urging, the International Congress for 
the Protection of nature, which held its third (and final) meeting in Paris 
in July 1931, endorsed a revision of the 1900 London Convention. Then, in 
1932, the British government established the Preparatory Committee for 
the International Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora 
of africa. It consisted of representatives from the Foreign, Colonial, and 
Dominion offices; the Fauna Society; the British natural History museum; 
Kew Gardens; the London Zoological Society; and the economic advisory 
Council, under the chairmanship of the earl of onslow. Its Draft Second 
report served as the basis for the Convention relative to the Preservation 
of Flora and Fauna in Their natural State in 1933 (hereafter the 1933 Lon-
don Convention).86
 The Draft Second report relied heavily on Hingston’s analysis, though 
the authors put less blame on indigenous black populations and more on 
the colonial settlements for causing most of the disruptions. “The dan-
ger to any species of wild animal arising out of indiscriminate killing for 
sport or profit needs no emphasis,” the introduction noted. “The increase 
of population also and the spread of cultivation and settlement, assisted by 
modern methods of irrigation and modern sanitary and medical knowl-
edge, must lead in time to the disappearance of wild life from many areas 
in which it is now found.” The committee saw two interlocking dangers to 
the viability of wildlife populations—“on the one hand the destruction of 
animals by hunters, often for commercial purposes, on the other the ad-
vance of settlement and the gradually changing character of the country.” 
agricultural and industrial developments in africa were proceeding at a 
slow but steady pace, the report noted, and eventually, their combined im-
pact would be felt throughout the continent: “In urging the need of protec-
tion of the wild life in africa, we are not advocating a policy which is in any 
way inconsistent with the future destiny of the country. We call rather for 
the exercise of prudence and foresight in the conservation of an important 
part of its natural resources.”87
 The Draft Second report emphasized that the primary purpose of the 
1933 London Convention ought to be the “concentration of fauna in specially 
constituted sanctuaries.” much of africa consisted of thinly settled regions 
where the local populace depended on agriculture and stock raising and 
where wild animals were often perceived as a nuisance, the report noted: 
“The harm done by marauding elephants and other animals to crops in 
many areas is only too evident. Indeed, in some British territories, the exist-
ing Game Departments had their origin in organizations the object of which 
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was primarily the protection of crops of the natives from damage done by 
elephants and other wild animals.” Domestic animals were also subject to 
diseases such as rinderpest and trypanosomiasis, wherein the “proximity of 
wild animals” to the domestic herds often accelerated the infection rates. “In 
many parts of africa,” the report added, “there is no graver problem affect-
ing human welfare than the tsetse problem. Large areas of country which 
might be put to profitable use for grazing have had to be abandoned owing 
to tsetse infestation.” echoing Hingston, the report called for a system based 
on human-animal apartheid: “a final solution of the difficulties which arise 
from the intermingling of wild animals with native settlements can only be 
provided by the establishment of permanent and semi-permanent sanctuar-
ies in which the animals can be effectually segregated.”88
 Preparations for the 1933 conference were so thorough that little discus-
sion occurred at the meeting itself, and the plenipotentiaries of the Union 
of South africa, Belgium, the United Kingdom, egypt, Spain, France, Italy, 
Portugal, and the anglo-egyptian Sudan signed a final text that was nearly 
identical to the recommendations enumerated in the Draft Second report. 
The prologue reiterated the principal goals of the 1900 London Convention 
but prioritized them differently. The main goal now was the establishment 
of “national parks, strict natural reserves, and other reserves within which 
the hunting, killing or capturing of fauna, and the collection or destruction 
of flora shall be limited or prohibited.” relegated to second place was the 
“institution of regulations concerning the hunting, killing and capturing 
of fauna outside such areas” and the “regulation of the traffic in trophies.” 
Lowest on the list of priorities was the “prohibition of certain methods of 
and weapons for the hunting, killing and capturing of fauna.”89
 article 1 declared that the convention would cover “all the territories 
(that is, metropolitan territories, colonies, overseas territories, or territo-
ries under suzerainty, protection or mandate) of any Contracting Govern-
ment which are situated in the continent of africa, including madagascar 
and Zanzibar,” and “any other territory in respect of which a Contracting 
Government shall have assumed all the obligations of the present Conven-
tion.”90 This made its geographic reach much more extensive than that of 
the 1900 treaty, which had not covered the territory north of the twentieth 
parallel or the large islands off the east coast of africa.
 article 2 spelled out in detail what was meant by the terms national 
park and strict natural reserve. It defined a national park as an area “placed 
under public control” by a competent legislature, so long as it was set aside 
for the “propagation, protection and preservation of wild animal life and 
wild vegetation” or “for the preservation of objects of esthetic, geological, 
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prehistoric, archaeological, or other scientific interest for the benefit, ad-
vantage, and enjoyment of the general public.” a strict natural reserve, by 
contrast, was any area where hunting, fishing, forestry, agriculture, mining, and 
drilling were forbidden, as were any activities that in any way disturbed the 
flora and fauna within the confines of the protected area. although there 
were some possibilities for overlap in this terminology, nature tourism was 
generally perceived as the defining feature of a park, whereas habitat and 
species protection was the defining feature of a strict natural reserve. no 
hunting was permitted in either area, except as authorized by the presiding 
authorities (game wardens, colonial governments, and so forth) for pur-
poses of culling or animal control.91
 articles 3 through  obligated the participating governments to establish 
parks or strict natural reserves within two years of the treaty’s ratification. To 
accomplish this task, the governments were supposed to “control” (though 
not necessarily exclude) all “white and native settlements in national parks” 
so as to reduce the possibility of damaging the natural fauna and flora. They 
were also encouraged to establish “intermediate zones” around the parks and 
reserves in which the “hunting, killing and capturing of animals may take 
place under the control of the authorities of the park or reserve.” They were 
further urged to choose sites “sufficient in extent to cover, so far as possible, 
the migrations of the fauna preserved therein” and also to preserve a “suf-
ficient degree of forest country.” Finally, they were encouraged to work with 
neighboring countries in the establishment of transnational parks.92
 articles 8 through 10 and the annexes addressed the topic that had 
dominated the 1900 conference: hunting. article 8 left much of the earlier 
hunting regimen intact, especially licensing requirements, but it spelled out 
in far greater detail the species that were to receive protection and divided 
them into two groups: Class a, which included animals whose protection 
was a matter of “special urgency and importance,” and Class B, which in-
cluded animals that could only be killed with a game license but whose 
preservation did not require “rigorous protection.” The “vermin” category 
completely disappeared, a major advancement from the 1900 treaty. article 
8 was also slightly more favorable toward hunting by indigenous peoples: 
“no hunting or other rights already possessed by native chiefs or tribes or 
any other persons or bodies, by treaty, concession, or specific agreement, or 
by administrative permission . . . are to be considered as being in any way 
prejudiced by the provisions of the preceding paragraph.”93
 article 9 broached a topic not handled in the earlier convention: the 
taking of “trophies,” defined as “any animal, dead or alive, mentioned in 
the annex to the Convention, or anything part of or produced from any 
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such animal when dead, or the eggs, egg-shells, nests or plumage of any 
bird so mentioned.” Importantly, it also declared that all “found” elephant 
and rhinoceros tusks (old tusks picked up from the ground rather than 
from freshly killed animals) belonged to the government and not to the 
individuals who found them. The delegates added this article because over 
the preceding three decades, many customs officials allowed hunters to 
transport freshly killed animals across borders under the pretext that they 
were “trophies” or “found tusks.” article 10 made it illegal for hunters to 
shoot from motor vehicles and aircraft or to use either to cause herds to 
stampede. It also reiterated the previous ban on the use of poison or explo-
sives for killing fish and the use of nets, pits, snares, and poisoned weapons 
for hunting animals—yet another sign that traditional methods were still 
largely viewed as primitive and cruel.94
 The conference was brief, lasting only from october 31 to november 8, 
and there were no topics that caused heated debate. Changes to the Draft 
Second report were minimal, and all were designed to strengthen the 
treaty rather than water it down. at the request of Belgium, the concept of 
“strict natural preserve” was added to article 2, which not only enhanced 
the preservationist thrust of the treaty but also provided an alternative to 
the anglo-american notion that protected areas should pay for themselves 
through tourism. article  was enhanced with four new sections ( through 
8). The first three granted extra protection to africa’s forested areas and 
indigenous tree species, and the fourth encouraged the “domestication 
of wild animals susceptible of economic utilization.” articles 9, 11, 12, and 
19 were also slightly expanded, reworded, or altered. The only major task 
that fell to the conference participants was to compile the annex (which 
had not been prepared in advance) and determine which species required 
which level of protection. This task, too, proved uncontroversial.95
 The 1933 London Convention officially went into force in January 
1936, after being ratified by egypt, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Sudan, 
the Union of South africa, Portugal, and anglo-egyptian Sudan. at the 
time of ratification, however, the Belgium government inserted a “reserva-
tion” that diluted the effectiveness of the treaty: “elephants shall not be 
considered in the Belgian Congo or in ruanda-Urundi as being included 
among the animals mentioned in Class B, but shall be understood to be 
included in Class a (elephants each tusk of which does not weigh more 
than  kilogrammes).”96 In less bureaucratic language, this meant that the 
Belgian-controlled regions would continue to outlaw trade in immature 
ivory (tusks under five kilograms) but would not accept the new restric-
tions on mature ivory (tusks over five kilograms).
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 For the rest of the 1930s, the British government tried to extend the 
terms of the african Convention to the asian region. The economic ad-
visory Council once again asked the earl of onslow to preside over the 
new Fauna and Flora of asia Committee (later renamed the Committee 
for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of asia, australia, and new Zea-
land), which was all but identical in representation to the earlier Prepara-
tory Committee that had prepared the 1933 London Convention. Initially, 
a majority on the committee assumed the 1933 London Convention could 
simply be extended to include asia with some minor adjustments in termi-
nology, but after listening to the arguments for a new treaty, they decided 
to start from scratch. “Certainly the adoption by foreign asiatic Govern-
ments of measures to prevent smuggling from africa of trophies (nota-
bly rhinoceros horns) is essential to the effective working of the african 
Convention,” Simon Harcourt-Smith, the most outspoken advocate of a 
new treaty, argued: “nevertheless in such countries as Siam and to a very 
much greater degree French Indo-China there is a real and pressing need 
for internal legislation if certain rare species of fauna are to be preserved 
from extinction, and I venture to suggest that no effective action will be 
taken by either of the Governments concerned if they are merely invited to 
accede to the whole or part of the africa Convention.”97 Unfortunately, the 
committee spent the next several years composing a new text and trying to 
settle on the proper geographic boundaries for the new treaty, and before 
the Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of africa and asia 
could commence as planned on november , 1939, the outbreak of World 
War II forced its abrupt cancellation.98 Plans to hold the conference after 
the war never materialized, in no small part because the colonial powers 
found themselves on the losing side of national independence movements 
in both asia and africa.
In 162, when the Dutch first established a toehold on the Cape of Good 
Hope, lions and elephants roamed free, and europeans found them-
selves largely confined to isolated ports along the african coastline. Three 
hundred years later, europeans moved freely throughout the continent, 
whereas wild animals found themselves increasingly contained within the 
boundaries of nature parks and game reserves. This massive transforma-
tion occurred almost entirely during the half century that separated the 
Berlin Conference and the 1933 London Convention.
 apartheid was, in many ways, the logical outcome of europe’s political 
and economic priorities. Wherever the europeans established themselves in 
africa—in the southern regions first and then elsewhere—they simultaneously 
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exploited the animal resources around them and carved out tracts of land 
for cultivation and pasture. These dual endeavors could not be sustained 
forever, for they led to both a steep decline in animal numbers and an 
ever-quickening reduction in animal habitat. For the first two centuries, 
the damage remained confined to a handful of regions, but the technolog-
ical-scientific revolution of the mid-nineteenth century spread the disrup-
tions throughout much of sub-Saharan africa. elephants, rhinos, hippos, 
and many other large mammals were now easier to kill, thanks to a new 
generation of high-powered rifles and accurate scopes. railroads opened 
up previously isolated areas for exploitation, settlement, and cultivation. 
The demand for tusks, skins, feathers, eggs, and many other animal prod-
ucts stimulated a commodities trade that reached around the globe, both 
for “legitimate” (government-sanctioned) and “illegitimate” (fenced and 
smuggled) products. The thirst for gold, diamonds, rubber, coffee, and ba-
nanas played a role as well. as europeans became more aware of africa’s 
natural resources and as they extracted these resources from the continent 
as if there were no tomorrow, they increasingly disrupted the ecosystems 
that had maintained a vast array of animals for thousands of years.
 racism too played a role in the apartheid solution. The colonists took 
european culture and values with them to africa, and they judged african 
societies largely on the basis of how closely they approximated (or were 
willing to adopt) those same standards. europeans had long ago eradicated 
or confined so-called vermin in their own countries in order to make room 
for cultivation and cities. They had enacted game laws and created hunt-
ing preserves and protected areas in order to maximize the annual “game 
crop.” They had hired wardens to catch and punish poachers. They had, 
insofar as possible, isolated their towns and villages from wild animals. The 
idea that societies could (or even should) strive to coexist with animals ran 
counter to the sensibilities they took with them to africa, as well as to their 
political and economic interests in africa. Had they looked at the world 
differently, they might well have carved out vast territories for indigenous 
africans and indigenous animals that preserved landscapes from the 
european impact instead of creating nature parks and game reserves that 
catered mostly to white hunters and tourists. The establishment of mega-
zoos was a peculiar solution to a specific problem that could have been 
solved differently only if the colonists had been of a different mind-set.
 The haphazard way that africa was carved up between 188 and 1900 
was significant as well. a hegemonic power on the continent might have 
been more willing to set aside for special protection larger chunks of 
territory in a greater variety of settings, perhaps even leaving intact terri-
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tories that belonged to some of the larger and more powerful indigenous 
groups. a hegemonic power certainly would have been in a better posi-
tion to create uniform game laws, control the flow of trade, and suppress 
smuggling. But africa was carved up in the same way that europe had 
been sliced and resliced over the centuries: by war, diplomacy, and sheer 
happenstance. The homespun rivalries of the British, French, German, 
Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish spilled over to the colonial arena, some-
times more virulently than in europe, but so did a proclivity to cooperate 
and compromise with neighboring powers. The number of agreements 
these powers reached during this period—on everything from free trade 
to nature conservation—is a testimony to their ability to promote their 
own interests through collective means. They shared an interest in sup-
pressing indigenous hunting traditions and practices. They shared an 
interest in making sure african blacks did not have access to modern 
weaponry. and they shared an interest in maintaining a plentiful sup-
ply of game animals. It was only when individual greed far outstripped 
common restraint—as was almost always the case with ivory—that the 
cooperative impulse seriously faltered.
 The apartheid solution was not uppermost in the minds of Hermann 
von Wissmann, Lord Salisbury, and the dozens of other statesmen, big-
game hunters, and scientists who dreamed up the 1900 London Conven-
tion. Their experience with game laws and nature reserves in europe sim-
ply did not prepare them for the problems they would face in africa. What 
worked in Brandenburg-Prussia (Wissmann’s birthplace) or Hertfordshire 
(Lord Salisbury’s birthplace) did not necessarily work well in africa: eu-
ropean game wardens had to deal with plenty of poachers but not with 
trypanosomiasis, elephant rampages, ivory poachers, skin dealers, man-
killing lions, and colonial rebellions. The need for the 1933 London Conven-
tion became increasingly apparent over time, as the colonial governments 
grappled with the implications of their hunting and conservation policies. 
Conservationists were surprised at the ferocity of the resistance to the new 
hunting regimen, and they feared for the long-term prospects of animal 
protection in light of this resistance. Strict separation between people and 
animals seemed like a logical long-range solution.
 For all its problems, the 1933 London Convention did much to con-
serve africa’s wildlife in the face of relentless development and demo-
graphic growth. The British version of a protected area—a nature park 
that sustains itself economically on tourism—has proven quite successful 
in the former east african colonies of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, where 
Serengeti, Kilimanjaro, and many other parks draw millions of tourists to 
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visit each year, though the artificiality of these entities is hard to miss. The 
Belgium version of a strict natural reserve—in which tourism is kept to 
a minimum or prohibited entirely—has been more problematic. on the 
positive side, it offers a more “natural” setting for the protected animals, 
but on the negative side, it offers fewer opportunities for revenue produc-
tion and therefore fewer incentives to hire game wardens, leaving the re-
gions more vulnerable to poachers and smugglers.
 There was much speculation as to whether the parks and reserves 
would survive the african decolonization process in the 1960s and 190s. 
Concerns began to subside in 1964 when Julius nyerere, soon to be Tan-
zania’s first president, issued the arusha manifesto, in which he pledged 
to uphold the integrity of the park system and to promote nature conser-
vation in postcolonial africa. Fears were further laid to rest when major 
african leaders met in algiers in 1968 and signed the african Convention 
on the Conservation of nature and natural resources, which largely re-
affirmed the 1933 London Convention. By the late 1960s, africa’s nature 
parks and reserves had become so famous around the world—and such a 
valuable source of tourist revenues—that it seemed folly to destroy them.
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Time Line of African Animal Protection
1884 Chancellor otto von Bismarck of Germany convoked Berlin Conference, at-
tended by fourteen european countries. The conference addressed Belgium’s 
claim to the Congo basin and laid down the rules for further african coloniza-
tion, setting off the “scramble for africa” that lasted until 1900.
1889 King Leopold II of Belgium convoked the Brussels Conference, which restricted 
the type of firearms and ammunition that could be sold to black africans be-
tween the twentieth parallel north and twentieth parallel south and sanctioned 
the introduction of colonial gun licenses and big-game hunting restrictions.
1892 The Congo Basin Convention was signed by the Congo Free State (King Leopold 
II’s personal fiefdom), France, and Portugal in Brussels to regulate export duties 
on elephant tusks in Central africa.
1896 Hermann von Wissmann promulgated the German east african Game ordinance, 
which served as a model for colonial game laws elsewhere in africa and also as the 
basis for international agreements.
1900 The Convention for the Preservation of Wild animals, Birds, and Fish in africa (the 
1900 London Convention) was signed in London in may 1900. Though never rati-
fied, it led to greater uniformity in the regulation of africa’s migratory animals.
1902 The Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the empire was estab-
lished in Great Britain.
1909 The First International Congress for the Protection of nature was held in Paris.
1923 The Second International Congress for the Protection of nature was held in Paris.
1931 The Third (and final) International Congress for the Protection of nature was 
held in Paris.
1933 The Convention relative to the Preservation of Flora and Fauna in Their natu-
ral State (the 1933 London Convention) was held in London in november 1933.
1934 The International office for the Protection of nature was established. It did not 
survive the impact of World War II.
1948 The International Union for the Protection of nature, headquartered in morges, 
Switzerland, was created. It became the International Union for the Conser-
vation of nature and natural resources in 196 and the World Conservation 
Union in 1991.
196 The arusha manifesto was declared by Julius nyerere, who would soon become 
the first president of Tanzania. It established the framework for nature protec-
tion in postcolonial africa.
1968 The african Convention on the Conservation of nature and natural resources 
was signed in algiers. It reiterated and expanded the terms of the 1933 London 
Convention.
193 The Convention on International Trade in endangered Species (CITeS) was 
signed in Washington, D.C. It helped to halt the trade in wild animal products, 
including elephant tusks and rhino horns.
199 The Convention on the Conservation of migratory Species of Wild animals was 
signed in Bonn (the Bonn Convention). It became first treaty of importance to pro-
tect migratory animals worldwide.
Chapter 2
The North American Bird War
When I hear of the destruction of a species I feel just as if  
all the works of some great writer had perished, as if  
we had lost all instead of only part of Polybius or Livy.
—Theodore Roosevelt (1904)
William T. Hornaday’s widely acclaimed book, Our Vanishing Wild Life: 
Its Extermination and Preservation (1913), reads like a war chronicle. as he 
wrote, Europe was poised for conflict over the Balkans, the United States 
was flexing its muscles in the Caribbean and asia, and mexico was in 
the throes of revolution. Hornaday, however, was neither a general nor a 
diplomat. He was the founding director of the New York Zoological Park 
(the Bronx Zoo) and one of the most avid conservationists of the Pro-
gressive Era. The war that prompted his book was the one being waged 
against the bird species of North america. “Throughout the length and 
breadth of america,” he wrote, “the ruling passion is to kill as long as 
anything killable remains.”1
 as Hornaday saw it, this avian war was being fought by a vast “army of 
Destruction” made up of six heavily armed divisions: “gentlemen sports-
men” (hunters who shot purely for pleasure), “game hogs” (trigger-happy 
hunters who always bagged their legal limit or beyond), “meat-gunners” 
(protein suppliers for big-city markets), “feather traders” (plume hunters 
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for the hat-making industry), immigrant “slaughterers” (italian americans 
who used net traps, known as roccolos, to kill songbirds), and poor “south-
erners” (whites and blacks who lived off robins, mockingbirds, meadow-
larks, and other “nongame” birds).2 Based on the total number of hunting 
licenses that state governments issued in 1911, Hornaday reckoned the army 
of Destruction was 2.6 million strong, not counting the “guerrilla army” 
(those who shot without licenses), whose numbers were unknown. “in-
deed it is a motley array,” he noted: “We see true sportsmen beside ordinary 
gunners, game-hogs and meat hunters . . . and well-gowned women and 
ladies’ maids are jostled by half naked ‘poor-white’ and black-negro ‘plume 
hunters.’”3 although Hornaday did not estimate the relative strength of 
each army division, he clearly feared the meat-gunners and feather traders 
most of all: they hunted for the market and not just for the pot.
 Standing on the other side of the battlefield was a small “army of the 
Defense,” “friends of wild life who themselves are not on the firing line.” 
This army consisted of federal officials, state game commissioners, bird 
conservationists, zoological societies, and recreational hunters. a veteran 
of earlier wildlife skirmishes (he was past president of the american Bison 
Society), Hornaday was pessimistic about the war’s outcome: “Over the 
world at large, i think the active Destroyers outnumber the active Defend-
ers of wild life at least in the ratio of 00 to 1; and the money available to 
the Destroyers is to the fund of the Defenders as 00 is to 1.”4
 One need not accept Hornaday’s manichean perspective or his racial-
ized categories to appreciate the power of his metaphor. During much of 
the nineteenth century, americans waged what can aptly be described as 
an unwitting—and ultimately self-defeating—war against their own wild-
life. “There was a hazy kind of faith,” John C. Phillips (one of the leaders 
of the army of the Defense) later wrote, “in the existence far north of our 
borders of a sort of mysterious duck and snipe factory which could turn 
out the required supply practically forever.”5 This faith was misplaced. as 
railroads began to crisscross North america, as the american and Cana-
dian populations moved westward, as farmers turned wetlands into fields, 
and as more and more commercial hunters blasted the sky for meat and 
feathers, the vast flocks of birds that once migrated across North america 
were becoming noticeably scarcer.
 The front lines of the avian war ran north to south along the four great 
migratory routes of North america—routes Frederick C. lincoln later 
named the atlantic, mississippi, Central, and Pacific flyways—that most 
bird populations used on their annual travels up and down the Western 
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Hemisphere. The main battlegrounds were the “staging posts” along these 
routes—places where birds collected to rest and feed before undertaking 
the next stage of their migration, many of which were located in the United 
States. By 1910, the nation’s most renowned birding sites had become, as 
Hornaday noted, “so thoroughly ‘shot out’ that they have ceased to hold 
their former rank.” among these shot-out sites were Cape Cod (massachu-
Atlantic Mississippi
Central Pacific
Figure 2.1 The four major flyways of North America: Atlantic, Mississippi, 
Central, and Pacific. 
Figure 2.1. The four major flyways of North america: atlantic, mississippi, Central, and 
Pacific. adapted from Frederick linc ln, The Migration of American Birds (New York: 
Doubleday, 1939), 13, 167, 172, and 17.
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setts), the Great South Bay (New York), Currituck Sound (South Carolina), 
marsh island (louisiana), the Sunk lands (arkansas), the Great Salt lake 
(Utah), Klamath lake (Oregon), the lakes of minnesota, the whole mid-
west, and all of southern California.6
 The weapons of choice were the pump-gun, punt-gun, automatic rifle, 
and most especially the twelve-gauge shotgun, all weapons of capable of mas-
sive destruction. in 1911 alone, the country’s four largest cartridge manu-
facturers (Winchester, Union metallic, Peters, and Western) produced a 
combined total of 77 million shotgun cartridges, more than enough to 
pockmark the sky with buckshot. “it is natural,” Hornaday noted, “for the 
duck-butchers of Currituck to love the automatic shot-guns as they do, be-
cause they kill the most ducks per flock. . . . it is natural for an awkward and 
blundering wing-shot to love the deadliest gun, in order that he may make 
as good a bag as an expert shot can make with a double-barreled gun. it is 
natural for the hunter who does not care a rap about the extermination of 
species to love the gun that will enable him to kill up to the bag limit, every 
time he takes to the field.”7
 The passenger pigeon was the best-known casualty of this warfare. 
Once by far the most plentiful bird in all of North america—with popula-
tion numbers estimated at 3 to  billion—it was all but extinct by the be-
ginning of the twentieth century (the last one dying in the Cincinnati Zoo 
in 1914), a victim of overhunting, habitat loss, and disease.8 Nine other bird 
species—the great auk, the labrador duck, the Pallas cormorant, the Es-
kimo curlew, the Cuban tricolored macaw, the Gosse’s macaw, the yellow-
winged green parrot, the purple Guadeloupe parakeet, and the Carolina 
parakeet—were also extinct or nearly so by 1910. Other birds—including 
the whooping crane, the trumpeter swan, the american flamingo, the 
long-billed curlew, the american egret, the snowy egret, the wood duck, 
the band-tailed pigeon, the heath hen, and the California condor—were 
directly in the crosshairs, their numbers so depleted at the time Hornaday 
wrote that extinction seemed only a matter of time. Shorebirds were es-
pecially endangered, among them the woodcock, the snipe, the willet, the 
dowitcher, the red-breasted sandpiper, the pectoral sandpiper, the upland 
plover, and the golden plover. Because market hunters could reach their 
rookeries with little effort, Hornaday predicted they would soon become 
“the first to be exterminated in North america as a group.”9
 Gentlemen sportsmen, game hogs, meat-gunners, feather traders, 
immigrants, and poor southerners—as Hornaday well knew—were but 
the foot soldiers of this avian war. Two powerful warlords stood behind 
them, partially hidden amid the fog of battle: the meatpacking industry, 
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congregated in Chicago, Boston, New Orleans, San Francisco, and a few 
other major cities, where millions of game birds were processed, sold, and 
shipped each year, and the millinery industry, headquartered in New York, 
which catered to the fashion in feathered hats. Behind these industries in 
turn stood american consumers, the real perpetrators of this war, and most 
especially urban middle- and upper-class whites, who found it sporting to 
dine on game birds and bedeck themselves with feathers. as historian Jen-
nifer Price pithily noted, it was a time when “women were women, men 
were men, and birds were hats.”10
 meatpackers were interested solely in “game birds,” defined as any spe-
cies for which there was enough consumer demand to make it worthwhile 
to kill, dress, package, and market them. Ducks, geese, swans, and other wa-
terfowl were the mainstays, as were pigeons and doves. Culinary tastes for 
wild meat changed little over time, which meant that the same birds and the 
same staging posts were targeted year after year. There are no comprehen-
sive records of the yearly kill, but anecdotal evidence (gleaned largely from 
law-enforcement records) suggests the numbers must have been in the hun-
dreds of millions. During the winter of 1893–94, for instance, commercial 
hunters in Big lake, arkansas, shipped 120,000 mallards to market. at about 
the same time, some 120,000 robins were slaughtered annually in the cedar 
forests of central Tennessee.11 meanwhile, in 1902, investigators discovered a 
cold-storage facility in New York that contained over 40,000 illegally killed 
birds, including snow buntings, sandpipers, grouse, plovers, and quails. and 
in 1909, louisiana reported a yearly kill of .7 million game birds (mostly 
wild ducks, quails, snipes, sandpipers, plovers, doves, geese, and brants).12
 if meatpackers wanted game birds, the millineries sought “ornamental 
birds,” defined as any species with colorful, large, or unusual plumage, the 
rarer the better. most were not considered edible, so their carcasses were 
discarded after the feathers, wings, heads, and other fashion parts had been 
plucked and cut from them. Tanagers, cardinals, indigo buntings, orioles, 
blue jays, juncos, mourning doves, cuckoos, kingfishers, egrets, herons, 
owls, brown pelicans, and grebes were among the preferred species, but the 
fickleness of fashion ensured that the carnage spread across a wide range 
of birds all around the world.13 The fall fashion of 187 (the first year of 
the plumage craze) called for hats bedecked with hummingbird, pigeon, 
and bird of paradise feathers, as well as the wings of larks, blackbirds, and 
starlings. By the spring of 1884, stylish bonnets had to be adorned with 
the aigrettes (nuptial plumes) of herons or with marabou and humming-
bird feathers. The 1896 winter season featured the wings, tails, and quills of 
grebes, parrots, and ostriches, and the summer vogue of 1899 brought forth 
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walking hats covered with whole stuffed birds and golf hats ornamented 
with wings and feathers.14 Though there are no reliable figures, conserva-
tionists estimated at the time that at least 200 million birds were sacrificed 
worldwide each year at the altar of hat vanity.15
 Hornaday wrote in a period when the outcome of the avian war was 
still uncertain. in retrospect, it is easy to see that he greatly underestimated 
the size of the army of the Defense and the weapons at its disposal. it 
consisted of three articulate and powerful divisions: bird conservation-
ists (bird-watchers and bird scientists), recreational hunters, and farmers. 
Those in the first group—bird conservationists—came together in the 
1880s under the aegis of two closely linked organizations: the american 
Ornithologists’ Union (aOU) and the National association of audubon 
Societies (hereafter the audubon Society). aside from Hornaday, the most 
prominent leaders included George Bird Grinnell, editor of the sporting 
journal Forest and Stream; William Dutcher, first president of the audubon 
Society and an aOU member; and T. Gilbert Pearson, second president 
of the audubon Society and first president of the international Commit-
tee for Bird Preservation (established in 1922). The predominance of male 
names in the upper echelons of these organizations was deceptive, for al-
most all local and state bird chapters of the audubon Society were estab-
lished, led, and dominated by women—Harriet Hemenway, mabel Osgood 
Wright, minna B. Hall, Orinda Hornbrooke, and Jennie June Croly among 
them—even if national policies and diplomatic initiatives were largely in 
the hands of men.16
 Recreational hunters made up the second group of bird protectionists. 
at the time, no clear line separated conservationists and sportsmen (audu-
bon, Grinnell, Dutcher, Hornaday, and Pearson were all penitent butchers, 
much like their counterparts in africa). Nor was there a sharp break be-
tween those who hunted recreationally and those who earned some extra 
cash by supplying the local or national market; many hunters shot for food 
or sport on some days and for profit on others. Organizationally, however, 
recreational hunters constituted a distinct group: their political voice was 
the american Game Protective and Propagation association (aGPPa), an 
organization inspired and funded by Remington, Winchester, Dupont, and 
other gun and ammunition manufacturers. led by John Bird Burnham, 
aGPPa concerned itself exclusively with the conservation of game ani-
mals and the promulgation of laws to end commercial hunting. Some or-
nithologists shunned this organization (Pearson, for instance, declined 
the offer to become its first president), but many welcomed it as a useful 
counterbalance to the meatpacking lobby. like many gun lobbies before 
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and since, it also had plenty of money to throw around for purposes of 
propaganda and political influence.17
 The third group of bird conservationists worked in the U.S. De-
partment of agriculture’s Bureau of Biological Survey (hereafter the 
Biological Survey), which was later transferred to the Department of 
the interior and renamed the Fish and Wildlife Service. Established at 
the urging of the aOU, the Biological Survey was entrusted with the 
task of protecting insectivorous and weed-eating birds—“birds useful 
to agriculture,” in the language of the day—from decimation and ex-
tinction.18 The Department of agriculture estimated in 1904 that insect 
pests destroyed roughly 1 percent of the U.S. yield of cereals, hay, cot-
ton, tobacco, sugars, fruits, and other farm and forest products each year, 
or $79 million out of a total of $. billion.19 in an era when chemical 
insecticides were still largely unknown, farmers and foresters were al-
most wholly dependent on birds to keep their crops and timber free of 
deadly pests. Unfortunately, many of these birds—including the rose-
breasted grosbeak (which feeds on insect larvae), the scarlet tanager 
(tree lice), the cedar waxwing (cankerworm), the downy woodpecker 
(codling moth), the Baltimore oriole (cotton weevil), the upland plover 
(clover-leaf weevil), the killdeer (locusts), the sandpiper (grasshoppers), 
and the american goldfinch (weeds)—were being slaughtered en masse 
for their meat and feathers.20
 The bob-tail quail was perhaps the most beloved—and endangered—
of these agricultural birds, a fact that Hornaday used to great effect in his 
speeches and writings. as he wrote in Our Vanishing Wild Life:
The next time you regale a good appetite with blue points, 
terrapin stew, filet of sole and saddle of mutton, touched up 
here and there with the high lights of rare old sherry, rich claret 
and dry monopole, pause as the dead quail is laid before you, on 
a funeral pyre of toast, and consider this: “Here lies the charred 
remains of the Farmer’s ally and Friend, poor Bob White. in 
life he devoured 14 different kinds of bad insects, and the seeds 
of 129 anathema weeds. For the smaller pests of the farm, he 
was the most marvelous engine of destruction that God ever 
put together of flesh and blood. He was good, beautiful and 
true; and his small life was blameless. and here he lies, dead; 
snatched away from his field of labor, and destroyed, in order 
that i may be tempted to dine three minutes longer, after i have 
already eaten to satiety.”21
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 Prominent figures within the Biological Survey included George law-
yer, the first to promote a federal revenue stamp for waterfowl hunting 
(which later became the Duck Stamp); Theodore S. Palmer, who wrote 
the first draft of the U.S.-Canadian migratory bird treaty; Edward William 
Nelson, who helped compose the final treaty draft; and Jay “Ding” Darling, 
who was instrumental in the formulation of the U.S.-mexican treaty and 
in the passage of the Duck Stamp act. although the Biological Survey’s 
mandate extended only to insectivorous and weed-eating birds, its mem-
bers understood that the preferred diet of this or that individual species 
was not a scientifically sound foundation upon which to base bird conser-
vation, and from the outset, they worked closely with ornithologists to save 
a wide variety of birds and their habitats. There was, nonetheless, a limit to 
their largesse: birds that ate cereal crops (such as crows) and birds of prey 
(such as hawks and eagles) were not offered protection. as in africa, these 
types of animals were considered vermin, for which the preferred remedy 
was eradication.22
 in retrospect, it is easy to see that, in many ways, Hornaday misun-
derstood the nature of the war that he was chronicling. To begin with, 
the army of Destruction was not as solid a force as he assumed. as the 
feather carnage became better known, as crops were repeatedly devoured 
by insects, and as game birds became ever scarcer, many bird slaughterers 
switched sides and joined the army of the Defense. Here and there, the 
slaughter continued unabated, but more and more americans came to re-
alize that the killing frenzy had to come to an end before bird populations 
plummeted beyond the possibility of replenishment (the disappearance 
of the passenger pigeon served as a wake-up call for many). Furthermore, 
over time, a new front began to open up in this war: the legislatures and 
courts of North america. This phase of the war pitted states’ rights and 
provincial rights advocates in the United States and Canada against federal 
authorities, nationalists against internationalists, and strict construction-
ists against judicial activists. as the battlefront moved from the flyways to 
the political arena, the army of the Defense swelled with legislators and 
judges with a Progressive Era belief in the power of government and the 
importance of conservation.
 Four simple but ingenious conservation measures brought the slaugh-
ter to an abrupt halt in the first half of the twentieth century. The first 
was a ban on hunting during the spring and summer months (known col-
loquially as the spring shooting season). This measure put an end to the 
killing of females and their young offspring during the mating and breed-
ing months. The second was the outlawing of all commercial bird hunting. 
66  | The Game of Conservation
This move saved game and nongame birds alike from mass slaughter at 
the hands of the meatpacking and millinery industries, while leaving rec-
reational hunters free to shoot during the open season. The third mea-
sure entailed complete protection for certain endangered birds in order 
to restore their depleted populations. The fourth was the establishment 
of special bird reserves (sometimes also know by the quasi-religious term 
sanctuaries). These reserves provided breeding, feeding, and wintering sites 
for both migratory and nonmigratory species.
 Ultimately, the real enemies of bird protection were those who op-
posed uniform game laws, who saw no value in bird reserves, who believed 
that state and provincial authorities could protect migratory animals with-
out federal and international oversight, and who put too much credence 
in the invisible hand of laissez-faire economics. Success in the avian war 
depended almost entirely on an active federal government and a strong 
spirit of international cooperation—and therefore, on the defeat of states’ 
righters, isolationists, and free traders.
From State and Provincial Game Laws to Federal Protection, 
1871–1913
For most of the nineteenth century, game laws within the forty-eight states 
that make up the continental United States (some of which were still ter-
ritories at the time) tended to be lax, ineffective, or nonexistent. as of 1870, 
only one state had imposed a complete ban on spring shooting of game 
birds. another eleven had modest spring restrictions, and the remaining 
thirty-six states offered no restrictions whatsoever.23 Regarding nongame 
birds, only sixteen states offered any protection, typically of a minimal na-
ture, such as the outlawing of Sunday hunting (minnesota and iowa), pro-
scriptions on killing certain insectivorous birds (Connecticut and Pennsyl-
vania), protection for a few favored species (massachusetts, Rhode island, 
and maine), or a ban on shooting “harmless” and small birds (New Jersey, 
Kentucky, and michigan).24
 Bird laws gradually grew more stringent over time, especially in states 
that had strong aOU or audubon chapters or effective hunting organiza-
tions. a precedent-setting Supreme Court decision—Geer v. Connecticut 
(1896)—also acted as a spur to legislation, putting to rest the question of 
whether the state “owned” the wild animals within its borders or whether 
they belonged to those who owned the land upon which they were shot. 
The Geer case revolved around a hunter convicted of transporting game 
birds across state lines, in violation of Connecticut law. The hunter con-
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tended that a state had no right to regulate this type of interstate commerce. 
Writing on behalf of the Court majority, however, Justice Edward Douglas 
White upheld Connecticut’s law and established the state-ownership doc-
trine in the process: “The right to preserve game flows from the undoubted 
existence in the state of a police power to that end.”25
 after the Geer decision, state legislatures passed a flurry of game laws 
with little fear of a constitutional challenge, and by 1913, legal protec-
tion for birds had improved remarkably. There was also a modest trend 
in the direction of uniformity among the states. all 48 states exercised 
some level of control over the hunting season, all required nonresidents 
to purchase a hunting license, all banned the export of certain game birds 
outside state borders, and all but one (North Carolina) banned the sale 
of certain game birds in state markets. Collectively, these restrictions 
placed some limits on interstate commerce in game birds, though the 
birds under protection varied too much from state to state for the restric-
tions to be truly effective. in addition, 43 states (excepting arkansas, Ken-
tucky, North Carolina, Rhode island, and Virginia) had instituted daily 
bag limits, and thirty-nine states (excepting arkansas, maine, maryland, 
mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and 
West Virginia) required resident licenses. meanwhile, forty-four states 
(excepting arkansas, mississippi, Nevada, Virginia) had a team of state 
game wardens to enforce the laws.26
 Game laws in Canada’s thirteen provinces and territories (some of 
which were not yet distinct entities) were similar to and often more strin-
gent than those in the United States. By 1913, all imposed a closed season on 
the most highly prized game birds. all but the Northwest Territories im-
posed daily bag limits on hunters and banned the export of certain game 
birds outside the province in which they were killed. all but the Northwest 
Territories and Prince Edward island also banned the sale of some game 
species on the public market. as in the United States, there was a general 
trend in the direction of greater uniformity in the laws.27
 Protection for nongame birds also gradually improved, mostly be-
cause the audubon Society successfully lobbied for passage of the aOU 
model law in many state and provincial legislatures. The aOU model 
law placed a total ban on the killing of most nongame birds and gave 
special protection to all birds with coveted plumes. as of 1913, 39 states 
(excepting arizona, idaho, Kansas, maryland, montana, Nevada, Ne-
braska, New mexico, and Utah) had passed some version of the aOU 
law, as had many Canadian provinces, though enforcement (as with the 
game laws) was spotty at best.28
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 Despite the undeniable improvements in the direction of uniformity, the 
overall quality of bird protection continued to vary greatly from state to state 
and province to province. Some states and provinces—especially Florida, ar-
kansas, and the Northwest Territories—had weak laws and few (if any) game 
wardens. Other states—California, massachusetts, and New York—had more 
stringent ones (New York was in a class of its own with passage of the 1910 
Baynes audubon Plumage law, which outlawed all commerce in wild bird 
feathers in the state). Only eighteen states put a total ban on spring shooting. 
Some states had long open seasons, and neighboring states had short ones. 
Some states made an effort to protect breeding and feeding grounds, and oth-
ers did not. Some states and provinces patrolled their borders diligently, and 
others winked as contraband crossed state and national lines. None of the 
atlantic states or provinces offered any real protection to shorebirds, many 
of which were being decimated for their feathers. and not a single state or 
province placed a total ban on commercial hunting.29
 in the absence of uniform state and provincial laws or effective en-
forcement mechanisms, it was child’s play for meat-gunners to shoot birds 
in one state or province and fence the contraband in a neighboring one. 
and in the absence of international regulations, it was equally simple for 
milliners to evade the intent of the aOU model law by importing orna-
mental feathers from outside the United States. By the 1890s, therefore, 
state game commissioners, bird protectionists, and sportsmen began to 
clamor more and more for federal legislation.
 Finding a legislative majority in the U.S. Congress in favor of national 
bird protection, however, was no simple task: the idea of a powerful and ac-
tive federal government was still hotly contested, especially in the southern 
states, where the states’ rights cause was strong. The various presidents of 
the period—William mcKinley (1897–1901), Theodore Roosevelt (1901–9), 
William Howard Taft (1909–13), and Woodrow Wilson (1913–21)—could 
generally be counted on to favor federal bird legislation, with the possible 
exception of Taft. But it was anybody’s guess as to how the U.S. Supreme 
Court might rule on the matter, since Geer v. Connecticut applied only to 
the states, not to the federal government.30
 Given the political and legal constraints, federal legislation progressed 
slowly and cautiously. in 1900, Congress passed the lacey Game and Wild 
Birds Preservation and Disposition act (hereafter the lacey act), named 
after Representative John lacey (R-ia), the wildlife enthusiast who spon-
sored the legislation. it prohibited the transport of wild animals, includ-
ing birds and bird parts, across state lines if the person involved was in 
violation of state law when and where the animals were killed. Signed by 
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President mcKinley, it gave the Department of agriculture jurisdiction 
over the law’s enforcement (though it was expected that the department 
would rely primarily on state game commissioners). The lacey act caused 
little concern to states’ rights advocates because it bolstered already exist-
ing state laws without imposing uniform standards. Unfortunately, it was 
also a weak law, with no federal enforcement procedures and no funds for 
wardens. it did not take long for commercial hunters to realize they could 
flout the law with impunity.31
 The next step came in 1904, when Representative George Shiras (i-Pa), 
an avid wildlife photographer with ties to the Republican Party, intro-
duced a bill in Congress “to protect the migrating game birds of the 
United States.” Supported by Roosevelt, the measure bounced around 
Congress for nearly a decade before being amended to include birds 
useful to agriculture (the so-called dickey-bird clause) and eventually 
passed as the migratory Bird act of 1913. it is more commonly known 
as the Weeks-mclean law, after Representative John Weeks (R-ma) and 
Senator George P. mclean (R-CT), who were instrumental in securing 
its passage. a mere page in length, the Weeks-mclean law was one of 
the greatest milestones in U.S. bird-protection history. it targeted com-
mercial hunting and the illegal transport of migratory birds, as well as 
placing proscriptions on the killing of insectivorous birds. The most con-
tentious part of the legislation read:
all wild geese, wild swans, brant, wild ducks, snipe, plover, 
woodcock, rail, wild pigeons and all other migratory game 
and insectivorous birds which in their northern and southern 
migrations pass through or do not remain permanently the 
entire year within the borders of any State or Territory, shall 
hereafter be deemed to be within the custody and protection of the 
Government of the United States, and shall not be destroyed or 
taken contrary to regulations hereinafter provided therefore.32
 Empowered by the custody and protection clause, the Department of 
agriculture imposed a nationwide ban on spring hunting and began to 
construct a set of regulatory guidelines for state governments to follow. 
The era of national protection had begun.
 meanwhile, President Wilson’s new administration secured passage 
of the Underwood Tariff act of 1913, which included a “feather proviso” 
(paragraph 347, formulated by Hornaday and Pearson) to curtail the in-
ternational feather trade. it stated: “The importation of aigrettes, egret 
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plumes or so-called osprey plumes, and the feathers, quills, heads, wings, 
tails, skins, or parts of skins, of wild birds, either raw or manufactured, 
and not for scientific or educational purposes is hereby prohibited.”33 
The Underwood Tariff passed handily, though not without a debate that 
revealed the woeful ignorance of many senators and members of Con-
gress on conservation matters. Thus, James a. Reed (D-mO), addressing 
the question of protecting egrets, stated: “i really honestly want to know 
why there should be any sympathy or sentiment about a long-legged, long-
beaked, long-necked bird that lives in swamps, and eats tadpoles and fish 
and crawfish and things of that kind. Why should we worry ourselves into 
a frenzy because some lady adorns her hat with one of its feathers, which 
appears to be the only use it has?”34
 The Underwood Tariff act stood on a firm constitutional foundation—
the interstate commerce clause. The Weeks-mclean law, however, was 
vulnerable to both political and legal challenges. its backers had slipped 
it into the Department of agriculture’s appropriation bill as a last-minute 
rider, leaving its opponents no real opportunity for discussion or debate. 
President Taft had then signed the bill on his last day in office, without 
realizing that the rider had been attached (he later claimed he would prob-
ably have vetoed it had he known). This stealth tactic merely ensured that 
the law’s opponents would vigorously dispute its validity in the courts.35
 in fact, the Weeks-mclean law drew seventeen legal challenges in 
its first year alone and three more in the following year. as of 1916, the 
number of pending cases in federal and state courts had grown to twenty, 
with another thirty-three coming down the pike. There was, moreover, no 
uniformity to the judicial opinions that came out of these cases. Federal 
district courts in Oregon, California, South Dakota, Nebraska, minnesota, 
and michigan upheld the constitutionality of the law, but federal district 
courts in arkansas and Kansas and the state supreme courts of Kansas and 
maine did not.36 Two of the federal cases in particular captured national 
attention: United States v. Shauver (1914) and United States v. McCullagh 
(191). in the Shauver case, a federal judge in arkansas threw out the con-
viction of a coot-shooter, agreeing with the defendant that the federal gov-
ernment had no jurisdiction over arkansas’s wild animals. in the McCul-
lagh case, a federal judge in Kansas invoked the delegated-powers doctrine 
to toss a case involving a duck hunter: “if the act in question shall, on any 
ground, or for any reason, be upheld and enforced, it must surely follow 
[that] the many laws of the separate States of this Union must hereafter be 
held inoperative, for there can be no divided authority of the nation and 
the several States over the single subject matter in issue.” Two state cases 
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also received a high level of publicity. in State v. Savage (191), the Kansas 
Supreme Court ruled that “the natural flight of wild fowl from one point 
to another does not constitute ‘commerce,’ unless that word be expanded 
beyond any significance heretofore given it.”37 Similarly, in State v. Sawyer 
(191), the maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled that neither the commerce 
clause nor the general-welfare clause applied to the issue of migratory birds.38
 Of these cases, only United States v. Shauver reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and it was never fully adjudicated. at the first hearing, in October 
191, only six of the nine justices were present, and they were evenly split. 
The case was argued again in 1916, this time in front of all nine judges. By 
that point, however, Chief Justice White—the author of the Geer v. Con-
necticut decision and a passionate champion of federal bird protection—
had become convinced that a majority of the justices would declare the 
Weeks-mclean law unconstitutional. He therefore used his powers as 
chief justice to delay a verdict until Congress had a chance to find a way 
around this constitutional impasse.39
 as it turned out, the easiest way around the impasse was to wrap the 
Weeks-mclean law into an international treaty. Treaty making clearly fell 
within the prerogatives of the federal government, and a migratory bird 
treaty would therefore rest on firm constitutional footing.40
The 1916 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds
it is not entirely clear who first came up with the idea of circumventing 
the constitutionality issue via the 1916 Convention for the Protection of 
migratory Birds (hereafter the 1916 Convention). There is some indirect 
evidence to suggest that it came out of a private conversation between a 
State Department lawyer (Fred K. Neilsen?) and a Supreme Court justice 
(Chief Justice White or Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes?), but there is no of-
ficial record of this conversation.41 What is clear is that Senator Elihu Root 
(R-NY) was the first to suggest a bird treaty in public. Root was a well-
known internationalist who had helped initiate a new era in U.S.-Canadian 
relations while serving as Roosevelt’s secretary of state. in January 1913, he 
introduced a Senate motion asking the president to pursue an accord with 
the “Governments of other North american countries.”42 When it stalled, 
Senator mclean introduced a near-identical motion proposing “the ne-
gotiation of a convention for the mutual protection and preservation of 
birds.” it passed in april 1913.43
 President Wilson responded to the Senate resolution by dashing off 
a quick note to his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, that stated: 
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“Personally, i should very much like to do this.”44 initially, Wilson and 
Bryan had two broadly based international treaties in mind. The first was a 
U.S.-initiated treaty to protect migratory birds in the Western Hemisphere 
and the Pacific, which would include the territories of Canada, mexico, 
South america, and Japan. The second was a British-initiated treaty to halt 
“the traffic in birds’ plumage for millinery purposes” worldwide.45 Both 
initiatives, however, would have required extensive diplomacy, by which 
time (it was feared) the Supreme Court would have voided the Weeks-
mclean law. Racing against the clock, the Wilson administration decided 
to reduce the territorial scope to Canada alone and to narrow the focus to 
migratory birds only.46
 Canada’s national government responded favorably to a bilateral 
treaty, though negotiations did not proceed quite as quickly as the Wil-
son administration had hoped. Unlike the United States, Canada lacked 
a well-organized army of the Defense poised to champion the cause of 
bird protection. The country had many notable bird organizations—the 
Thomas mcilwraith Field Naturalists’ Club of Ontario among them—but 
none comparable in size and stature to the aOU or audubon Society. Nor 
was there much of a groundswell of public support for protection; in fact, 
some Canadians distrusted the treaty idea simply because it originated 
in the United States. missing too were well-funded sportsmen’s lobbies, 
though the North american Fish and Game Protective association (a joint 
Canadian-U.S. organization) pushed for the treaty, as did the U.S.-based 
aGPPa. Both the Grand Trunk Railway and the Canadian Pacific Railway 
lent some support, mostly because their executives realized that wildlife 
attracted train tourists to the nation’s national parks. also backing the 
treaty was the tiny South Essex County Conservation Club, founded by 
Jack miner, a pioneer in the establishment of bird reserves in Ontario, and 
Percy Taverner, a self-taught ornithologist who worked at the National 
museum of Canada (now the Canadian museum of Nature) in Ottawa.47
 in the absence of a powerful and active bird lobby, the task of secur-
ing a treaty landed largely on the shoulders of middle-level civil servants, 
chiefly C. Gordon Hewitt, the Dominion consulting zoologist; James 
Harkin, the commissioner of Dominion parks, Canada’s national park 
service; maxwell Graham, chief of the animal Division of the Dominion 
Parks Branch; and martin Burrell, the minister of agriculture, a lukewarm 
supporter at best. Clifford Sifton and James White, chair and assistant 
chair of the Commission of Conservation (a short-lived, quasi-private 
institution created by the ministry of interior in 1909), also played a role 
in the discussions.
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 as in the United States, Dominion officials found themselves treading 
largely on terra incognita. The British North american act of 1867, which 
governed Canada’s Dominion status within the British Empire, placed the 
country’s natural resources under the jurisdiction of the provinces. Though 
the 1867 act did not specifically list wildlife as a natural resource, federal 
authorities had traditionally treated it as one and had left hunting issues 
to provincial discretion, except in those regions that were directly under 
federal jurisdiction (such as the Northwest Territories). Before usurping a 
traditional provincial prerogative, federal authorities would normally take 
the matter to the provincial parliaments for a vote. This path, however, 
was bound to be slow and arduous and, in the end, probably also futile. 
They therefore chose the more expeditious route of asking the provincial 
cabinets (the premiers and their cabinet members) to agree to the treaty in 
principle and leave it up to Ottawa to negotiate the details. Though faster, 
this path had one disadvantage: it required the unanimous approval of the 
provincial cabinets, which meant that the treaty’s provisions were hostage 
to the whims of each and every provincial cabinet.48
 Fortunately, the majority of cabinets—including those of Quebec, 
Ontario, Prince Edward island, New Brunswick, alberta, manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan—saw the benefits of uniform game laws and gave their con-
sent with few complaints or delays. among the others, the Yukon Territory 
was inadvertently overlooked and thus not consulted until after the treaty 
was signed. Newfoundland, which would not become a province until 
1949, remained outside the treaty’s scope. The Northwest Territories was 
already subject to national jurisdiction. Nova Scotia came on board after 
being promised a revision in the hunting season for shorebirds. British Co-
lumbia was the sole holdout, mostly because hunters there wanted to keep 
their traditional open season (five and a half months for ducks, six months 
for geese) and because some provincial officials feared (incorrectly, as it 
turned out) that the treaty would not apply to the nearby Territory of 
alaska.49 Eventually, the premier agreed not to thwart the negotiations as 
long as the treaty incorporated language giving British Columbia special 
privileges regarding the hunting of certain game birds. Once all the hurdles 
had been cleared, Canadian authorities issued an “Order in Council” on 
may 31, 191, formally approving a treaty.50
 The treaty text itself went through just one revision before reaching 
final form. Theodore Palmer of the Biological Survey wrote the initial draft 
(hereafter the Palmer Draft). For the most part, it was a compilation of 
the 1900 lacey act, the 1913 Weeks-mclean law, and existing Department 
of agriculture game regulations. Edward Nelson and C. Gordon Hewitt 
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formulated the second draft (hereafter the Final Text) in light of changes 
demanded by Dominion authorities, the recalcitrant Canadian provinces, 
and several U.S. states.51
 The Palmer Draft was so well crafted that Nelson and Hewitt only had 
to make about a dozen alterations altogether. most were minor changes, 
such as the insertion of the word migratory before game birds to ensure 
greater textual clarity. Three changes were more substantive. The first af-
fected the dates of the closed season. The second addressed insectivorous 
and weed-eating birds. The third exempted Native americans from some 
of the terms of the treaty. Diplomats, not bird experts, initiated all three of 
these alterations, and they reflected the political exigencies of the negotiat-
ing process. Without exception, they were made in order to bring farmers, 
reluctant legislators, or some other key constituency on board or to ad-
dress the special needs of indigenous hunters. Collectively, they reduced 
the conservationist goals of the Palmer Draft to a discernible degree—but 
not enough to erode the support of bird-protectionist groups.
 The preamble (in both the Palmer Draft and the Final Text) was wholly 
lacking in the flowery and high-minded language that characterized so 
many other treaties of that era. “The United States of america and His 
majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain,” it stated in part, 
“being desirous of saving from indiscriminate slaughter and of insuring 
the preservation of such migratory birds as are either useful to man or are 
harmless, have resolved to adopt some uniform system of protection which 
shall effectively accomplish such objects.”52 The sole purpose of the treaty 
was to create a common set of game laws. Protection was justified on two 
purely practical grounds: birds eat crop pests and humans eat birds. Only 
those migratory birds that flew across the U.S.-Canadian border (roughly 
the forty-ninth parallel) were to receive protection.
 Palmer’s preamble made only one short reference to agricultural birds: 
“many of these species are of great value in destroying noxious insects or as 
a source of food but are nevertheless in danger of extermination through 
lack of adequate protection during the nesting season or on their way to and 
from their breeding grounds.” Both Nelson and Hewitt, however, realized 
that textual additions were needed to ensure that farmers would support 
the treaty. The Final Text was therefore strengthened to read: “many of 
these species are of great value as a source of food or in destroying insects 
which are injurious to forests and forage plants on the public domain, as well 
as to agricultural crops, in both the United States and Canada, but are never-
theless in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection 
during the nesting season or while on their way to and from their breed-
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ing grounds.” in addition, a whole new section (article Vii) was added to 
ensure that the treaty did not interfere with farm-management policies: 
“Permits to kill any of the above-named birds, which under extraordinary 
conditions may become seriously injurious to the agricultural interests in any 
particular community, may be issued by the proper authorities of the High 
Contracting Powers under suitable regulations prescribed therefor by them re-
spectively, but such permits shall lapse, or may be cancelled at any time when 
in the opinion of the said authorities the particular exigency has passed and 
no birds killed under this article shall be shipped, sold or offered for sale.”53
 article i expanded the scope of the preamble somewhat in terms of 
both the birds deserving protection and the definition of migratory. most 
important, it enumerated three categories of birds (not two, as suggested 
by the preamble). The first category was “migratory game birds.” This set 
included the order limicolae (shorebirds) and the families anatidae (water-
fowl), Gruidae (cranes), Rallidae (rails), and Columbidae (pigeons). The 
second category, “migratory insectivorous birds,” included bobolinks, 
cuckoos, flycatchers, grosbeaks, meadowlarks, robins, waxwings, and many 
other species deemed useful to farmers and foresters. The third category 
was “other migratory nongame birds,” a catchall phrase that allowed for 
the inclusion of the auk, the heron, the puffin, the tern, and other endan-
gered birds. it was a credit to the diplomats that they did not make any 
changes whatsoever to article i of the Palmer Draft, even though all three 
categories included some species whose migratory routes did not neces-
sarily entail a border crossing and even though the third category included 
many birds with no hunting or agricultural value.54
 article ii established the framework for a uniform hunting season in 
both countries. it limited the open season on game birds to a maximum 
of three and a half months per year, while prohibiting spring and summer 
shooting. The Final Text mandated a closed season for most game birds 
from march 10 to September 1. For shorebirds, it began February 1 and 
lasted until august 1. States and provinces were free to choose the opening 
and closing dates of the shooting season in their own territories, so long 
as those dates were within the time frame of September 1 and march 10 
(august 1 and February 1 for shorebirds) and did not exceed three and 
a half months in length. a year-round closed season was declared for all 
migratory insectivorous birds and other migratory nongame birds. it was 
symptomatic of the game-law mentality that the negotiators couched what 
was obviously meant as a permanent and total ban on the shooting of these 
birds in the language of a “close season” that “shall continue throughout 
the year.”55
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 in the same vein, article iii established a “continuous close season” 
for a period of ten years on a number of endangered game birds, including 
the band-tailed pigeon, crane (little brown, sandhill, and whooping), swan, 
and curlew. all shorebirds—except the plover (black-breasted and golden), 
Wilson’s snipe, woodcock, and yellowleg (greater and lesser)—received the 
same protection. article iV extended special protection to the wood duck 
and eider duck, both of which were so beloved by trigger-happy hunt-
ers that their survival was in doubt. This article gave states and provinces 
considerable leeway in determining how best to protect these ducks. They 
could declare a year-round closed season for five years or more, establish 
duck refuges, or enact “other regulations as may be deemed appropriate.” 
Theoretically, they could even continue to allow an open season on wood 
duck and eider duck, as long as they took adequate countermeasures to 
ensure a rebound of these species within their territories.56
 articles ii and iii of the Final Text differed in significant ways from 
the Palmer Draft. Palmer sought a considerably longer closed season—to 
begin on February 1 and last until September 1, dates that spanned the 
breeding season for nearly all bird species. However, at the insistence of 
fifty-two U.S. members of Congress from a handful of states (principally 
from louisiana, mississippi, illinois, and missouri), Hewitt and Nelson 
felt compelled to reduce the mandated closed season by nearly six weeks, 
so that it began march 10 and ended September 1. initially, the Biological 
Survey stiffly resisted the new dates, as did Hewitt, arguing (with much jus-
tification) that it left mothers and their young vulnerable during the earli-
est part of the breeding season. But they yielded to the political pressure 
once they received assurances that the three-and-a-half-month–maximum 
open season would remain intact.57
 The demands of Nova Scotia and British Columbia account for the re-
maining changes in the dates of the hunting season. The Palmer Draft called 
for a closed season on migratory shorebirds (limicolae) from February 1 
to September 1. Nova Scotia negotiated a shortening of the closed season 
by about two weeks—February 1 to august 1—for hunters residing on the 
atlantic coast north of Chesapeake Bay (roughly the New England states and 
the maritime provinces). This change did not trouble the U.S. negotiators 
because the Department of agriculture already granted these same excep-
tions to the New England states in its domestic regulations. British Colum-
bia, meanwhile, refused to adhere to the mandatory ten-year closed season 
on cranes, swans, and curlews, all of which were protected by article iii. To 
accommodate this objection, the Final Text gave that province’s parliament 
leeway in deciding whether these game birds deserved protection.58
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 The Palmer Draft did not address the issue of indigenous hunting 
rights at all, even though it was common practice in the Territory of alaska, 
the Northwest Territories, and elsewhere to exempt “indians” and “Eski-
mos” from some game provisions. To rectify this deficiency, the Canadian 
government secured a slight change to article ii. Paragraph 1 (which dealt 
with the issue of closed seasons) was amended to read: “indians may take 
at any time scoters for food but not for sale.” Paragraph 3 (which protected 
certain endangered birds) was reworded to read: Eskimos and Indians may 
take at any season auks, auklets, guillemots, murres, and puffins, and their 
eggs, for food and their skins for clothing, but the birds and eggs so taken 
shall not be sold or offered for sale.”59 indigenous hunters, however, were 
not exempted from the spring-shooting ban on other birds, even though 
other treaties guaranteed them the right to year-round hunting (this was 
not an oversight but rather a deliberate attempt by Canadian authorities 
to use this treaty to override previous agreements).60 They circumvented 
the treaty as best they could, and sensible game wardens winked at their 
transgressions, but it remained a major focal point of discontent until the 
Protocol amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of migratory 
Birds finally eliminated these restrictions in 199.61
 Neither the Palmer Draft nor the Final Text addressed the interna-
tional feather trade directly, since a separate treaty was being contemplated 
at the time. Two articles, however, put limits on the commerce in other bird 
products, using language borrowed from the lacey act of 1900. article V 
prohibited the “taking of nests or eggs of migratory game or insectivorous 
or nongame birds” except for scientific purposes. article Vi prohibited 
the “shipment or export of migratory birds or their eggs from any State 
or Province, during the continuance of the close season in such State or 
Province.” The same article also prohibited the “international traffic in any 
birds or eggs” that were “captured, killed, taken, or shipped at any time 
contrary to the laws of the State or Province in which the same were cap-
tured, killed, taken, or shipped.” The latter prohibition, which appeared in 
the Palmer Draft, was initially removed on the grounds that it strayed too 
far from the purpose of the treaty, but it was restored in the Final Text.62
 Canada’s quasi-colonial status within the British Empire delayed the 
ratification process. Negotiators in Ottawa and Washington began work 
on the Final Text in February 1914. after they finished, it then had to go 
to the British Embassy and from there to the Foreign Office, Colonial 
Office, governor-general’s office, and finally back to the British Embassy. 
(Even U.S. authorities were left in the dark for a long while as to its where-
abouts, not least because the Order in Council lay misfiled for months in 
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the British Embassy.) The outbreak of World War i in Europe in august 
1914 no doubt slowed the process as well. at long last, the British govern-
ment agreed to the treaty in February 1916; the U.S. secretary of state, Rob-
ert lansing, and the British ambassador, Cecil Spring-Rice, formally signed 
the treaty in august 1916; and both governments ratified it in December 
1916. Cecil Spring-Rice’s apt description of the treaty—as an agreement 
“by which the protection accorded to migratory birds in the United States 
under the law of march 4th, 1913 [the Weeks-mclean law], should be ex-
tended to the Dominion of Canada”—clearly belied its U.S. origins.63
 The 1916 Convention required each government to pass an enabling 
law, known in Canada as the migratory Birds Convention act of 1917 
(mBCa) and in the United States as the migratory Bird Treaty act of 1918 
(mBTa). aside from reiterating the treaty’s stipulations, these laws con-
solidated past federal regulations, established game warden agencies, and 
enumerated a system of penalties and fines for poaching (typically $10 to 
$2 in the early years). in Canada, oversight was given to the governor-
general-in-council and the Department of interior. in the United States, 
authority resided first in the Department of agriculture’s Biological Sur-
vey; it was then transferred to the Department of interior’s Fish and Wild-
life Service. Both enabling laws gave these bodies a tremendous amount of 
leeway to update federal regulations year by year without first having to 
secure legislative approval. in practice, this has meant that federal, state, 
and provincial game wardens have been able to modify federal game laws 
in accordance with changing conditions.64
 States’ rights advocates in the United States—especially those in mis-
souri and Kansas—immediately challenged the constitutionality of the 1916 
Convention and mBTa, though the treaty-making clause in the U.S. Con-
stitution now put them at a great disadvantage. The main test case was 
Missouri v. Holland (1919). it pitted the attorney general of missouri, Frank 
mcallister, who went duck hunting during the federally mandated closed 
season, against Ray Holland, the federal game warden who arrested him. 
mcallister’s challenge rested entirely on the primacy of the Tenth amendment, 
which gave the states authority over matters not specifically delegated to 
the federal government. Holland’s attorneys relied on the treaty-making 
authority of the federal government. By a vote of seven to two, the Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of both the treaty and the federal 
legislation. Writing on behalf of the Court majority, Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes dismissed the notion that the Tenth amendment trumped 
the federal government’s treaty-making authority: “Wild birds are not in 
the possession of anyone, and possession is the beginning of ownership. 
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The whole foundation of the State’s rights is the presence within their ju-
risdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in 
another State, and in a week a thousand miles away.” Bird protection was a 
“national interest of very nearly the first magnitude,” beyond the capability 
of the states to handle effectively: “The subject matter is only transitorily 
within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty 
and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. 
We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit 
by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our 
crops are destroyed.”65
 Unable to thwart federal jurisdiction on constitutional grounds, treaty 
opponents attempted to exploit ambiguities in the term migratory bird to 
gut its efficacy. This time, the main test case was United States v. Lump-
kin (1921), which began when a Georgia hunter was arrested and fined $2 
for killing doves during the federally mandated closed season. The doves 
in question were mourning doves (also known as turtle doves). a song-
bird, the mourning dove had replaced the vanished passenger pigeon as 
a favorite of hunters in the southeastern part of the United States (and it 
remains to this day a mainstay of game hunters). The hunter in the Lump-
kin case contested his fine on the grounds that doves were not genuinely 
“migratory” because some mourning doves stayed within the territory of 
the United States the entire year, never reaching as far north as Canada. a 
Georgia district judge, however, disagreed: “i think what the Treaty means 
to say is this: Our purpose is to deal with migratory birds, but we do not 
want it left up in the air; we don’t want it subject to uncertainties that will 
inevitably arise, and differences of opinion that will exist in various locali-
ties; we don’t want hunters or birds under uncertainties of that sort, but 
will proceed to examine and find out and agree as to what kind of birds 
we are talking about; and they mentioned doves.” and later in the opin-
ion, he stated: “i think that this Treaty plainly states that it is agreed that 
doves (which certainly must have included turtle or mourning doves if it 
included any) are migratory.”66
 in Canada, the constitutionality of the treaty and enabling law was 
never seriously in doubt, but some hunters tested the measures nonethe-
less. The key case, King v. Clark (1920), revolved around the arrest of a 
hunter caught illegally shooting fourteen geese on Prince Edward island. 
He challenged the arrest on the grounds that the British North american 
act of 1867 gave the provinces jurisdiction over wildlife. after winning in 
municipal court, he lost on appeal to the Supreme Court of Prince Edward 
island, the presiding judge citing Oliver Wendell Holmes in rendering his 
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Figure 2.2  The breeding and wintering ranges of mourning doves 
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district judge determined that mourning doves were migratory 
even though some ocks did not cross the Canadian or Mexican 
borders during the annual movements. (Source: Tacha and Braun, 
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Figure 2.2. The breeding and wintering ranges of mourning doves (turtle doves). in 
United States v. Lumpkin (1922), a federal district judge determined that mourning 
doves were migratory even though some flocks did not cross the Canadian or mexican 
borde s during their annual movements. Thomas C. Tacha and Clait E. B un, Migra-
tory Shore and Upland Game Bir  Management in North America (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1994), 9.
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verdict. When the Canadian Supreme Court declined to hear the hunter’s 
appeal, his conviction stood. The constitutionality issue was settled.67
 as in the United States, Dominion authorities had to deal not just with 
constitutional issues but also with some dissension among the provinces. 
alberta, Saskatchewan, manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec all quickly brought 
their provincial legislation into conformity with federal law as required by 
the treaty. So did the once-recalcitrant British Columbia, which chose not 
to take advantage of the exemptions that it had been granted. Dissatisfac-
tion, however, was high among parliamentarians in the maritime Provinces 
of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward island, mostly because 
sportsmen there were reluctant to abandon their spring-shooting traditions, 
treaty or no treaty. To show its displeasure, the New Brunswick legislature 
repealed all of its waterfowl regulations, declaring that it was now up to 
federal authorities to impose and enforce game laws. Neither Nova Scotia 
nor Prince Edward island legislators took such draconian steps, but they 
did let it be known that they would not underwrite the costs of hiring game 
wardens. “The expressions that i have heard,” Prince Edward island’s pre-
mier stated at a meeting convoked to iron out federal-province differences, 
“have been to the effect that the legislation was designed for the benefit of 
the southern portion of North america.” Eventually, Dominion authorities 
were forced to hire their own game wardens to patrol these provinces. The 
Yukon Territory, for its part, felt cheated by the fact that the fall hunting 
season did not begin until September 1, by which time most waterfowl 
and shorebirds had already headed south for the winter. This unfortunate 
circumstance (which affected the neighboring Territory of alaska as well) 
could not be rectified without reopening negotiations, which neither 
Ottawa nor Washington was willing to do.68
 indigenous hunters fared no better. When the Fort Chipewyan chiefs 
in alberta Province complained in July 1927 that the U.S.-Canadian agree-
ment stood in crass contradiction to their prior treaty with the Canadian 
government, the Department of indian affairs simply told them that the 
migratory Bird Convention act trumped all prior commitments. “are we 
then to starve during the summer months,” the chiefs queried, “because 
the whiteman has broken his word to us?”69
The Path to Bird Reserves in the United States and Canada
american, Canadian, and British diplomats largely allowed bird conser-
vationists and scientists to formulate the treaty’s provisions, intervening 
only when it was necessary to guarantee a smooth ratification process. This 
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approach ensured that the treaty had a much stronger conservationist edge 
than did the african treaties of 1900 and 1933, even if (as in africa) it greatly 
shortchanged the indigenous populations. altogether, nearly 40 species 
of migratory birds came within the scope of the treaty.70 Game birds were 
protected during the breeding season, and insectivorous and endangered 
birds were protected year-round. Diplomats also allowed scientists to de-
termine which birds should receive protection, even though the list in-
cluded some that were clearly neither game nor insectivorous birds, as well 
as a few whose migratory routes were not fully known. as a rule, if conser-
vationists believed that any particular migratory bird deserved protection, 
the diplomats went along with them, as long as some of the species within 
that family inhabited both the United States and Canada.
 although there was no explicit avenue for expanding or contracting 
this list after 1916, some of the treaty’s terminology was ambiguous enough 
to allow for a degree of flexibility. article i, for instance, listed birds by 
order or family, leaving it up to federal authorities to decide which spe-
cies within these groups deserved protection. Similarly, the same article, 
after listing a few dozen insectivorous birds by species name, then turned 
around and granted protection to “all other perching birds which feed en-
tirely or chiefly on insects”; this phraseology left plenty of room for expan-
sion, since the phrase perching birds, if interpreted as being synonymous 
with the order Passeriformes, accounts for about half of all bird species 
worldwide, many of them insect-eaters. Over the next decades, both Can-
ada and the United States did in fact utilize the textual flexibility to extend 
the treaty’s protective net, until it protected nearly sixty families represent-
ing over seven hundred species.71
 The 1916 Convention, however, had some serious flaws. it established a 
three-and-a-half-month-maximum hunting season, but it did not require 
any uniformity or cooperation among the various states and provinces (or 
even among the counties or districts within a state or province) in deter-
mining the exact dates. Staggered seasons were the outcome, potentially 
leaving some game birds “under fire” at one point or another on their 
migratory routes for nearly six months of the year (though in practice, 
it would be closer to four and a half months).72 Furthermore, some 220 
migratory species initially did not receive any protection whatsoever, ei-
ther because they were not considered edible, because they did not feed 
primarily on insects and weeds, because they were birds of prey (and there-
fore deemed vermin), or because they were not yet endangered. Prominent 
among these nonprotected birds were the albatross, the cormorant, the 
pelican, the flamingo, the ibis, the hawk, the owl, the parrot, the kingfisher, 
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the crow, the jay, the blackbird, and the mockingbird—some of which 
would become endangered in the decades after the treaty went into effect. 
also specifically excluded from the terms of the treaty were all game birds 
considered resident (nonmigratory), including quails, pheasants, grouses, 
wild turkeys, and other gallinaceous birds beloved by hunters, some of 
which were already endangered.73
 Nothing in the treaty, of course, prevented Canada and the United 
States or the individual states and provinces from enacting legislation on 
their own to protect species excluded from the 1916 Convention. But the 
initiative would have to come from below, which had predictable results: 
laws were slow in coming and poorly coordinated among neighboring ter-
ritories. Before more-stringent measures were put in place, the heath hen 
would become extinct and the California condor nearly so.
 By far, the most glaring weakness in the 1916 Convention was the ab-
sence of any paragraphs specifically devoted to the establishment of bird 
reserves. Only article iV broached the subject of reserves at all and then 
only as an option for those states and provinces that chose not to institute a 
five-year closed season on endangered ducks. Those involved with negoti-
ating the 1916 Convention certainly appreciated the importance of habitat 
protection, but they were far more preoccupied with what seemed at the 
time a more urgent concern—saving overexploited birds from the brink 
of extinction. The treaty, therefore, provided no grand design for saving 
important wetlands and staging posts. Bird reserves thus emerged in hap-
hazard fashion, slowly over time.
 President Theodore Roosevelt (largely on the advice of the aOU and 
the audubon Society) had already begun to establish federal bird reserves 
in the United States, a full decade before the bird treaty was conceived. in 
keeping with the temper of the times, these reserves were not designed to 
provide a large and diverse habitat for all birds but simply to preserve a 
few endangered species at a handful of key locations. in practice, this ap-
proach largely meant protecting atlantic shorebirds from the predations of 
meat, egg, and feather hunters. in 1903, Roosevelt issued an executive order 
declaring the tiny government-owned Pelican island (Florida)—an endan-
gered brown pelican rookery—as the first federal migratory bird refuge. 
He created another fifty-five reserves by executive order during his time 
in office, including the Klamath lake Reserve (Oregon), the first designed 
specifically to protect waterfowl, and the Hawaiian islands Reservation for 
Birds, the first in the new Territory of Hawaii. Subsequent presidents fol-
lowed suit, and by 1929, the United States possessed over seventy federal 
refuges nationwide by way of executive order.74 Some state legislatures also 
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created special wildlife reserves, with California leading the way in 1870 
with the establishment of lake merritt (now just a pond in the middle 
of downtown Oakland); California was followed by indiana (1903), Penn-
sylvania (190), alabama (1907), massachusetts (1908), idaho (1909), and 
louisiana (1911).75
 meanwhile, the audubon Society set up a system of private refuges 
funded by its own membership and outside donors. By 1929, it had created 
fifty-nine sanctuaries in twelve american states, forty-two of which were 
along the atlantic shoreline: maine (ten), Connecticut (six), New York (two), 
New Jersey (one), Virginia (two), North Carolina (one), South Carolina 
(two), Georgia (three), and Florida (fifteen). Some of these refuges—such 
as the twelve-acre Roosevelt Bird Sanctuary surrounding the president’s 
grave at Oyster Bay in long island, New York—were more symbolic than 
anything else. But others—such as the twenty-six-thousand-acre Paul J. 
Rainey Wildlife Sanctuary (louisiana) on the Gulf of mexico—were large 
enough to provide protection for a wide variety of small land birds, water-
fowl, and shorebirds.76
 Congress too moved slowly but inexorably in the direction of a feder-
ally funded reserve system. in 1922, Representative Daniel anthony (R-KS) 
proposed a federal license of $1 per year applicable to hunters in all states. 
The money generated by the licenses was to be designated for the purchase 
of land for refuges and public shooting grounds, as well as for the salaries 
of game wardens. “The result of the migratory bird treaty act has been a 
great increase in the supply of wild fowl,” testified Edward Nelson, chief of 
the Biological Survey and cowriter of the 1916 Convention, appearing be-
fore a House of Representatives subcommittee in defense of anthony’s bill, 
“but the rapid increase of drainage throughout the United States is taking 
away the homes of these birds, and if this is continued without any effort 
being made to maintain marsh and water areas for the birds the ultimate 
result will be the wiping out of the birds, simply because they will have no 
place in which to live, to breed, and to feed.”77
 The anthony bill never became law, mostly because states’ righters op-
posed the concept of a federal license and because some conservationists 
(notably Hornaday) disliked the idea of creating public shooting grounds.78 
Subsequent efforts, however, were more successful. in 1924, Congress au-
thorized $1. million to purchase nonagricultural land along the missis-
sippi River between Rock island, illinois, and Wabash, minnesota, for the 
establishment of the Upper mississippi Wildlife and Fish Refuge, an im-
portant staging post on the mississippi flyway. in 1928, it authorized funds 
for the creation of the Bear River migratory Bird Refuge near the Great Salt 
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Figure 2.3. The Duck Stamp (federal wildfowl hunting license) for the 1934–3 season. 
migratory Bird Conservation Commission, 2000 Annual Report: Migratory Bird Con-
servation Commission (Washington, DC: migratory Bird Conservation Commission, 
2000), front cover.
Figure 2.4. National migratory Bird Refuge areas in the continental United States. 
migratory Bird Conservation Commission, 2000 Ann al Report: Migratory Bird Con-
servati n Commission (Washington, DC: migratory Bird Con rvation Commission, 
2000), 9.
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lake in Utah, and in 1930, it did so for the Cheyenne Bottoms migratory 
Bird Refuge in Kansas; both refuges were along the Central flyway.79
 Then, in 1929, Senator Peter Norbeck (R-SD) and Representative au-
gust andresen (R-mN) managed to steer the migratory Bird Conservation 
act (or Norbeck-andresen act) through Congress, along with a $7.8 mil-
lion appropriation for land purchases over the next ten years.80 The act 
led to the establishment of the migratory Bird Conservation Commission, 
composed of the secretaries of agriculture, commerce, and interior as well 
as two senators and two members of Congress, to oversee the purchase 
of land for bird reserves. in 1934, Congress took yet another step, passing 
the migratory Bird Hunting Stamp act (better known as the Duck Stamp 
act). its biggest champion was Ding Darling, a popular political cartoonist 
who served briefly as chief of the Biological Survey during the presidency 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–4). The act required hunters to purchase a 
$1 stamp each year (a disguised federal license) for the right to shoot wild-
fowl, with the proceeds earmarked for land purchases.81
 These congressional actions added many elements that were missing 
in the 1916 Convention and mBTa, setting the stage for the establishment 
of today’s National Wildlife Refuge System (formally constituted in 1966, 
when game ranges, wildlife ranges, wildlife-management areas, waterfowl-
production areas, and wildlife refuges were consolidated under one system). 
The figures tell the tale. Between 1903, when Theodore Roosevelt estab-
lished the first bird refuge, and 1929, when the Conservation Commission 
was created, the government set aside a total of only 668,000 acres of land 
and water for bird protection. Over the following twenty-five years, from 
1929 to 194, the government created 129 more refuges, bringing the total 
to nearly 3.8 million acres, more than a fivefold increase. Roughly one-
third of the commission’s land acquisitions during that period came from 
Duck Stamp funds, the rest from congressional appropriations.82 By the 
time the National Wildlife Refuge System celebrated its centennial in 2003, 
the number of refuges had grown to nearly 40, covering around 9 mil-
lion acres.83 (One could plausibly add the 83 million acres in 369 parks of 
the National Park System to the tally; though not specifically designed as 
bird refuges, these parks do provide safe and secure breeding and feeding 
grounds.)
 aside from administering the refuges, the Biological Survey issued new 
regulations in the 1920s and 1930s designed to protect both bird habitats 
and bird species.84 Hunting was temporarily banned year-round along cer-
tain popular stretches of the mississippi flyway to give duck populations a 
chance to rebound. Bag limits were reduced to twenty-five per day for soras; 
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twenty per day for Wilson’s snipes; fifteen per day for ducks, rails, and gal-
linules; and four per day for woodcocks and geese. a year-round closed 
season was established for black-bellied and golden plovers and greater 
and lesser yellowlegs throughout the country.85 most controversially, the 
Biological Survey banned the practice of baiting (sprinkling grain and 
other food around hunting sites to lure birds), and it restricted the estab-
lishment of private shooting grounds adjacent to federal reserves. in two 
key test cases, United States v. Reese (1939) and Bailey v. Holland (1942), the 
courts upheld the constitutionality of these regulations.
 The establishment of a bird reserve system proceeded more smoothly 
in Canada than in the United States, though the total acreage under pro-
tection in the first decades was roughly the same (640,000 acres in Canada 
as of 1933, as compared to 668,000 in 1929 in the United States).86 in 1887, 
Dominion authorities established a bird reserve at last mountain lake in 
Saskatchewan (then part of the Northwest Territories), making it the oldest 
federal bird sanctuary in North america. it was, however, a singular event, 
soon forgotten by all but a few. Then, in 191, as the U.S.-Canadian treaty 
was under negotiation, the government decided to set aside twelve lakes in 
Saskatchewan and fourteen in alberta as possible future waterfowl refuges, 
as well as three sites along the St. lawrence Gulf (Quebec) for shorebirds 
and one site in Nova Scotia for geese.87 The three along the St. lawrence 
Gulf—Percé Rock, Bonaventure island, and Bird Rocks—took on a sym-
bolic importance out of proportion to their small size, for they were saved 
just before the Department of marine and Fisheries would have destroyed 
the rookeries there on the (unfounded) grounds that cormorants and gan-
nets were eating all the fish at the expense of the local fisheries.88 Earlier, 
Jack miner had established a small private goose sanctuary on a pond next 
to his brick factory near Kingsville, Ontario, in 1904, which attracted a lot 
of press attention and tourists. it quickly became a staging post for thou-
sands of geese on their spring migration to the north, and it was eventually 
incorporated into Canada’s national refuge system.89
 in 1919, Ottawa updated its enabling law (a full decade before the 
United States passed its corresponding law), adding a section entitled “Regu-
lations for the Control of Bird Sanctuaries” that laid out a framework for 
the establishment of federal reserves and for their administration by the 
commissioner of Dominion parks. as of 1933, the country had established 
fifty-four bird refuges under Dominion and provincial control, distributed 
as follows: British Columbia (four), alberta (ten), Saskatchewan (fourteen), 
Ontario (one), Quebec (twenty-two), New Brunswick (two), and Nova 
Scotia (one).90 The refuges in British Columbia, alberta, and Saskatchewan 
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were especially important, for nearly three-quarters of Canada’s migratory 
ducks spend their summers in those provinces.91 as of 1948, the number of 
reserves had grown to seventy-four, covering 1.1 million acres.92 By 1996, 
the number had risen to ninety-eight, covering nearly 28 million acres.93
 a few Canadian parliamentarians remained hostile to bird protec-
tion, and in 1934, they made a last-ditch attempt to abrogate the treaty on 
the grounds that it favored U.S. sportsmen over their Canadian peers. The 
Canadian government, however, refused to budge, stating, “if there were 
no treaty or no regulations these birds which to a great extent breed in 
Canada might be slaughtered indiscriminately by our friends to the south, 
and with the exception of a general protest we would have nothing to say 
in the matter.”94
Toward a Treaty with Mexico
Negotiating a bird treaty with Canada turned out to be a relatively easy 
matter. Federal authorities on both sides of the border were supportive 
of a treaty; the two countries shared a common political, economic, and 
cultural heritage; and state and provincial game laws were not all that dif-
ferent from each other. Negotiating a treaty with mexico was far more 
problematic.
 For mexicans, the name miguel angel de Quevedo—“El apóstol del 
arbol” (meaning “The Tree apostle”)—was all but synonymous with con-
servationism during the first half of the twentieth century. in 1917, Quevedo 
convinced President Venustiano Carranza (1917–20) to create mexico’s first 
national park, Desierto de los leones. He also made sure that the mexi-
can Constitution of 1917 included a strong conservation clause (article 27): 
“The nation shall always have the right to impose on private property the 
rules dictated by the public interest and to regulate the use of natural ele-
ments, susceptible to appropriation so as to distribute equitably the public 
wealth and to safeguard its conservation.” When President lázaro Cárde-
nas (1934–40) made environmental protection a linchpin of his adminis-
tration, Quevedo was called on to create and administer the Department 
of Forestry, Fish, and Game (later folded into the Department of agricul-
ture). Under his tutelage, mexico established forty national parks in five 
years (thirty-one of which have survived), representing about two-thirds 
of mexico’s current forty-seven national parks and nearly 8 percent of 
total park territory (1.6 million of 1.9 million acres, by the late twentieth 
century). Though best known as a champion of forests, Quevedo worked 
closely with Edward Goldman of the U.S. Biological Survey to protect 
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birds, successfully lobbying in 1932 for a ban on the use of armadas (shoot-
ing batteries) in duck hunting, a common practice in the Valley of mexico. 
as head of the mexican Committee for the Protection of Wild Birds (an 
affiliate of the audubon Society’s international Committee for Bird Pres-
ervation), he also championed the broadening of the U.S.-Canadian mi-
gratory bird treaty to include mexico.95
 Within the United States, the most vocal champion of a Pan-american 
bird treaty was John H. Wallace, the commissioner of the alabama Depart-
ment of Game and Fish. “The United States should take the lead,” he told 
President Wilson upon hearing of the Root and mclean Senate resolutions 
of 1913, “in proposing an international program under which the migra-
tory wild life of the Western Hemisphere will be accorded the greatest pos-
sible protection.”96 Wallace’s plea fell on deaf ears at the time, but he tried 
again in 1919, after the treaty with Canada had been successfully negoti-
ated. “it is clear to my mind,” he told acting Secretary of State Frank l. 
Polk, “that no program for the conservation of migratory wild life can be 
effective unless the migratory birds are protected throughout their entire 
line of migration. To protect them in Canada and the United States, and 
to permit their slaughter in the Spanish american Republics imposes a tax 
upon the breeding stock of migratory wild life that it cannot stand with-
out being depleted within the next few years to the point of extinction.”97 
This time, he had the support of Senator John H. Bankhead (D-al), who 
secured passage of a Senate resolution in February 1920, requesting the 
president to extend the 1916 Convention to mexico, Central america, and 
South america.
 The State Department, however, concluded that the timing was not yet 
right for an agreement with mexico and that an omnibus treaty with the 
other Spanish-speaking states, excluding mexico, made little sense from a 
political or conservationist perspective. Relations between the two coun-
tries, which had been good under the dictatorship of President Porfirio 
Díaz (1876–1911), had taken a turn for the worse with the outset of the 
mexican Revolution in 1910. “i fear that, should we propose such a treaty,” 
one State Department official noted candidly, “mexico might suggest that 
we have treaties now existing, which we have chosen to consider as dead 
letters (for instance, the Extradition Treaty), and that it would be best to 
restore the functions of such treaties before any attempt should be made 
to negotiate new ones.”98 Reading between the lines, he was indicating that 
the U.S. government did not want to have to turn fugitives who had fled to 
El Paso and other border towns over to the revolutionary mexican govern-
ment. it was better to let sleeping treaties lie.
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 The Department of agriculture belatedly came to the same conclu-
sion. Spurred initially by the Bankhead resolution, the Biological Survey 
sent two of its bird experts—alexander Wetmore and Edward Goldman—
to South america and mexico on fact-finding expeditions. Wetmore left 
in may 1920 on a yearlong mission to argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Para-
guay, and Chile to study migratory flight patterns and to build support 
for a treaty. “The outcome of this work,” as the secretary of agriculture 
later explained to the secretary of state, “was that for the present it did not 
appear that treaties with those countries would produce practical results 
warranting their negotiation.”99 Goldman was sent to mexico in 192 to lo-
cate the country’s principal waterfowl staging posts in order to determine 
whether a bilateral bird treaty “would be desirable.”100 He too came back 
empty-handed, and he would not return to mexico to finish his scientific 
investigations for nearly a decade.101
 Progress in the direction of a treaty finally came under the presiden-
cies of Emilio Portes Gil (1928–30) and lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). Gil 
had become well versed in conservationist issues while serving as mexico’s 
secretary of the interior under President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–28), 
and he knew that wildlife issues played well in the United States. in a letter 
to the State Department that initiated the negotiations, manuel C. Tellez, 
mexico’s ambassador to the United States, wrote, “it would be of great ad-
vantage for our respective countries to take certain measures for the pro-
tection of the animal and vegetative marine life and land fauna.” Gil and 
Tellez had an omnibus “hunting and fishing” treaty in mind, designed to 
protect sea life and land fauna, end the smuggling of illicit animal prod-
ucts, impose a duty on hunters and fishers, eradicate predatory animals 
(agricultural and pastoral pests), and “protect migratory birds and those 
that are useful to agriculture, woodland and public health.”102 mexico’s 
newfound desire for a nature-protection treaty dovetailed well with Presi-
dent Franklin Roosevelt’s newly initiated Good Neighbor Policy, and the 
result was the Convention between the United States of america and the 
United States of mexico for the Protection of migratory Birds and Game 
mammals of 1936 (hereafter the 1936 Convention).103
 The 1936 Convention was modeled almost entirely on the 1916 Con-
vention, though there were some notable differences. Negotiators, for in-
stance, no longer felt the need to justify bird protection primarily on the 
animals’ usefulness to farmers. They also employed the rhetoric of “ratio-
nal use” rather than species preservation. article i justified the 1936 Con-
vention on the straightforward grounds that it was “right and proper” to 
protect migratory birds so that they would “not be exterminated.” it called 
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for “adequate measures which will permit a rational utilization of migra-
tory birds for the purposes of sport as well as for food, commerce and in-
dustry.”104 article ii offered year-round protection for insectivorous birds 
(eggs and nests included), using language similar to that found in the 1916 
Convention. For game birds, however, it established a four-month open 
season, as compared to the three-and-a-half-month season that bound the 
United States and Canada. moreover, unlike the 1916 Convention, it placed 
no ban whatsoever on spring and summer shooting, except in the case of 
wild ducks, which could not be shot from march 10 to September 1 (the 
same dates as in the 1916 Convention). This arrangement left the mexican 
government free to allow hunting during the breeding season for all game 
birds except ducks. it also meant—theoretically at least, though never in 
practice—that game birds could be under fire for nearly ten months of the 
year as they flew back and forth between Canada and mexico.
 article ii went slightly beyond the terms of the 1916 Convention in 
two areas. First, it explicitly called for “the establishment of refuge zones 
in which the taking of such birds will be prohibited.” Second, it prohibited 
“hunting from aircraft.”105 Neither of these new clauses, however, did much 
to strengthen the treaty. The refuge clause would have been much more ef-
fective if it spelled out in greater detail the number, type, size, and location 
of these zones (preferably using Canada’s system as a model) so as to better 
guarantee a wide range of avian habitats. For the hunting-methods clause 
to have had clout, it would have needed to include bans not just on the use 
of aircraft but also on other “unsportsmanlike” hunting practices—such as 
site baiting, the use of sink boxes, and the deployment of live decoys—all 
of which were already banned in the United States and Canada by domes-
tic law. it would also have been useful to ban explicitly the use of armadas 
in the treaty. Though this practice was already prohibited in mexico, en-
forcement was subject to the whims of governmental authorities.
 article iii outlawed the transport of migratory birds, dead or alive, 
across the U.S.-mexican border. it was similar to the proscriptions estab-
lished in the 1916 Convention and in conformity with general international 
trends against the international meat-and-feather trade. it did not, how-
ever, restrict in any way the commercial trade in feathers within the terri-
tory of mexico (a practice already banned in the United States). Nor did it 
regulate in any way commerce in caged birds—a common sight in mexi-
can markets—even though many of these captured birds (robins, orioles, 
scarlet tanagers, and waxwings among them) were U.S.-mexico migrants. 
article V did, however, extend the ban on international trade to game 
mammals. This step was an innovative attempt to restrict the commerce in 
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big-game hunting in anticipation of a more stringent treaty in the future. 
(it also explains why the official title of the treaty extends beyond migra-
tory birds.)
 article iV listed the migratory game and nongame birds covered by the 
terms of the treaty. Regarding game birds, the list was practically identical to 
that of the 1916 Convention (the families anatidae, Gruidae, Rallidae, and 
Columbidae and the order limicolae), except that birds within the order 
limicolae were now enumerated under their family names: Charadriidae 
(plovers), Scolopacidae (sandpipers), Recurvirostridae (avocets and stilts), 
and Phalaropodidae (highly aquatic shorebirds). as for nongame birds, the 
treaty protected twenty-three families, including cuckoos, nightjars, swifts, 
hummingbirds, woodpeckers, flycatchers, wrens, and many others. The 
list of protected birds mostly overlapped with that of the 1916 Convention 
(which listed nongame birds by species, not families), but the new treaty 
extended protection to some new species, including horned larks, black-
birds, grackles, cowbirds, mockingbirds, thrashers, finches, phainopeplas, 
and sparrows.106
 missing from the 1936 Convention was any protection for birds solely 
on the basis of their rarity or endangerment. Whereas the 1916 Convention 
gave year-round protection to several disappearing species—including gulls, 
terns, herons, bitterns, band-tailed pigeons, cranes (little brown, sandhill, 
and whooping), curlews, and most shorebirds—the newer treaty did not. 
also missing from the list were a number of species (mostly birds of prey 
and fish-eaters) that had become endangered since 1916, including eagles, 
hawks, owls, kingfishers, pelicans, cormorants, anhingas, ibises, and ravens. 
a more forward-looking treaty would have included special protections 
for these species. article iV, however, did allow for the addition of new 
birds to the protected list “by common agreement” of the two countries.107 
(This clause would finally bear fruit in march 1972, when the United States 
and mexico signed the agreement Supplementing the Convention of Feb-
ruary 7, 1936 for the Protection of migratory Birds and Game mammals, 
which brought an additional thirty-two families under protection.)108 also 
missing from the treaty was an exemption clause that would have al-
lowed mexico’s indigenous populations to engage in subsistence hunting 
throughout the year. (This defect was not corrected until the Protocol with 
mexico amending Convention for the Protection of migratory Birds and 
Game mammals was signed in 1997.)109
 The 1936 Convention is best viewed as an extension of the 1916 Conven-
tion rather than as a breakthrough treaty in the field of conservation diplo-
macy. With rare exception (such as the ban on hunting from airplanes), it 
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merely reiterated the U.S.-Canadian treaty. Had it been negotiated twenty 
years earlier, it would probably have looked only slightly different; agri-
cultural concerns would no doubt have been in the spotlight, and birds 
would have been listed by species instead of families, but those are the only 
differences. Conservationists were disappointed with the treaty, mostly be-
cause they wanted more birds to be placed under protection, a ban on 
caged birds, and tighter hunting laws. Judged from the vantage point of 
1936, the treaty was indeed disappointing, chiefly because it paid too little 
attention to habitat protection at the very moment that the United States 
and Canada had finally committed themselves to the establishment of bird 
preserves. However, as a State Department spokesperson told treaty critics 
in 1936, the alternative was not a stronger treaty but no treaty at all: “The 
Treaty with mexico only places a minimum as to the protection we shall 
grant migratory birds in this country. We got the most assurances we could 
out of mexico. The laws that they agreed to enact and enforce are certainly 
more than they have had before in mexico.”110
 The 1936 Convention was negotiated and ratified in the heyday of the 
Cárdenas-Quevedo years. Conservationism, however, fared less well under 
Cárdenas’s successor, President manuel avila Camacho (1940–1946), who 
reauthorized the practice of using armadas for duck hunting in the Val-
ley of mexico. President miguel alemán Valdés (1946–192), an avid sports 
hunter, took the treaty more seriously: he secured passage of the Federal 
Hunting law of 192, which outlawed the use of poisons to hunt animals, 
halted the exportation of animal parts, banned shooting in national parks, 
and established a federal licensing system. His administration, however, did 
not hire enough game wardens to enforce these measures. Furthermore, 
none of Cárdenas’s successors set up bird reserves along the Gulf and Pa-
cific coastlines, the principal flyways and wintering sites for waterfowl.111
 american conservation groups rightly deplored mexico’s lax game 
laws, but the chief beneficiaries of this laxness were U.S. tourists and hunt-
ers, not mexican citizens. most mexicans did not eat wildfowl, greatly pre-
ferring the taste of chicken and (if they hunted) venison. Commercial duck 
hunting took place on a significant scale in only two parts of the country—
in the Valley of mexico and along the U.S.-mexican border—with nearly 
all of the kill going to restaurants that catered to the tourist industry in 
mexico City and the border towns.112 an investigation by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service in 192, for instance, revealed that mexico had fewer than 
five thousand waterfowl hunters as compared to 2 million in the United 
States and that the total annual mexican duck kill amounted to around three 
hundred thousand, less than the number of ducks killed on the opening 
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day alone of the U.S. duck season.113 “i have often thought that were i a 
duck from the northern United States, Canada or alaska, when Septem-
ber arrived i would climb to about a thousand feet altitude and head for 
mexico,” wrote George B. Saunders, the waterfowl expert who assembled 
the data:
En route across the United States i would stop at several favorite 
wildlife refuges, but my long-range compass would be set for 
mexico. The destination there would be Tamaulipas, Veracruz, 
Sinaloa, or any of the other coastal states. For in each there 
are fine waters where the two-legged duck hunter is a rare or 
unknown animal, and i could enjoy safety and pleasant feeding 
until time to migrate northward again. Some will question 
the wisdom of a duck going to mexico because of tall tales 
they have heard or read about armadas (batteries of guns), 
overshooting, and poisoning of waterfowl there. Of the several 
million ducks that usually winter in mexico, most would take 
that country anytime in preference to the United States, for 
they are relatively safer there during the open season than they 
are in the United States during the closed season.114
Beyond North America: A Western Hemisphere Treaty?
Efforts to extend treaty protection to migratory birds beyond the terri-
tories of Canada, the United States, and mexico met with mixed success. 
in December 193, at the request of the audubon Society’s international 
Committee for Bird Preservation, the U.S. State Department sent a dip-
lomatic memo to all Central and South american governments soliciting 
a list of their existing bird-protection laws and enforcement mechanisms. 
Their responses made clear that most of them lacked the legal machin-
ery upon which a bird treaty could be based. Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela all reported that they had, for all intents and purposes, no laws 
or restrictions on the hunting and taking of birds. Chile, Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Dominican Republic, and Ecuador reported that they had a modicum of 
laws. Only argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay claimed to have an extensive 
number of laws and regulations. law enforcement, to the extent that it 
existed at all, was sporadic. Not a single one of the responding states had 
any bird reserves.115
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 By the end of the 1930s, a new opportunity for bird protection emerged 
with the signing of the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Pres-
ervation in the Western Hemisphere in 1940 (hereafter the 1940 Western 
Hemisphere Convention). The signers included the United States, mexico, 
ten of South america’s thirteen states (excepting Guyana, Surinam, and 
French Guiana), and eight of Central america’s eleven states (excepting Ja-
maica, Belize, and Honduras). The idea for this convention emerged from 
the Eighth international Conference of american States, which met in De-
cember 1938 in lima, Peru, and it was negotiated under the aegis of the 
recently created Pan american Union. an equally important force behind 
the convention was the american Committee for international Wildlife 
Protection, a committee that included John Phillips, alexander Wetmore, 
and other well-known bird conservationists.116
 The 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention was modeled almost entirely 
on the 1933 london Convention. it called for the establishment of national 
parks, national reserves, nature monuments, and strict wilderness reserves 
“to protect and preserve in their natural habitat representatives of all spe-
cies and genera of their native flora and fauna, including migratory birds, 
in sufficient numbers and over areas extensive enough to assure them from 
becoming extinct through any agency within man’s control.” article i de-
fined the phrase migratory bird broadly to include “birds of those species, 
all or some of whose individual members, may at any season cross any of 
the boundaries between the american countries,” including Charadriidae 
(plovers), Scolopacidae (sandpipers), Caprimulgidae (nightjars and whip-
poor-wills), and Hirundinidae (swallows). article Vii, the only one exclusively 
dedicated to bird protection, stated in full: “The Contracting Governments 
shall adopt appropriate measures for the protection of migratory birds of 
economic or aesthetic value or to prevent the threatened extinction of any 
given species. adequate measures shall be adopted which will permit, in so 
far as the respective governments may see fit, a rational utilization of mi-
gratory birds for the purpose of sports as well as for food, commerce, and 
industry, and for scientific study and investigation.”117
 The treaty encouraged each country to submit a list (to be attached to 
the treaty as an annex) of all flora and fauna that it considered endangered 
enough to deserve special protection within its territory. Unfortunately, no 
country was even obligated to prepare such a list, let alone to protect any 
of the species it listed. Nor was there any incentive to work in conjunc-
tion with neighboring states to jointly protect endangered species. as a 
consequence, a patchwork of bird-protection regulations emerged, remi-
niscent of what had prevailed among the U.S. states before passage of the 
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Weeks-mclean law in 1913. Brazil, for instance, placed a closed season on 
the hunting of nine families (Tinamidae, anatidae, Cracidae, Phasianidae, 
Rallidae, Cariamidae, Scolopacidae, Recurvirostridae, Columbidae) and 
extended year-round protection to another fifty-two. Neighboring Bo-
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Figure 2.5  Migratory patterns of the American golden plover, 
scarlet tanager, bobolink, and red-eyed vireo.  None of these 
species remain within the connes of the 1916 and 1936 Treaties 
during their annual migrations.  
Figure 2.5. migratory patterns of he american golden plover, scarl t tanager, bobolink, 
and red-eyed vireo. None of these species remains within the confines of the 1916 and 
1936 treaties during their annual migrations. adapted from Jean Dorst, The Migrations 
of Birds (Boston: Houghton mifflin, 1962), 110, 114, 123, and 137.
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livia, by contrast, submitted a list that covered just thirteen species (the 
house wren, ovenbird, swallow, ostrich, tero-tero, plover, seagull, calandra 
lark, magellanic woodpecker, owl, great kiskadee, the little blue heron, and 
white heron), and Paraguay submitted no list at all. Similarly, argentina 
extended protection to twenty-two bird species, but its neighbor Chile did 
not bother to compile a list. in the Caribbean, Cuba produced a long list 
of protected species, whereas the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced 
only short lists. in Central america, El Salvador offered protection to two 
large orders, Passeriformes (“perching birds”) and Falconiformes (hawks 
and vultures), as well as to seven families and five species. But Nicaragua 
listed only three families, Guatemala just twenty-eight species, and Ecua-
dor a mere nine species.118
 Efforts to use the 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention to jump-start 
national parks and wildlife reserves brought a measure of success. a few 
countries, such as argentina, Venezuela, and mexico, had already estab-
lished some parks and reserves before 1940, and the new treaty spurred 
them to develop more. Other Central and South american countries 
slowly followed suit—sometimes after decades of delay—and by the end 
of the twentieth century, there were hundreds of parks, reserves, wilder-
ness areas, and other protected regions for birds and other animals. a few, 
notably Costa Rica, have made the parks and reserves a major source of 
tourist dollars. more typically, however, states have been lax in enforcing 
game laws and in shielding the protected areas from outside development 
and encroachments.
“in the United States there are now out hunting, in this very season, 48 big 
armies of men,” Hornaday wrote in his aptly titled retrospective, Thirty 
Years War for Wild Life (1931). “Their grand total strength,” he said, “is 
about 7,00,000 well armed, well equipped, and money-supplied killers of 
‘game’ and pseudo-game. This means 7,00 regiments of full strength! The 
grand total is composed of 6,493,44 licensed hunters, plus about 1,00,000 
unlicensed hunters who legally hunt local game on their own lands with-
out licenses. it far exceeds in number all of the active standing armies of the 
world.” He added: “The progressive extinction of all United States game 
and near-game birds is rapidly proceeding. Ninety percent of it is due to 
merciless and determined shooting; and we greatly fear that the leaden-
footed Big Stick of the law will not overtake the 48 huge armies of killers 
before the game takes its final plunge into oblivion.”119
 Nearly twenty years had passed since the publication of Our Vanishing 
Wild Life, but Hornaday still viewed hunters in the forty-eight states of the 
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continental United States as a vast army of Destruction. like the proverbial 
generals of World War i, he was fighting the last war rather than preparing 
for new ones on the horizon. lead-footed or not, the U.S. and Canadian 
governments had successfully ended the bird carnage that had marred the 
previous century. The 1916 Convention (and the later 1936 Convention) 
went a long way toward weaning North americans from their excessive re-
liance on nature’s bounty. The era of commercial hunting—once the single 
greatest threat to the flyways and rookeries of North america—came to an 
abrupt end. To survive, milliners turned to ribbons and bows instead of 
bird parts, and meatpackers turned increasingly to farm-produced poultry 
(chicken and turkey farms) instead of wildfowl.120 Recreational hunting 
was still going strong, but it was now a highly regulated sport, held in check 
by closed seasons, bag limits, and license requirements. as international 
hunting accords, the 1916 and 1936 treaties have to be judged successes: no 
North americans today dine regularly on robin soup and goldfinch pie, 
adorn themselves with heron aigrettes and hummingbird heads, or con-
sider it sporting to wipe out an entire flock and rookery in a single day.
 as habitat-protection accords, the treaties were far more problematic, 
largely because they did not provide an adequate framework for protecting 
breeding, feeding, and wintering sites along the principal North american 
flyways. Hornaday, for instance, insisted that there were thirteen bird spe-
cies on the brink of extinction in 1931, five of them game birds—the wood-
cock, sharp-tailed grouse, pinnated grouse (prairie chicken), sage grouse, 
and golden plover—and he predicted the army of Destruction would soon 
blast all five to oblivion.121 Some eighty years later, however, not a single 
one has become extinct, and among those that are today still endangered 
(notably the pinnated grouse), habitat loss rather than overhunting is the 
principal cause. The same is true of ducks, geese, and many other game 
birds that were not included in Hornaday’s list: the gradual decline in their 
numbers since 1916 has been far more closely linked to the disappearance 
of marshes and other wetland habitats than to the impact of hunters.
 One major problem is the geographic limitations of the 1916 and 1936 
treaties. The combined geographic areas of Canada (3.8 million square 
miles), the United States (3.4 million), and mexico (76,000)—though 
totaling over 8.1 million square miles—are not large enough to contain 
the entire habitat range of many migratory bird species. Birds on the Pa-
cific flyway are relatively well protected because they characteristically 
breed in Canada and alaska; utilize the western half of Canada and the 
United States as a sky route; and winter in the United States, mexico, and 
(in some cases) Central america. The Canada goose, Ross’s goose, gray-
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cheeked thrush, fox sparrow, and Connecticut warbler are all examples of 
birds whose ranges are largely confined to Canada and the United States. 
The mourning dove and common snipe are examples of birds whose range 
is largely coterminous with Canada, the United States, and mexico (plus 
Central america). But other birds—especially those that utilize the mis-
sissippi and atlantic flyways—are far more exposed to predation: many of 
them fly to South america via the Caribbean, skipping mexico altogether 
or utilizing only the Yucatan. The black-poll warbler, cliff swallow, black-
and-white warbler, redstart, rose-breasted grosbeak, and red-eyed vireo all 
range between Canada and the northern half of South america, whereas 
the golden plover, bobolink, and scarlet tanager range between Canada and 
the southern half of South america. The arctic tern travels from Canada to 
Europe to antarctica and then back again to Canada.122
 Recognizing some of the geographic limitations, the United States 
signed separate bird treaties with two additional countries in the eastern 
Pacific: the 1972 Convention for the Protection of migratory Birds and 
Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, signed between 
the United States and Japan, and the 1976 Convention between the United 
States of america and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning 
the Conservation of migratory Birds and Their Environment. Japan sub-
sequently signed two other bilateral bird treaties, one with australia and 
the other with the Soviet Union, further extending the network. However, 
these additional agreements, though offering extra protection to birds that 
utilize the eastern Pacific Rim as part of their migratory routes, were never 
extensive enough to offer full protection to most bird species. many more 
countries would have had to sign bilateral or multilateral arrangements for 
this approach to be effective.
 Wetland drainage also proved a major hurdle to effective bird protec-
tion. The greatest loss, by far, has occurred along the flyways of the continen-
tal United States, where agricultural and urban development has resulted in a 
large amount of habitat loss. in 1780, the area that now constitutes the United 
States contained 392 million acres of wetlands, of which around 221 million 
acres were found in the forty-eight continental states, 170 million acres in 
alaska, and 9,000 acres in Hawaii. as of 1980, the continental United States 
had lost 117 million acres (a 3 percent drop) and Hawaii around 7,000 acres 
(a 12 percent drop), whereas alaska had retained almost all of its wetland 
acreage (less than a 1 percent drop). Florida had taken the hardest hit, losing 
9.3 million of its original 20.3 million acres (a 46 percent loss), followed by 
Texas, which lost 8.39 million of its original 16 million acres (a 2 percent 
loss), and louisiana, which lost 7.41 million of 16.2 million acres (a 46 
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percent loss). meanwhile, California had lost 91 percent of its original wet-
lands (4. million out of  million acres), followed by Ohio with a loss of 
90 percent (4.2 million out of  million acres), and iowa with a loss of 89 
percent (3.8 million out of 4 million acres).123 This massive depletion of 
wetland acreage has far outstripped the acres put aside as bird reserves and 
national parks over the past hundred years, and the end result is that birds 
now have less, not more, space on which to land.
 Habitat loss in Canada was far less severe (with wetlands still cover-
ing 14 percent of its territory), though agricultural drainage in certain key 
regions has had a dramatic impact on some bird species. Waterfowl popu-
lations were particularly hard hit by the gradual drainage of “prairie pot-
holes” (shallow pools ranging from an acre to hundreds of acres in size) 
in alberta, manitoba, and Saskatchewan to make room for farmland. By 
the 1970s, alberta had lost 61 percent of its original wetland space, and 
southwestern manitoba experienced a 7 percent decline. Damage in Sas-
katchewan was less severe, but nonetheless, 84 percent of its wetlands had 
been affected in one way or another by human activities. On the west coast, 
British Columbia had lost 70 percent of its wetlands to agriculture, much 
to the detriment of shorebirds. On the east coast, the Bay of Fundy on the 
Nova Scotia–New Brunswick border has been hard hit by development. 
Ontario and Quebec have also experienced huge wetland losses, especially 
in the Great lakes region and the St. lawrence Valley, prime sites for mi-
gratory birds.124 as in the United States, there has been a net loss of wetland 
acreage, despite the proliferation of bird reserves.
 The lack of reliable data on mexico makes it much more difficult to 
ascertain the rate of habitat loss there, but the combined impact of agricul-
tural development, cattle ranching, industrial pollution (especially from oil, 
chemicals, and petrochemicals), deforestation, and tourism must have been 
severe. Equally problematic is the fact that only five of the country’s sixty-
six major wetlands regions are under protection today. Wetland drainage 
as a consequence of agricultural irrigation and river impoundments along 
the Pacific and Gulf coasts—prime wintering spots for waterfowl and other 
migrants—has been particularly intense since the mid-1980s. Oil extraction, 
meanwhile, increasingly threatens the wetlands of Tabasco and Vera Cruz. 
The waterfowl-rich wetlands in the interior highlands (including Chihua-
hua, Coahuila, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and michoacan) have also been affected 
recently, mostly due to logging, grazing, cultivation, and urban growth.125
 Still, Hornaday was right about one thing: the 1916 Convention was 
more a cease-fire than a full-fledged peace agreement. The negotia-
tors did not foresee—and indeed could not have foreseen—all of the 
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challenges that lay ahead for bird conservation, from water-drainage 
projects to oil spills to avian flu. They did comprehend, however, that 
commercial hunting for meat and feathers had become annihilationist, 
and they managed to stop the bloodletting before irreversible damage 
had been done to most game species. They accomplished a good deal 
more in the process, extending protection to hundreds of “agricultural 
birds” and other species that would normally not be included in a typi-
cal hunting treaty. State of the art when it was first conceived, the 1916 
Convention quickly became the foundation upon which all bird pro-
tection in North america rested, even if it gradually began to show its 
age and require some updating to keep it functional. although few ne-
gotiators hold up the 1916 Convention as a model for global bird agree-
ments today, it was the only effective bird treaty in the entire world 
for many decades, and it certainly helped save many North american 
species from the butcher’s block.
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Time Line of Migratory Bird Protection
1896 in Geer v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that wild animals 
were under the jurisdiction of the states, not private landowners.
1900 The lacey Game and Wild Birds Preservation and Disposition act (lacey act) 
became law in the United States. it made it illegal to transport birds across state 
lines if the birds were killed in violation of state law.
1913 The migratory Bird act (Weeks-mclean law) placed migratory birds in the 
United States under federal jurisdiction. Opponents challenged its constitution-
ality in the courts.
1916 The Convention for the Protection of migratory Birds (or the 1916 Convention) 
was signed between the United States and Canada. it established a framework 
for creating uniform game laws in both countries and placed some endangered 
birds under year-round protection.
1917 The migratory Birds Convention act was passed by the Canadian Dominion 
government in august. it established game regulations for Canadian provinces 
in conformity with the 1916 Convention.
1918 The migratory Bird Treaty act was passed in the United States. it brought U.S. 
federal and state laws into conformity with the 1916 Convention.
1920 in Missouri v. Holland, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the 1916 Convention. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the majority opinion.
1920 in King v. Russell C. Clark, the Supreme Court of Prince Edward island upheld 
the validity of the 1916 Convention. The presiding judge cited Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in his decision.
1924 The Upper mississippi Wildlife and Fish Refuge act established the first large 
federal wildlife reserve for birds and fish in the United States.
1928 The Bear River migratory Bird Refuge act established a bird reserve near Utah’s 
Great Salt lake in the United States.
1929 The migratory Bird Conservation act created a commission to purchase land for 
migratory bird reserves in the United States.
1936 The Convention between the United States of america and the United States 
of mexico for the Protection of migratory Birds and Game mammals (or the 
1936 Convention) was enacted. This agreement extended the 1916 Convention to 
mexico with minor textual changes.
1937 The Pittman-Robertson act (Federal aid in Wildlife Restoration act) augmented 
the U.S. federal government’s role in wildlife restoration projects, including bird 
protection.
1940 The Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western 
Hemisphere was signed. This agreement promoted the creation of nature parks, 
including bird reserves, throughout the americas.
190 international Convention for the Protection of Birds, signed in Paris, became first 
bird treaty of importance outside of North america.
1966 The Endangered Species act became law in the United States (updated in 1969 
and 1973).
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1971 The Convention on Wetlands of international importance Especially as Water-
fowl Habitat was signed in Ramsar, iran. it was the first multilateral treaty of 
importance to protect bird habitat.
1972 The agreement Supplementing the agreement of February 7, 1936 between the 
United States of america and the United States of mexico for the Protection of 
migratory Birds and Game mammals was signed. This pact expanded the list of 
birds protected under the terms of the U.S.-mexican treaty.
1972 The Convention for the Protection of migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of 
Extinction, and Their Environment, signed between the United States and Japan, 
partially extended the 1916 Convention to a small portion of the Pacific Rim.
1973 The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CiTES Convention), signed in Washington, DC, became the first comprehen-
sive attempt to save endangered species worldwide.
1976 The Convention between the United States of america and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics Concerning the Conservation of migratory Birds and Their 
Environment was signed. it extended portions of the 1916 Convention to the 
Soviet Union.
1979 The Convention on the Conservation of migratory Species of Wild animals, 
signed in Bonn (Bonn Convention), became first treaty of importance to protect 
migratory birds worldwide.
1986 The North american Waterfowl management Plan was inaugurated by the 
United States and Canada to further protect North american game birds.
199 The Protocol amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of migratory 
Birds updated several articles of the 1916 Convention and exempted indigenous 
peoples from the closed-season clauses.
1997 The agreement Supplementing the Convention of February 7, 1936 for the Pro-
tection of migratory Birds and Game mammals exempted indigenous peoples 
from the closed-season clauses of the 1936 Convention.
Chapter 3
The Antarctic Whale Massacre
They say the sea is cold, but the sea contains 
the hottest blood of  all, and the wildest, the most urgent.
—D. H. Lawrence, “Whales Weep Not!”
Norway—the “Land of the Midnight Sun”—is a magnet for people in 
search of “unspoiled” nature. It possesses a long and jagged coastline with 
spectacular fjords and a narrow interior with high and rugged peaks. hun-
dreds of bird species soar through its skies, and salmon, cod, and capelin 
teem along its shores. Sparsely populated for its size (4.5 million people in 
an area of 125,000 square miles), Norway has just a single major city, its 
capital, oslo (population 503,000). Cocooned in splendor, Norwegians do 
not need to drive to a national park to enjoy the great outdoors. yet this na-
tion also harbors a deeply troubling environmental legacy: from the 1860s 
to the 1960s, Norway was the greatest whaling power in the world. For the 
better part of a century, Norwegians killed more whales than did all other 
peoples on the face of the earth.1
 the person most identified with Norway’s rise to prominence as a 
whaling power was Svend Foyn. Foyn was born in 1809 in tønsberg, a port 
town in the province of Vestfold, on the western side of the oslo fjord, 
just south of oslo. he made his fortune as a sealer on Jan Mayen Island 
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(north of Iceland) before turning his attention to whaling in the 1860s, an 
endeavor that preoccupied him until his death some three decades later 
in 1894. a risk-taker and an innovator, Foyn poured his time and money 
into the improvement of hunting techniques. In 1863, he built the world’s 
first steam-powered whale catcher, Spes et Fides (hope and Faith). Less 
than a hundred feet long and equipped with a fifty-horsepower engine ca-
pable of only seven knots, it merely hinted at the mammoth, oil-powered 
whale catchers that would come later. But it already far outpaced the tra-
ditional sail-driven schooners and rowboats of his day, and it required a 
much smaller crew, so its design was soon adopted by others. Foyn was 
also among the first whalers to install an accumulator (a winch-and-rope 
system that functions much like a fishing rod) on his ship, thereby greatly 
reducing the frequency of snapped ropes and lost whales. In the 1880s, he 
installed yet another device, an air-compression pump, which forced air 
into a captured whale’s body cavity to keep it afloat for easy processing.2
 Foyn’s best-known invention—and the one that earned him the nick-
name “father of modern whaling”—was the harpoon gun. Patented in 
1870, it provided whalers with a surefire method for killing all species re-
gardless of their size or speed. accurate and reliable, it became the model 
for all subsequent whaling guns for the next hundred years. Shaped like a 
piece of light artillery, it was mounted on a swivel on the vessel’s bow. It 
consisted of three distinct devices that worked together: a cannon, a har-
poon, and a grenade (originally with gunpowder and sulfuric acid). the 
cannon was used to launch a harpoon deep into the whale’s backside. the 
harpoon was fastened to the ship with a rope. the harpoon tip contained 
the grenade, and just behind the grenade were four backward-facing barbs. 
Upon impact, the four barbs opened outward (much like umbrella ribs), 
preventing the whale from dislodging the harpoon. the movement of the 
barbs also triggered the exploding device, which detonated once the har-
poon was lodged inside the whale’s body. If all worked as planned, the 
whale died within a half hour or so, without pulling and thrashing the ship 
too much.3
 Foyn’s many innovations gave the Norwegians a competitive edge that 
they would not fully relinquish until the 1960s, by which time most of the 
world’s whale stocks were already severely depleted. his home province 
of Vestfold, Norway’s most populated region and busiest shipping cen-
ter, emerged as the center of the world whaling industry. Its three main 
ports—Sandefjord, tønsberg, and Lavik—generated much of the capital 
and produced most of the ships and crews for whaling expeditions worldwide, 
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even those flying under foreign flags. (In 1931, for instance, all but 142 of the 
10,691 whalers in the antarctic were from Norway, of which nearly 8,000 
came from Vestfold alone.)4 Norwegians pioneered in the development 
of the modern floating factory, the high-pressure boiler, and the stern 
slipway. they discovered methods for turning whale wastage into usable 
products such as animal feed and fertilizer. they designed stronger ropes 
and sturdier harpoons. they were the first to fully exploit the arctic hunt-
ing grounds, the first to open up the antarctic, and the first to engage in 
modern pelagic whaling. Norwegian was even the official language aboard 
nearly all whaling ships, and the one word every whaler understood with-
out a translator was hvalblast (meaning “thar she blows”).5
 So thoroughly did Norway dominate the whaling industry after the 
1860s that all previous hunting techniques came to be known as “old whal-
ing” and Norwegian ones as “modern whaling.” Sail and human muscle 
powered the old vessels, whereas coal and oil fueled the modern ones. 
old whalers used handheld harpoons, but modern ones were grenade-
tipped. old whalers fastened the carcass to the ship’s side or hauled it to 
a nearby shore station in order to strip (flense) the fat (blubber) from the 
whale. Modern whalers, by contrast, learned how to hoist a dead whale 
directly onto a ship’s deck for quick flensing. old whalers boiled (ren-
dered) the blubber slowly in specially designed cooking pots (tryworks) 
and then stored the oil in barrels; at best, they could squeeze only about 
half the oil from the carcass. Modern whalers learned how to render the 
entire carcass in high-pressure boilers and store the oil in huge tanks, 
wasting little. old-style whaling was an artisanal enterprise, limited in 
size and scope. Modern whaling was an industrial enterprise, limited 
only by the number of whales in the ocean. old whalers stayed mostly 
in the arctic regions, close to their shore stations and home markets. 
Modern whalers worked almost entirely in the Southern ocean (south 
of 60º south latitude) around the antarctic continent. old whaling led 
to the gradual depletion of one hunting ground after the next over many 
centuries. Modern whaling was undertaken on a scale so massive that it 
can only be called exterminationist.
 the figures tell the tale. the Basques, the world’s first great commer-
cial whalers, snagged about five hundred whales per year between 1530 and 
1610.6 the Dutch, the foremost whalers of the seventeenth century, killed 
an average of eight hundred bowheads (their favorite whale species) be-
tween 1670 and 1719.7 By contrast, antarctic whalers killed around nine 
thousand whales per year between 1904 and 1924 and over thirty thousand 
per year in the 1930s.8
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Whale Biology
Porpoises, dolphins, and whales are all mammals belonging to the order 
Cetacea. there is no clear biological line separating whales from porpoises 
and dolphins, except a few minor anatomical characteristics. the porpoise 
has a rounded snout and a length of four to eight feet, whereas the dol-
phin has a beaklike snout and a length of eight to twelve feet. whales are 
generally over twelve feet in length, and “great whales” are between thirty 
and one hundred feet long. Physical size, however, is a poor gauge because 
there are many pygmy whale species that are the same size as porpoises 
and dolphins. to complicate matters, some common nomenclatures are 
inaccurate: the melon-headed whale and killer whale, for instance, both 
belong to the dolphin family. the terms Cetacea and whale were often used 
interchangeably in whaling treaties, even when it was clear that the diplo-
mats were solely concerned with the great whales—the only ones regularly 
hunted. this carelessness gave rise to a still-unresolved controversy as to 
whether the treaties apply only to the great whales or to porpoises, dol-
phins, and small whales as well.9
 Like other mammals, cetaceans are warm-blooded lung breathers that 
give birth to live young and nurse through milk-filled glands. they are, 
however, the only mammals that have become completely adapted to wa-
ter. to keep their vital organs insulated from the frigid oceans, their bod-
ies are surrounded by a thick layer of blubber. aside from keeping them 
warm, blubber gives them more buoyancy in water and serves as a food 
reserve during the breeding season. their “nose” is a blowhole atop their 
heads linked directly to their lungs; to breathe, whales break the surface of 
the water, blow out the air in their lungs, and ingest new air, all within a 
few seconds. the frigid oceans once gave whales a level of security that no 
land mammal enjoyed. their thick layer of blubber, however, made them 
a coveted prize for human hunters, and their breathing mechanism made 
them visible to whalers and thus vulnerable to the harpoon.10
 Cetaceans are divided into two suborders—Mysticeti (“moustached 
whales”) and odontoceti (“toothed whales”)—based largely on their 
feeding methods. Mysticeti are more commonly known as baleen whales 
because they trap food in curtains of flat, keratinous rods (baleens) at-
tached to the roof of the mouth. they feed mostly on tiny creatures—zoo-
plankton and small fish—using the baleens to filter out water and debris. 
Some species skim the surface of the water to capture their prey, and others 
swim below the surface and swallow in big gulps. the largest of the ba-
leen whales are known as rorquals (derived from the Norwegian rörhval, 
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meaning “furrowed whale”). rorquals have distinctive grooves about three 
inches deep that begin at their throats and run longitudinally about one-
third of the way down their undersides.
 the other suborder of whales—odontoceti—have teeth instead of 
baleens in their mouths. they prey mostly on fish, squid, and octopus. 
Most have cone-shaped teeth that help them engulf (not chew) food, but 
there is considerable variation among different species. Some have two 
hundred teeth; the male narwhal, however, has just a single long tooth that 
juts spearlike eight feet or more from its mouth. Feeding methods mark 
the main difference between Mysticeti and odontoceti, but there are other 
distinctions as well. Baleen whales are generally larger than toothed whales, 
and baleen females are generally larger than their male counterparts. Ba-
leens tend to travel alone or in small groups, whereas toothed whales often 
prefer to live and move in larger groups. Baleens have paired blowholes, 
toothed whales only one. Baleens cannot echolocate (“see” with sound), 
but toothed whales can. Baleens are monogamous, toothed whales gener-
ally polygamous. Finally, all members of the Mysticeti suborder are whales, 
whereas the odontoceti suborder includes dolphins and porpoises.11
 Mysticeti and odontoceti are further divided into nine families and 
seventy-five species. there are only three Mysticeti families—the Balaeni-
dae (right whales), Balaenopteridae (rorquals), and eschrichtiidae (gray 
whales)—but these families include all the species that have been hunted 
to near extinction over the past two centuries. there are six families 
of odontoceti: Physeteridae (sperm whales), Monodontidae (narwhals 
and belugas), Ziphiidae (beaked whales), Delphinidae (oceanic dolphins), 
Phocoenidae (true porpoises), and Platanistidae (river dolphins). among 
these, only sperm whales have been hunted to any significant extent. 
Porpoises and dolphins were not spared out of nostalgia or respect but 
because they were considered too small to be worth the chase. the term 
hunted whale is therefore all but synonymous with great whale; except for 
the sperm whale, it is also synonymous with baleen whale.
 whales have torpedo-like shapes and powerful tails (flukes), which 
they use to propel themselves in water. Nearly all of the great whales un-
dertake an annual migration between polar regions and temperate regions. 
Most are “cosmopolitan” (that is, they inhabit all of the world’s oceans), 
but typically, they do not cross the equator, so northern and southern popu-
lations are isolated from each other. Migrating whales head to the polar 
seas to feed when it is warmest there—april to September in the arctic, 
october to March in the antarctic. For humans, the polar seas always seem 
bleak and barren, but baleen whales find a smorgasbord of zooplankton 
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and fish there during summer. In the arctic, they rely primarily on ptero-
pod mollusks and various crustacea known colloquially as brit. antarctica 
is even richer in food, especially along the so-called antarctic convergence, 
where cold and warm currents come together. whales there feast primarily 
on Euphausia superba, a shrimplike crustacean about two inches in length, 
known by the Norwegian word krill. toothed whales prefer fish and squid, 
so they are far less dependent on polar feeding, but bachelor sperms are 
known to migrate there nonetheless.12
 During the breeding season—october to March in the arctic, april 
to September in the antarctic—whales leave the polar regions and head 
to tropical and subtropical seas. Gestation and nursing periods vary from 
species to species, but rorquals are generally on a two-year reproduction 
cycle and right whales on a three-year cycle. Females give birth around 
eleven months after mating and typically nurse for another six months. 
Sperm whales follow a different rhythm: they gestate for fifteen months, 
nurse for two years, and reproduce every four years. these slow reproduc-
tion rates made it difficult to protect whale stocks in the face of round-the-
clock hunting, and they have greatly slowed the replenishment rate in the 
posthunting era. the fact that female baleens are larger than male baleens 
and that pregnant females are the largest (and most oil-rich) of all has also 
worked against conservation.13
 Until the twentieth century, nearly everything that was known about 
whales came from the firsthand accounts of whalers and the onboard in-
vestigations of amateur scientists, often filtered to the public through the 
fertile imaginations of storytellers. william Scoresby’s Account of the Arc-
tic Regions with a History and a Description of the Northern Whale-Fishery 
(1820) and herman Melville’s Moby Dick (1851) are among the most famous 
and accurate of these accounts. By 1900, many biologists were becoming 
increasingly concerned about the long-term prospect for whale conserva-
tion in light of modern hunting techniques. at their urging, the British 
Colonial office established the Discovery Committee (headquartered in 
Grytviken, South Georgia), which launched a succession of ships—Discovery 
(1920), William Scoresby (1925), and Discovery II (1929)—to observe distri-
bution patterns, behavioral characteristics, and reproduction rates. In 1929, 
the Norwegian government established three interlocking institutions: the 
hvalråd (whaling Council), composed of government leaders and scien-
tists; the Statens Institutt for hvalforskning (State Institute for whale re-
search), a center for cetacean science; and the Komitéen for Internasjonal 
hvalfangststatistiskk (International Committee for whaling Statistics), 
which tracked whaling ships around the world. out of Norway’s efforts 
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emerged the annual International Whaling Statistics, still the most reliable 
and comprehensive source of kill data worldwide. Diplomats relied almost 
entirely on Britain’s scientific reports and Norway’s official statistics when 
they formulated the international treaties of the 1930s and 1940s. Unfortu-
nately, there were still two glaring gaps. too little was known about repro-
duction patterns, and therefore, the treaties allowed for the taking of many 
juveniles that were mistakenly thought to be fully grown. too little was 
also understood about migration routes, and as a consequence, the same 
populations were allowed to be targeted at different sites during various 
times of the year.14
 Until Foyn invented the grenade harpoon, only five species of great 
whales—rights, bowheads, humpbacks, grays, and sperms—were hunted 
to any significant extent. these were, for the most part, slow-moving 
(around seven knots per hour) and coast-hugging species that could be 
caught readily with premodern hunting methods. rights and bowheads 
were greatly preferred because they floated after dying, making them easier 
to secure to a boat and haul to shore. humpbacks and grays were less desir-
able because they did not yield as much oil per pound as rights and bow-
heads. Moreover, humpbacks (like all rorquals) sank when they died, and 
grays had the reputation of being fierce fighters. as for sperm whales, only 
U.S. whalers built an entire industry around killing them; others chased 
them only occasionally.
 with the advent of Norwegian-style whaling in the 1860s, five more 
whale species (all rorquals) became targets: blues, fins, seis, Bryde’s, and 
minkes. they were either too large, too fast (moving at up to thirty knots 
per hour), or too elusive for earlier generations of whalers to catch with 
any regularity. Unfortunately, modern whalers did not stop hunting the 
first five species when they began chasing the next five; on the contrary, the 
new hunting techniques just made it all that much easier for them to mop 
up the remnant populations of rights, bowheads, grays, and humpbacks; 
these species thus became commercially extinct in many parts of the world 
long after they were the prime targets, casually killed by gunners in search 
of the more highly prized rorquals.
Right Whales
the right whale—also sometimes known as the nordcaper and North 
Cape—got its common name from British whalers back in the days when 
it was the most coveted species and hence the “right” one to pursue. there 
are two distinct populations, one that remains in the Northern hemi-
sphere (Balaena glacialis) and one that remains in the Southern hemisphere 
The Antarctic Whale Massacre |  111
(Balaena australis). rights reach a maximum length of only sixty feet and 
a weight of eighty tons, but they produce more oil per pound than do 
most other whales. they are black or gray, except for a white patch on 
their undersides, and they have keratinous lumps, known as callosities, on 
their heads. their lower jaws are large, and their mouths contain two large 
baleen plates, each eight to ten feet long. Like most whales, rights feed on 
zooplankton in the cool polar regions, then migrate each year to warmer 
and shallower waters to breed and give birth.
Bowhead Whales
the bowhead whale (Balaena mysticetus)—also known as the Green-
land whale and polar whale—is a larger and rounder cousin of the right, 
found only in the arctic regions. It stays year-round in cooler waters, 
never migrating southward to temperate waters. Black except for a white 
patch on its lower jaw, it reaches a maximum length of sixty-five feet 
and a weight of sixty-five tons. Its huge head contains the longest ba-
leen plates of any whale, up to fifteen feet in length. For that reason, it 
was the whale of choice whenever women’s fashions called for corsets or 
hoops. Bowheads were once plentiful throughout the arctic region, but 
Dutch and British whalers all but eliminated the eastern arctic popula-
tions in the eighteenth century, and U.S. whalers decimated the western 
arctic stocks a century later. today’s remnant population spends its win-
ter months in the Bering Sea, then migrates northward toward the arctic 
pole in april and May.
Humpback Whales
the humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) is the only slow-moving 
rorqual and thus the only one that europeans hunted before the advent of 
modern whaling. Its baleens are short (about two to three feet long) and its 
oil yield meager as compared to rights and bowheads, so it was rarely the 
preferred target. a thickset creature, its name probably comes from the fact 
that it arches sharply when it dives. typically, it is black on top and white 
on the bottom, and it attains a length of fifty to sixty feet and an average 
weight of forty tons. humpbacks are the delight of whale watchers today 
because three-quarters of their bodies come out of the water when they 
breach and because the males make elaborate sound patterns that resemble 
human song. Groups of humpbacks sometimes engage in a unique ritual 
known as “bubble-net feeding”: they surround a school of fish and then 
release air bubbles, which force the fish more tightly together; the whales 
then lunge in and swallow their prey.15
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Gray Whales
the gray whale (Eschrichtius robustus) is nicknamed the “devil fish” be-
cause females with young have been known to ram ships when harassed or 
harpooned. Never as numerous as other whale species, grays once inhabited 
the atlantic and Pacific oceans, but humans eradicated them from the at-
lantic centuries ago and decimated their numbers in the western Pacific 
more recently; consequently, their distribution is now almost entirely 
limited to the eastern Pacific from alaska to Mexico (and this too is a rem-
nant population that barely survived the slaughter of California whalers). 
along with humpbacks, the gray is a favorite of whale watchers. It reaches 
a length of forty to fifty feet and thirty-five tons in weight. aside from its 
characteristic color, the gray can be identified by the absence of a dorsal fin 
and by the presence of “knuckles” (crenulations) on its backside; it is also 
the only large whale with an upper jaw that overhangs the lower one. the 
gray makes an annual migration from its feeding grounds in the Bering 
and Chukchi seas to Baja California, a distance of more than seven thou-
sand miles, the longest known migration of any mammal in the world. 
the gray is also unusual in that it is a bottom-feeder: it dives to the ocean 
floor and skims the bottom for copepods, using its baleen plates to filter 
out mud and water.
Sperm Whales
the sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus)—also known as the cachalot 
and pottwal—is the only great whale belonging to the odontoceti subor-
der. It is black in color, except for a white lower jaw and a white patch on 
its underside. among the great whales, it is the only polygamous species: 
dominant males impregnate many females, and the rest (“bachelors”) are 
pushed to the sidelines. Males weigh up to sixty tons and reach sixty feet 
in length; females are about one-third smaller. the sperm whale’s enor-
mous square head contains the world’s largest brain, the world’s largest 
breathing apparatus, a row of conical teeth, and a compartment (“case”) 
filled with a clear amber liquid known as spermaceti. Like other odonto-
ceti, the sperm whale locates its prey (mostly small squid) by echoloca-
tion; it may also stun them with sonic blasts before swallowing them. U.S. 
whalers targeted sperm whales for well over a century (roughly from 1720 
to 1860) without seriously depleting their numbers, probably because 
they preferred the larger males over the smaller females. Sperms were not 
regularly hunted again until after 1945 (and especially after 1962), as other 
species became depleted.16
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Blue Whales
the blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) is the largest animal ever 
known to have lived: it can reach one hundred feet in length and weigh 
one hundred and fifty tons or more. It has a greenish-blue color, but 
its underside is often laden with diatoms, giving it a yellowish hue 
and the nickname “sulphur bottom.” Blues are found worldwide, but 
they exist as several distinct populations that do not commingle, even 
when they feed, breed, and migrate in neighboring waters. they are not 
particularly gregarious, preferring to travel alone or in small groups. 
their distinctive color and enormous size, as well as rounded upper 
jaw, make them easy to distinguish from other whales. a subspecies of 
the blue, the pygmy blue (Balaenoptera musculus brevicauda), is found 
only in the Southern hemisphere. Its name is doubly deceptive: it at-
tains a length of eighty feet (small only by blue whale standards), and 
it is silvery-gray in color. Like other rorquals, the blue is an aggressive 
feeder: it opens its jaws wide and uses its lower jaw to scoop krill (its 
preferred food) into its mouth. During its four-month feeding season, 
a blue whale consumes around 1.5 million calories per day. whalers 
hunted the antarctic blues to the brink of extinction in the first half of 
the twentieth century and most intensely between 1913 to 1937. During 
the 1930–31 season alone, they took the largest number of blues ever 
recorded—29,410 according to the official tally—and over the follow-
ing thirty-five years, they took another 189,710 blues, for an average of 
5,420 per year.17 to this day, the stocks have never recovered from this 
onslaught.
Fin Whales
the fin whale (Balaeoptera physalus), also known as a finner and razor-
back, is seventy-five to eighty feet in length and fifty tons in weight, making 
it second only to the blue among the earth’s largest animals. as its name 
implies, it has the most pronounced dorsal fin of any whale. It is the only 
whale with asymmetrical colorization: the right side of its lower jaw is 
white, and the left side is pigmented. It can also move with unusual swift-
ness for a marine mammal. as with the blue whale, the fin whale inhabits 
every part of the world’s oceans. Its largeness made it a favorite target of 
whalers, especially after blues became increasingly scarce, and its numbers 
plummeted between 1937 and 1965, when it was most intensely hunted. 
Nonetheless, the fin remains one of the most widely distributed and abun-
dant of the great whales.18
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Sei and Bryde’s Whales
the sei whale and Bryde’s whale closely resemble each other. the sei (Ba-
laenoptera borealis) is so named because its annual spring migrations on 
the eastern atlantic coincide with those of the sei (Norwegian for the fish 
variously known as saithe, pollack, and coalfish). Dark gray in color, the sei 
whale can attain a length of fifty to sixty-five feet and a weight of forty tons, 
making it only slightly smaller than the fin whale. Its annual migration is 
slightly less regular than that of other whales. Bryde’s whale (Balaenoptera 
edeni)—forty-five feet in length and thirty tons in weight—is named after 
Johan Bryde, a Norwegian businessman who was one of the first to exploit 
these whales off the coast of South africa. Its colloquial name, “tropical 
whale,” is more informative. It roams in temperate and tropical waters, 
giving preference to the seas around Japan and South africa; it does not 
migrate to polar waters. the sei whale and Bryde’s whale were both con-
sidered too small to hunt in the early days of modern whaling, but they be-
came prime targets between 1965 and 1975, when whalers could no longer 
find many blues and fins.
Minke Whales
the minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) is the smallest of the rorquals, 
reaching twenty-five to thirty feet in length and weighing around ten tons. 
the minke is black on top and white on bottom; it is the only rorqual that 
leaps completely out of the water when it breaches. It is distributed world-
wide, but its southern and northern populations are quite distinct. Minkes 
were considered far too small to hunt as long as other rorquals were read-
ily available, though they were targeted in the waning days of the whaling 
industry from 1975 forward. Still plentiful, they are among the only whales 
being commercially hunted today.
Biology was, for most whalers, an abstruse science about which they un-
derstood little or nothing. they did, nonetheless, possess an enormous 
amount of practical knowledge about cetacean anatomy and behavior that 
helped them track whales—including infants—with ruthless efficiency. 
they knew, for instance, that whales were easiest to spot and most vul-
nerable to a harpoon when they surfaced periodically to breathe or feed. 
they knew that whales followed predictable annual migration routes, that 
a group (pod) of whales was likely to assist a wounded member rather than 
flee danger, and that females almost never abandoned their young. they 
could recognize different whale species almost instantly—using size, color, 
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blow patterns, and other distinguishing features as their guide—even if 
few of them could recite their Latin names. what they saw when they spot-
ted a whale, however, was not a species per se but a floating warehouse—a 
cornucopia of oil, baleen, meat, bone, spermaceti, ambergris, and other 
valuable raw materials.19
 Whale oil is the general term used to describe the edible oil extracted 
from the blubber, tongue, meat, bones, and internal organs of baleen 
whales. Structurally, it is a fatty acid, composed of one glycerine molecule 
combined with three fat molecules (triglycerides). triglycerides are poor 
conductors of heat, making them ideal insulators in polar seas. the oil, 
once rendered and refined, can be used for illumination and lubrication. 
when combined with an alkali (such as potash or sodium carbonate), the 
fatty acids can be transformed into a good-quality soap. when mixed with 
vinegar, the oil can be applied to rice paddies as a pesticide. the glycer-
ines in the oil can be used in the production of emollients and explosives. 
Most important, oleic acid, the most common fatty acid found in whale 
oil, can also be turned into margarine by adding two hydrogen molecules, 
a process known as hydrogenation. Until 1900, whale oil mostly went into 
the production of illuminants, soap, and explosives. By the 1930s, it was 
almost wholly used to make margarine and lard. (In 1934, some 84 percent 
of all whale oil shipped to europe was turned into margarine.)20 whale 
oil is indistinguishable from other edible fats such as canola, soy, copra 
(coconut), and linseed except in one respect: it can be stored for a much 
longer period of time without spoiling (over five years). For that reason, 
many governments once maintained a strategic reserve of whale oil for use 
during wartime.21
 Baleen is nicknamed “whalebone,” but it is actually made of keratin, 
the same material found in fingernails and hair. Before the era of steel 
springs and plastic, it was a highly coveted product, often more profitable 
than whale oil. Its utility came from its lightness, flexibility, springiness, 
and strength. It was used in all kinds of consumer goods, including corset 
stays, hoop petticoats, umbrella ribs, ramrods, fishing rods, buggy whips, 
and carriage springs. It could be cut into strips and used as a sieve, a net, 
or a brush. when shredded, it could be used to stuff upholstered furniture. 
after steel and plastic came into widespread use in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, baleen lost almost all of its commercial value and was discarded or 
used for mundane products such as chimney brooms.22
 Whale meat has the look and texture of beef, but it is somewhat darker 
in color and has a stronger flavor. only the Japanese and some indigenous 
peoples in the polar regions eat it on a regular basis. the Japanese distinguish 
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between three types of whale meat: akaniku (red meat), which is similar in 
composition to that of land mammals; onomi (tail meat), which is especially 
fatty; and sunoko (ventral-groove meat), which is layered with connective 
tissue as well as fat. Medieval europeans used to consume whale meat dur-
ing Lent, treating it as fish instead of flesh, but modern europeans and 
North americans never developed a taste for it, except in whaling com-
munities (such as Bergen, Norway), where it can be found on menus to 
this day. Since there was no market in europe or the United States for the 
meat, whalers typically rendered it along with the bones and intestines in 
order to extract its oil; the waste meat was then used as animal feed, and 
the waste bone was turned into phosphoric fertilizer. the Japanese have 
been heavily criticized over the decades for using whale meat as a protein 
source, though it is not readily apparent why turning these animals into 
margarine and fertilizer is more justifiable.23
 Sperm oil, spermaceti, and ambergris are unique to the sperm whale. 
Sperm oil and spermaceti are inedible waxes composed of esters of fatty 
acids with monohydric alcohols, making them structurally different 
from baleen oil (which contains glycerin). Sperm oil is rendered from the 
whale’s body, and it is a liquid at room temperature. heat-resistant and 
noncorrosive, it is an excellent lubricant for heavy machinery and can also 
be used for illumination. Spermaceti is found in a compartment (or case) 
in the whale’s forehead. It is a liquid when inside the whale, but it turns 
into a milky white substance (hence the whale’s sexualized name) when 
cooled and exposed to air. It is particularly suitable for the production of 
smokeless and odorless candles. Both sperm oil and spermaceti can also 
be used in the production of ointments, cosmetics, and soaps. the third 
product—ambergris—is a waxy material found in the large intestine or 
rectum of some sperm whales. It is probably an abnormal coalescence of 
substances that accumulates without doing the animal any apparent harm. 
Long a mainstay of the pharmaceutical, cosmetics, and alcohol industries, 
ambergris is still coveted today as a fixing agent for perfumes.24
The Impact of “Old Whaling” on Regional Populations
the Basques were the first people in the world known to have exploited 
whales primarily for their commercial value rather than for subsistence. 
Sometime in the twelfth century Ce (and perhaps even earlier), they be-
gan plying the atlantic seaboard between France and Spain in search of 
the right whale, whose migratory route included the Bay of Biscay, near 
the Basque homeland. their killing technique—adopted by all subsequent 
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european whalers—was an adaptation of Stone age technology to ocean 
conditions. a group of men rowed a boat as close as possible to a whale, 
and then one or more of them hurled a harpoon (the Basque word for 
spear) at its head or back. the harpoon was attached to the boat by a long 
rope. after spearing the animal, the boatmen’s chief task was to stay alive 
while the whale exhausted itself dragging the vessel behind it, sometimes 
for days. Crew members then lanced the dying whale and towed the car-
cass to a shore station, where they flensed the blubber and rendered it in 
trypots until it melted into oil. thousands of whales were caught this way, 
and many boats capsized, though the absence of written records makes it 
impossible to ascertain the total number.25
 over time, right whale populations in the Bay of Biscay began to dwin-
dle, most likely because of overexploitation. By the thirteenth century, the 
Basques were sailing to the arctic regions, especially to the waters around 
Greenland, where they found an untouched population of rights, bow-
heads, and atlantic grays. By the sixteenth century, they had extended their 
hunting grounds to include Newfoundland and Labrador in eastern Can-
ada, enlarging their annual take as they moved farther afield. they also be-
gan to use larger and more powerful vessels (including rowboats launched 
from sailing ships) and to flense the carcasses on the side of a boat, thereby 
reducing their dependency on shore stations. their expeditions brought 
them into greater contact with northern europeans—especially the Dutch, 
British, Danish, German, and russian sailors along the North and Baltic 
seas—who began to imitate and eventually overtake them. the Dutch were 
particularly aggressive hunters, and by the seventeenth century, they had 
supplanted the Basques as the world’s foremost whalers.26
 the Dutch whaling industry was centered at first in Spitsbergen 
(also known as Svalbard), a cluster of islands east of Greenland. It was 
there that the Dutch established their first shore station in the 1620s—
aptly named Smeerenburg (meaning “Blubbertown”)—and began ex-
ploiting a largely untouched population of rights, bowheads, and grays. 
Like the Basques, however, the Dutch soon discovered that they had 
to keep moving farther afield as they depleted one hunting area after 
the next, and over time, they retraced the Basque trail to Greenland, 
Iceland, and eastern Canada. they hunted in much the same way as 
their predecessors, often using Basque harpooners and blubber-cutters 
on their expeditions, but their ships (especially the flyboat) were more 
versatile and numerous, and their collective impact was more lethal. 
especially ominous was the total collapse of the Spitsbergen whaling 
grounds in the 1840s, after two centuries of exploitation, and the complete 
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disappearance of the atlantic gray populations (though no one knows 
for sure how or when that occurred).27
 among non-europeans, the Japanese developed a unique and thriv-
ing whaling industry from the seventeenth century forward. the Basque 
method was unknown in asia, but Japanese whalers developed their own 
hunting technique, one that resembles a cross between modern-day purse 
seining and samurai sword fighting. after a whale was spotted, boats sur-
rounded it and directed it toward a series of large nets that were held fast 
between specially designed net boats. as soon as the whale was entangled in 
the nets, a group of men harpooned it until it was mortally wounded. then 
several of them jumped on the whale’s back and performed the coup de 
grâce with lance blows. this unique hunting method allowed the Japanese 
to take not only the easily catchable right whales (their favorite target) but 
also the more elusive humpbacks and even an occasional fin. (Pacific grays 
were taken too, but they broke through the nets and had to be harpooned.) 
From the outset, the Japanese hunted mostly for meat, not oil (Buddhist 
monks, forbidden to eat animal flesh, were especially fond of whale “fish”). 
they also took special care not to kill female right whales accompanied by 
young. this fact may well explain why the rights did not become endan-
gered on the Japanese coastline as early as they did elsewhere.28
 whalers in the United States played a transitional role in the history 
of world whaling. For the most part, they used Basque and Dutch hunting 
techniques, but they also experimented with nearly all of the new tech-
niques that would later be associated with modern Norwegian whaling. By 
and large, the industry was concentrated along the yankee coastline of New 
england—New Bedford, Nantucket, Provincetown, New London, and Sag 
harbor—though San Francisco also emerged as a major port during the 
nineteenth century. american-based enterprises emerged slowly during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, gradually expanding from the 
atlantic to the Pacific, displacing the Dutch as they went. For a short pe-
riod, from 1820 to 1860, the United States enjoyed a virtual stranglehold 
over the industry worldwide.29
 Initially, yankee whalers targeted the same whales as the europeans—
rights and bowheads—but by the early eighteenth century, they had be-
come equally interested in sperm whales and grays. they developed the 
first safe and reliable method for rendering oil on the ship (a practice the 
europeans had attempted unsuccessfully). onboard tryworks turned U.S. 
ships into early versions of the floating factory, allowing whalers to travel 
farther from their base stations for longer periods of time, sometimes 
years. then, in the mid-nineteenth century, thomas welcome roys, the 
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first whaler to exploit commercially the western arctic region, invented 
two devices that foreshadowed the modern era. the first was a prototype 
winch-and-rope system (which roys called a compensator but Foyn later 
renamed an accumulator) that reeled in a whale like a fishing rod. the 
second was a prototype bazooka gun, which allowed a gunner to shoot a 
harpoon from his shoulder.30 (“It is now all over with the poor whales,” 
roys presciently remarked: “the weapon cleaves them like fate, making an 
internal wound about 10 feet in diameter closing at once every artery of 
life.”)31 So forward-looking were roys’s inventions that Norwegian histori-
ans have called him “the Svend Foyn of american whaling.”32
 Given roys’s inventiveness, U.S. whalers may well have nipped the 
Norwegian challenge in the bud, but domestic events conspired against 
them. In 1849, the California gold rush enticed thousands of able-bodied 
seamen into the Sierra Nevada, leaving many whaling expeditions bereft of 
experienced captains and crews. a decade later, much of the whaling fleet 
was sunk or scuttled during the Civil war (1861–65). then, in the 1860s, 
kerosene—a cheap illuminant derived from coal and (later) petroleum—
knocked the bottom out of the sperm-oil market. In 1846, some 735 whal-
ing ships sailed under the U.S. flag, roughly three-quarters of the world’s 
whaling fleet. the number had dwindled to 263 by 1866, to 124 by 1888, and 
to a mere 42 by 1906.33
 the other great whaling nation of the premodern era was Great Brit-
ain. British whaling, however, did not follow the same pattern of peak and 
collapse that characterized the Basque, Dutch, and U.S. industries. Instead, 
it survived over many centuries, never becoming hegemonic but also never 
disappearing altogether. after going to war with the Dutch over whal-
ing issues in the seventeenth century, the British settled for second best. 
this pattern repeated itself in North america, with British whalers first 
trying to control the U.S. whaling industry and then coming to accept it 
and even depend on it for oils. During the modern era, Britain once again 
played second fiddle, this time to Norway (even Britain’s largest whaling 
enterprise, Christian Salvesen, was founded by a Norwegian immigrant). 
Like their competitors, British whalers concentrated their activities in the 
eastern arctic, especially Spitsbergen, and then expanded westward until 
they reached Canada. From there, they ventured to the coastlines of af-
rica, South america, australia, and New Zealand and finally to the heart 
of the antarctic. British whalers would not pose a serious challenge 
to the Norwegians until the 1930s, but they did have two advantages that 
kept them competitive as others fell behind: many of the prime locations 
around the antarctic perimeter were British colonies, and much of the 
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world’s whale-oil trade came to be concentrated in the hands of a British-
based cartel, the Unilever (known as Lever Brothers before 1930).34
The Impact of Modern Whaling to 1931
Modern whaling began in the Varanger fjord of Finnmark, Norway’s north-
ernmost province, in the late 1860s. that is the fjord where Foyn first tested 
his new steamship and whaling harpoon on an untouched population of 
rorquals (mostly blues, fins, and seis) and also where he built his first shore 
station at Vadsø. Foyn’s catch was modest by later standards—averaging 
only forty whales per year from 1873 through 1878 and ninety-two per 
year from 1878 to 1882—but these numbers were astonishing for their 
day because no one had ever managed to kill anywhere near that many 
rorquals before.35 after a decade hunting in the Varanger fjord, Foyn and 
his growing band of competitors began to expand their operations, first to 
Iceland (around 1883), then to the Faroes (around 1894), to the Shetlands, 
the hebrides, and Spitsbergen (around 1903), and finally to Ireland (1908), 
exploiting much the same eastern hunting grounds as their predecessors 
had. By 1894, they were collectively killing 1,528 whales, and by 1904 (the 
peak year), the number rose to 2,380 whales.36 the total eastern arctic tally 
for the entire period between 1868 and 1904 came to around 40,000 whales, 
almost all of which were rorquals and nearly all of which were killed by 
Norwegian gunners.37
 the pickings were easy at first, much as in the early days of Basque, 
Dutch, and american whaling. But as competition grew and as whale popu-
lations declined in the eastern arctic, companies found that they had to 
venture farther and farther afield. First, they went to Newfoundland and 
Labrador in eastern Canada (around 1898), then to British Columbia in 
western Canada (around 1905), and finally to alaska (around 1912). Com-
plete data for the North american catch are not available, but the New-
foundland catch stood at 858 whales in 1903 and 518 whales in 1909, and 
the alaska catch stood at 482 whales in 1914 and 539 in 1919. the Japanese, 
meanwhile, adopted Norwegian techniques, and by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, they had transformed the coastlines of Japan and 
Korea into yet another rorqual killing site (with 42 killed in 1900 and 1,276 
in 1920).38
 For many decades, modern whaling was confined almost wholly to the 
Northern hemisphere, close to known harbors and local markets. only a 
handful of ships operated in the Southern hemisphere at all, and those 
that did tended to be relics of former Dutch, British, and american enter-
The Antarctic Whale Massacre |  121
prises. the geography of whaling, however, shifted dramatically when Carl 
Larsen, a Norwegian, captained the Jason and later the Antarctica deep into 
the southern seas in search of new killing grounds. Larsen went initially in 
pursuit of right whales, still the sentimental favorite among whalers, but 
he soon turned his guns on the rorquals—especially humpbacks, blues, 
and fins—that he found there in superabundance. antarctica, however, 
posed unique challenges. First, it took an enormous amount of coal and 
time to reach the southern polar region from Norway. Second, the ant-
arctic summer was so short and bitterly cold that crews had to work at 
breakneck speed to fill their ships to capacity; all too often, carcasses froze 
solid before they could be flensed and processed. third, ice hazards were 
everywhere, but protected harbors were few and far between. Given the 
hurdles, only the largest whaling companies risked their ships on such a 
costly experiment.39
 then, in 1904, Larsen found a solution: he established a shore station at 
Grytviken (meaning “Cauldron Bay”), an abandoned sealing site on South 
Georgia Island. South Georgia was part of an archipelago stretching from 
the Falklands to the antarctic continent, under nominal British suzerainty. 
as soon as it proved a profitable spot for catching and processing whales, 
a wild “scramble for antarctica” began. rival companies built shore sta-
tions on South Shetland, South orkney, and South Sandwich, all part of 
the Falklands archipelago. others set up operations on South america’s 
southern cone (Chile and argentina), the african coastline (modern-day 
Mozambique, South africa, angola, Gabon, and Madagascar), or austra-
lia and New Zealand—all locations that put them in striking distance of 
antarctica.40 early on, the pickings were easy, much as they had once been 
in the arctic. “we could often go right over to them and drop the harpoon 
in their backs,” one Norwegian expedition leader noted: “It’s unfortunate 
that cows with young should be killed, but there’s nothing that can be done 
about it.”41
 By the 1909–10 season, antarctic-based enterprises were already out-
pacing arctic-based ones, both in terms of the annual catch (6,099 whales 
in the antarctic as compared to 3,958 in the arctic) and the amount of oil 
produced (157,592 barrels as compared to 112,347). From that moment on, 
“world whaling” was increasingly identified with the Southern hemisphere 
in general and antarctica in particular. By 1922, antarctica’s share of world 
whaling stood at 70.8 percent, and by 1930, it had reached 90.8 percent.42 
the number of whales taken each year also gradually increased. Between 
1910 and 1924 alone, the antarctic catch averaged around 9,000 annually 
(totaling 134,026 whales), enough to produce 433,000 barrels of oil per year 
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(totaling 6,498,771 barrels).43 these totals were nearly ten times the killing 
and production rates set by Foyn and his competitors during the heyday of 
eastern arctic activities.
 then, in the 1920s, Norwegian whalers stumbled on the largest whal-
ing grounds in the world: the antarctic convergence (the meeting point of 
warm and cold ocean currents), where thousands and thousands of blues, 
fins, and other rorquals migrated each year to gorge on krill. once again, 
it was Larsen who led the way when he ventured into the ross Sea in 1923 
aboard the vessel Sir James Clark Ross.44 and once again, it was a Nor-
wegian inventor, Petter Sørlle, who designed a new modern factory ship 
that allowed whalers to exploit these grounds. In 1925, Sørlle outfitted the 
Lancing with a stern slipway—a large trapdoor in the back of the ship that 
could be opened and closed as needed (much the way a car ferry works 
today)—as well as a ramp, winch, and whale claw. these tools enabled the 
crew to grab and hoist a whale into the main deck for flensing and process-



















Figure 3.1  Global whale-oil production from the opening of the Antarctic whaling grounds in 1909 

















































































































Figure 3.1. Global whale-  production from the opening of the antarctic whaling 
grounds in 1909 to the signing of the 1937 London Convention. adapted from Commit-
tee for whaling Statistics, International Whaling Statistics, vol. 16  (oslo: Committeee 
for whaling Statistics, 1930–88), 5.
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 Sørlle’s factory ship had another advantage: it freed whaling enter-
prises from their dependence on shore stations and thus ushered in the 
era known as pelagic whaling.45 whaling companies could simply anchor 
one or more of these factory ships in the middle of the krill grounds and 
use them as ersatz shore stations. Four or more whale catchers would ac-
company each factory ship to antarctica and supply it with a steady stream 
of carcasses. By 1930–31, there were already 38 pelagic factory ships and 
184 whale catchers operating in this manner, enough to triple the previ-
ous kill rate. the annual catch reached an all-time high of 47,200 whales 
(around 3.6 million barrels of oil) in 1930–31, then spiked again to 50,769 
whales in 1937–38. Pelagic whaling also solidified the antarctic’s stronghold 
over world whaling. Back in 1868, nearly every rorqual death occurred at a 
single location—the Varanger fjord of northern Norway—in the arctic. By 
1938, 84 percent of the world catch occurred in the Southern hemisphere, 




























































































































Figure 3.2  Global whale oil production from 1909 to 1934 during the era of Norwegian 
and British domination.  (Source: International Whaling Statistics)
Figure 3.2. Global whale-oil production from 190  to 1934 during t   f Norwegian 
and British domination. adapted from Committee for whaling Statistics, International 
Whaling Statistics (oslo: Committeee for whaling Statistics, 1930–88), vols. 1–12.
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 with the advent of the modern antarctic factory ship, the killing 
rate began to spin out of control. whaling expeditions came to include 
not just a flotilla of factory ships, whale catchers, and fuel ships but also 
helicopters and other tracking devices (eventually including sonar). 
the demand for whale oil climbed steadily, as did (so it seemed) the 
opportunity for profits, and soon, there were new German, Japanese, 
russian, and Dutch enterprises entering the fray. Indeed, by the 1930s, 
a “global commons” problem was beginning to emerge: all whaling en-
terprises understood that they had a collective interest in a sustainable 
annual harvest, but no individual whaling company had an incentive 
to take a unilateral step in the direction of reducing its annual kill rate. 
the expeditions were enormously expensive, and whalers felt they had 
to maximize their catch every season in order to turn a profit. Conser-
vation on the part of an individual whaler just meant more whales for 
the others.
 the only thing that could protect whales from endangerment and ex-
tinction—and the whaling industry from itself!—was governmental and 
intergovernmental regulation.
International Whaling Regulations to 1946
as with the african land animal treaties and the North american bird trea-
ties, the whaling treaties emerged slowly and haphazardly over many de-
cades. the early regulations were, for the most part, parochial in scope, 
designed to protect local or national interests rather than to safeguard the 
world’s whale stocks. In 1863, the Norwegian government banned whaling 
in certain fjords during the herring season because local fishers were con-
vinced (incorrectly) that whale carcasses attracted predators and scared off 
herring schools. In 1881, Norway banned all whaling within one mile of its 
coastline, and it imposed a total ban on whaling in the Varanger fjord dur-
ing the cod season from January 1 to May 31. It subsequently banned whal-
ing entirely in the territorial waters of Finnmark between 1904 and 1918, 
after a series of bad fishing years there. Similarly, in 1886, Iceland estab-
lished a closed season on whaling within its territorial waters between May 
1 and october 31, and it banned whaling entirely in the vicinity of herring 
fisheries. In 1915, it also imposed a ten-year ban on all whaling within its 
territorial waters (not to protect the whales but to keep the Norwegians out 
while it built a domestic whaling industry). Likewise, in 1902, the Danish 
government banned whaling around the Faroe Islands to all except those 
who flew the Danish flag.47
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 asian whaling countries moved in the direction of regulation around 
the same time. In 1907, Korea established a closed season on whaling in 
its territorial waters between May 1 and September 30, and it placed a to-
tal ban on the killing of immature whales and adult females with young. 
these regulations were unusually forward-looking, for they focused on 
maintaining whale stocks rather than just national prerogatives. In 1908, 
the Japanese government channeled its whaling enterprises into a single 
umbrella organization, the Japanese whaling and Fishing association 
(headquartered in osaka), and gave it the power to limit the number of 
whale catchers working in its territorial waters. this was forward-looking 
too in the sense that it predated the larger and more powerful Norwegian-
led consortium of whaling enterprises, the association of whaling Com-
panies (hvalfangerforeningen), which was not founded until 1929.48
 the British government, meanwhile, introduced two major innova-
tions to whale management: (1) a fee-based licensing system, designed to 
discourage overfishing in any given hunting ground, and (2) a full-use re-
quirement, designed to eliminate wastage and thus reduce the stench of 
rotting carcasses (one of the chief complaints of fishers). all whale boats 
operating in the Shetlands after 1906, for instance, had to pay an annual fee 
of £100 and agree to process their carcasses within sixty hours of capture. 
In eastern Canada (Newfoundland and Labrador), the right to maintain 
a shore station, along with a single whale catcher, cost $1,500 per annum 
as of 1902, and in 1928, the total number of shore stations, each now with 
two catchers, was capped at eight.49 the French instituted a similar licens-
ing system in their colonial dependencies and pushed for an international 
whaling treaty—as well as extending the coastal territorial zone to fifteen 
to twenty miles—though no progress in the direction of transnational co-
operation came out of this initial effort.50
 when whaling shifted from the arctic to the antarctic in 1904, Britain 
extended its licensing system there as well. the Falklands governor capped 
the total number of licenses for South Georgia at twenty-two. each license, 
moreover, came with the right to establish only one shore station with a 
maximum of two whale catchers and one floating factory. In a glaring ad-
ministrative oversight, however, he did not impose a full-use requirement 
until many years later, by which time thousands of discarded entrails and 
piles of meat were rotting on the island shores. worse yet, he never im-
posed a yearly catch limit, thereby largely undermining the purpose of a 
licensing system. this situation resulted in the almost complete annihila-
tion of humpbacks, the most prevalent species in the archipelago, within 
a short span of time. In the first decade of whaling operations, from 1904 
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to 1914, nearly 70 percent of the 29,016 whales killed in the South Geor-
gian seas were humpbacks. this kill rate so vastly exceeded reproduction 
rates that a mere 131 humpbacks could be bagged during the 1917–18 sea-
son, prompting the governor to impose a temporary ban. Unfortunately, 
the ban was lifted long before humpback populations recovered, and from 
then on, they would never make up more than about 10 percent of the 
South Georgian catch.51
 It would be too much to assert that the advent of pelagic whaling in the 
mid-1920s undermined these early attempts to regulate the whaling indus-
try. the laws were too poorly constructed—and haphazardly enforced—to 
add up to anything remotely approaching an international regulatory re-
gime in the first place. Pelagic whaling did, however, finally put an end to 
the fiction that a country-by-country approach could effectively regulate a 
global industry, and it raised the question of how (or if) the industry could 
be regulated in the future. three institutions stepped in to fill the void. 
the first was the League of Nations (later the United Nations). League of-
ficials highlighted the importance of taking a biological approach to whale 
preservation, arguing that the needs of rational scientific management had 
to take precedence over the commercial rights of whaling nations. the 
League was the chief advocate of a comprehensive international treaty that 
would regulate the hunting grounds worldwide. the second association 
was the association of whaling Companies, founded in 1929 and known 
informally as the Sellers’ Pool. headquartered in Sandefjord, it had thirty-
two charter members (twenty-five Norwegian companies, four British, two 
Danish, and one argentinean), representing about 80 percent of world 
whale-oil production. working closely with the Norwegian government, it 
was essentially a price-fixing cartel, its primary purpose being to keep the 
price of oil high enough to keep whaling profitable, even if it meant accept-
ing an annual catch limit. the third association was the Unilever Group, 
a consortium of the three major margarine producers—Lever Brothers, 
De Nordiske Fabriker (De-No-Fa), and Margarine Unie—created in 1930 
and informally known as the Buyers’ Pool. working closely with the Brit-
ish government, its primary purpose was to ensure that the price of whale 
oil remained at or below the price of palm, coconut, linseed, and other 
equivalent edible oils and fats. the various treaties, protocols, and bilateral 
agreements that emerged between 1931 and 1938 reflected the interplay of 
power and negotiation among these three institutions. only the League of 
Nations took a scientific approach to whale management. the Sellers’ Pool 
and the Buyers’ Pool were solely interested in creating a reliable structure 
for producing and selling oil at a profit.
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 Conservationists had been discussing a whaling treaty at the same time 
they had been formulating the african and North american treaties. But 
the unregulated status of the world’s oceans and the absence of precedents 
regarding the global commons hindered progress. It was only after the 
commencement of pelagic whaling in the mid-1920s that the International 
Council for the exploration of the Sea (a League of Nations agency) began 
to explore the possibilities for a whaling convention. José León Suárez—an 
argentinean diplomat and a whale-conservation enthusiast—was put in 
charge, and the committee’s recommendations were published as the Report 
on the Exploitation of the Products of the Sea (hereafter the Suárez report).
 the Suárez report made a number of remarkably forward-looking 
recommendations modeled in large part on the african mammal and 
North american bird conventions of the recent past. these included: (1) 
the creation of a rotation system for whale exploitation (similar to the 
three-field system in agriculture) in the antarctic krill grounds, (2) an an-
nual closed season during breeding times akin to those used to protect 
migratory land animals, (3) complete protection for all immature whales 
and their mothers, (4) standardization of capture methods, and (5) the 
implementation of a full-use requirement for all carcasses. “the riches of 
the sea,” Suárez noted, “and especially the immense wealth of the antarctic 
region, are the patrimony of the whole race.”52
 the association of whaling Companies saw the matter quite differ-
ently: whales were prey, not patrimony. at its urging, Norway’s parliament 
passed the Norwegian whaling act of 1929 (hereafter the 1929 Norwegian 
act), the chief purpose of which was to stave off a League convention or, 
failing that, to provide an alternative text to the Suárez report for any 
future treaty. on the positive side, the 1929 Norwegian act was far more 
comprehensive than any previous national law, and since Norwegian en-
terprises dominated world whaling, its impact extended well beyond the 
confines of Norway. Companies were forbidden to kill more whales than 
their floating factories could process before the carcasses began to rot. 
waste was strictly forbidden: factory ships had to be outfitted with boilers 
and other equipment needed to render all parts of the whale (including the 
head, jaw, flank, tongue, and tail) into oil and to process other by-products, 
such as animal feed and fertilizer. the killing of right whales was forbidden 
outright, as was the killing of all calves, females with calves, blue whales 
under sixty feet long, and fin whales under fifty feet. to encourage the tak-
ing of mature whales, companies were required to pay their crews a wage 
based on the barrels of oil produced, not the number of whales caught. 
to ensure that these rules were enforced, each floating factory had to have 
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at least one inspector aboard at all times. on the negative side, however, 
the law focused far more on the compilation of accurate records than on 
conservation. It did not limit the annual kill, the number of factory ships, 
or the yearly production. Nor did it establish a licensing system for pelagic 
whaling (though Norwegian companies were required to inform the gov-
ernment where they intended to send their floating factories before com-
mencing operations).53
 once the 1929 Norwegian act was in place, Norway and Britain used 
their influence over the League to ensure that its stipulations—not those 
of the Suárez report—were used in the formulation of the Convention for 
the regulation of whaling, signed in Geneva in September 1931 (hereafter 
the 1931 Geneva Convention).54 Missing from the 1931 Geneva Convention 
was any wording that highlighted rational management based on scientific 
principles; in its place was the raw language of commercial exploitation. 
article 1 obligated the parties to “take appropriate measures” within “their 
respective jurisdictions” to ensure the “application of the provisions of the 
present Convention and the punishment of infractions.” article 2 made it 
clear that the convention applied only to “baleens or whalebone whales,” 
not toothed whales. article 4 stated in full: “the taking or killing of right 
whales, which shall be deemed to include North-Cape whales, Greenland 
whales, southern right whales, Pacific right whales and southern pigmy 
right whales, is prohibited.” (In other words, all rights and bowheads re-
ceived full protection worldwide.) article 5 extended that prohibition to 
the “taking or killing of calves or suckling whales, immature whales, and 
female whales which are accompanied by calves (or suckling whales).”55
 article 6 required the “fullest possible use” of whale carcasses, stat-
ing in part: “every factory, whether on shore or afloat, used for treating 
the carcasses of whales shall be equipped with adequate apparatus for the 
extraction of oil from the blubber, flesh and bones.” article 7 required 
companies to base the crew’s pay (insofar as it was tied to production) 
primarily on “size, species, value and yield of oil taken” rather than on 
“the number of whales taken.” this was supposed to encourage gunners 
to kill mature rather than juvenile whales, which it did. Unfortunately, it 
also encouraged gunners to target the largest of the largest whales, namely, 
pregnant blues. (In 1932–33, for instance, pregnant blues accounted for 80 
percent of all whales over eighty-five feet that were killed that season.)56 
article 9 noted that the treaty applied “to all the waters of the world, in-
cluding both the high seas and territorial and national waters.” articles 10 
through 12 dealt with the collection of statistics, and articles 13 through 21 
handled mundane issues relating to the process of implementation. only 
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two of these articles are noteworthy. article 17 stated that the convention 
would enter into force only after it had been ratified by “eight Members of 
the League or non-member States, including the Kingdom of Norway and 
the United Kingdom.” article 19 limited the treaty’s duration to three years 
after it came into force.57
 the 1931 Geneva Convention deviated from the 1929 Norwegian act in 
only two respects. article 3 was added at the request of the Soviet Union. It 
excluded “aborigines dwelling on the coasts of the territories of the high 
Contracting Parties” from the terms of the treaty as long as they utilized 
“native craft propelled by oars and sails,” hunted without the use of fire-
arms, and did not work for or deliver whale products to commercial 
whalers. article 8 was added by the British government. It required all 
commercial enterprises to have a valid license issued by the government 
under whose name its ships were registered. No limits were placed on the 
number of licenses each nation was allowed to issue, so in practice, it was 
ineffective as a conservation measure. at Canada’s insistence, however, an 
additional clause was inserted at the end of article 8: “Nothing in this ar-
ticle shall prejudice the right of any high Contracting Party to require that, 
in addition, a license shall be required from his own authorities by every 
vessel desirous of using his territory or territorial waters for the purposes 
of taking, landing or treating whales, and such license may be refused or 
may be made subject to such conditions as may be deemed by such high 
Contracting Party to be necessary or desirable, whatever the nationality 
of the vessel may be.” Countries, in other words, were free unilaterally to 
restrict the number of vessels in their territorial waters.58
 Norwegian and British delegates fended off all efforts to further 
strengthen the treaty in the direction outlined in the Suárez report. the 
Swedish government, for example, argued in vain for an additional clause 
that would have established a closed season. “In the arctic ocean, the whal-
ing season begins at present on october 1st, when whales are comparatively 
thin and yield little oil,” the Swedish delegate noted. “If the opening of 
the season were fixed, for instance, on December 1st, this would have two 
advantages: oil would be more easily obtained and fewer whales would be 
killed. In other parts of the world suitable close seasons might be fixed, 
based on biological study.” had the Swedish proposal passed, a precedent 
would have been set for the establishment of restrictive closed seasons and 
perhaps also the establishment of sanctuaries. Similarly, the Soviet Union 
unsuccessfully tried to add to article 4 the following sentence: “It is abso-
lutely forbidden to kill female cachalots [sperm whales] in any circum-
stances whatsoever.” had it passed, the convention’s scope would have been 
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widened to include the toothed whales. to their credit, however, Norwe-
gian and British delegates also defeated all attempts to weaken the treaty’s 
terms. Japan, for instance, tried in vain to exempt the North Pacific from 
the ban on hunting right whales. Likewise, Portugal failed in its attempt to 
exempt the waters around the azores from the terms of the convention. 
and the Soviet Union was unable to insert a paragraph that would have 
obligated whaling companies to harpoon all killer whales they encoun-
tered (a clause that would have represented a throwback to the old days of 
so-called vermin eradication, had it passed).59
 the 1931 Geneva Convention was signed in September and then sent 
to the various governments for ratification. the United States was the first 
to ratify, even though article 6 (which imposed restrictions on manufac-
turing processes) and article 7 (which guaranteed a minimum wage) were 
subject to constitutional challenge. here, the 1916 Convention between 
Canada and the United States came to the rescue: the State Department 
was able to convince a wavering President herbert hoover to support the 
treaty because in Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court had upheld the 
power of the executive branch to “adopt methods which could not be valid 
if adopted by the legislative branch of the Government.”60 once the United 
States ratified, so did Norway, the Union of South africa, Switzerland, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, yugoslavia, 
turkey, and Denmark. the British government, however, took three years 
to ratify, and as a result, the convention did not actually go into effect until 
the 1934–35 hunting season.
 the League’s secretary-general hailed the treaty as a great achievement 
that would “put an end to the uneconomic exploitation” of whales “with-
out injuring the essential interests of the whaling industry.”61 others, how-
ever, recognized that it was more a skeletal draft than a full-blown treaty 
and that the hard work of writing a genuine convention still lay in the 
future. It would be best, one British diplomat candidly noted, “to content 
ourselves at the moment with the present text of the draft Convention as 
laying down an elementary standard of conduct in whaling matters and 
providing a basis on which an effective system of control may gradually be 
built” and then “to utilize the period of the whaling holiday [the 1931–32 
moratorium] by endeavouring to arrive at a closer understanding with the 
country chiefly interested, viz., Norway.”62
 at the same time, a temporary glut in the oil market acted as a mo-
mentary check on the whale slaughter, forcing producers to rethink their 
approach to whale management. annual production yields had been 
zooming upward ever since pelagic whaling began. In the 1927–28 season, 
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the total antarctic catch stood at 13,775 whales (1,037,392 barrels), almost 
all of which came from 18 floating factories, 6 shore stations, and 84 whale 
catchers. By 1930–31, the total had climbed to 40,201 whales (3,608,348 bar-
rels), from 41 floating factories, 6 shore stations, and 238 catchers. that 
translated into 611,014 metric tons of whale oil (two-thirds of which was 
produced by Norwegian expeditions)—the largest single-season produc-
tion amount of all time.63 the demand for oils and fats surged too, espe-
cially in Germany, but it did not keep pace with supply, especially after the 
onset of the Great Depression in 1929, and prices soon began to tumble. oil 
fetched a price of around £30 per ton for most of the 1920s. Prearranged 
contracts kept the price propped up at £25 during the 1930–31 season, but 
it fell to £13 in 1931–32 and £11 in 1932–33. the outlook for profits was so 
bleak that the entire Norwegian fleet stayed in port for the 1931–32 season, 
as did most of the British fleet. whaling resumed on a modest scale in the 
following year, but the industry did not begin to recover until the 1935–36 
season, after weathering three rough seasons in a row.64
 the association of whaling Companies (the Sellers’ Pool) responded to 
the glut by signing a series of informal Production agreements (June 1932, 
May 1933, and September 1936), all of which were negotiated completely out-
side the framework of the 1931 Geneva Convention. these side agreements 
assigned each of its members a catch quota based on past production rates, 
and they capped the total annual oil yield at 2.2 million barrels. the sole 
purpose of these side agreements was to raise the price of oil artificially by 
keeping production about one-third below the 1930–31 season. rarely was 
price-fixing accomplished in a more open or blatant form.
 to verify compliance, the association concocted the Blue whale Unit 
(BwU), a notorious conversion standard that would remain in use until it 
was finally banned by international treaty in 1974. the BwU was based on 
the fact that the average blue whale produced 110 barrels (4,400 gallons) of 
oil, roughly twice as much oil as a fin whale, two and a half times as much 
as a humpback, and six times more than a sei whale. the BwU conversion 
formula was thus 1:2:2.5:6. the beauty of the system, from the whalers’ van-
tage point, was that a catch quota could be set each year without reference 
to the whale species. If the total quota for any given year was set at 20,000 
BwU, then whalers were free to kill 20,000 blue whales, or 40,000 fins, or 
50,000 humpbacks, or 120,000 seis, or any combination thereof that to-
taled 20,000 BwU.65
 the problem with the BwU system, from the nonwhalers’ vantage 
point, was that it worked against whale conservation. First, the annual 
BwU quotas were keyed to the market price of oil, not to the reproduction 
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rates of whales. Second, the stock of whale species in the world’s oceans did 
not conform to the 1:2:2.5:6 formula; there were not 2 fins for every blue in 
the world’s oceans, any more than there were 2.5 humpbacks or 6 seis for 
every blue. third, the BwU put a premium on size, since a company could 
fill its quota with less effort by taking the largest species. the BwU system 
thus promoted maximum profitability but not maximum sustainability.
 Predictably, from that moment on, whaling enterprises targeted blues 
first, fins next, humpbacks next, and seis last, moving down the size chart 
as each of the larger species became too rare to hunt commercially. all that 
the BwU system really did was to put a bull’s-eye on the largest available 
species until it was no longer plentiful, ultimately a self-defeating strategy. 
even for the whaling industry itself, the BwU system only worked properly 
in conjunction with a yearly side agreement that imposed enterprise-by-
enterprise production quotas. when these side agreements ended in 1936, 
enterprises were left with a strong incentive to construct larger factory 
ships and faster catcher boats in order to capture the largest possible share 
of the total annual catch before the BwU limit was reached. this in turn 
made it all the more difficult to adjust the BwU limits downward in light 
of conservation needs: a high annual quota was necessary to guarantee that 
whaling companies would recoup the huge investments they made in their 
flotillas. In a nutshell, the BwU system promoted an “arms race” rather 
than a conservationist ethic among the whaling companies.66
 while the association of whaling Companies was busy establishing the 
BwU system to prop up the price of oil, the Unilever Group (Buyers’ Pool) 
was doing what it could to drive prices downward. Unilever was a tight-knit 
consortium of margarine producers with a major trump card: it could switch 
to coconut, palm, peanut, or soybean oil if the price of whale oil rose beyond 
what it considered to be an acceptable price. Unilever’s position was fur-
ther strengthened by its connections to Christian Salvesen, Britain’s largest 
whaling enterprise. Not only was Salvesen one of the few whaling enterprises 
that did not belong to the association of whaling Companies, it also actively 
worked to undermine the Production agreements (for instance, it sent its 
fleet to the antarctic during the 1931–32 season while the entire Norwegian 
fleet stayed home and then used its catch from that year to flood the market 
whenever the price began to climb). with plenty of other edible oils avail-
able and with Salvesen acting as a strategic reserve, Unilever strove to keep 
the price under £14 per ton. this price was well below the £32 per ton that 
the whaling enterprises had enjoyed during the previous five seasons, and 
beyond that, it was at or below the cost of production, which (depending on 
enterprise) ranged from £14 to £18 per ton.67
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 the tug-of-war between the Sellers’ Pool and the Buyers’ Pool, of 
course, had nothing to do with whale protection or catch management 
and everything to do with the protection of narrow economic interests. 
In a free market, the price may well have fallen below the cost of produc-
tion, and many whaling companies have gone belly up before the price 
rose anew. More plant-based oils would have reached consumers, and 
more whales would have remained in the ocean to reproduce. however, 
the two whaling pools (and the two governments, Norway and Britain, that 
backed them) conspired to keep the industry sheltered from market-based 
competition, each for its own purposes. the Sellers’ Pool wanted to keep its 
operations going full tilt for as long as possible each season, since ships cost 
money to maintain regardless of whether they were out to sea or not. the 
Buyers’ Pool wanted an array of different edible oils at their disposal, so as 
to pit sellers against each other and thus keep all oils at an acceptable price. 
Neither pool was interested in conservation, a point that Birger Bergersen, 
a Norwegian biologist and later the first chair of the International whal-
ing Commission, hammered home at a whaling conference in May 1938: 
“In years when the prices are low and when we know that whale oil can be 
substituted by vegetable oils, it seems to the biologists that it is too bad that 
so many whales should be killed. It is easy to get plenty of new trees in the 
tropical areas, but it is impossible to renew the stock of whales when it is 
overtaxed.”68
 Norwegian and British authorities soon began to see the flaws in the 
1931 Geneva Convention and the informal Production agreements, and 
they formulated a new set of national regulations and bilateral agreements. 
two stand out. In 1935, Norway amended its 1929 whaling act so that it 
reduced the antarctic season to the period between December 1 and March 
15, restricted the hunting grounds to south of 40º south (deep in the heart 
of the antarctic), and capped the total production by Norwegian com-
panies at 1.1 million barrels. this signaled Norway’s willingness to accept 
short seasons and large ocean sanctuaries—but not a limit on the number 
of whales that could be caught each year or the number of factories that 
could operate in any given season. In 1936, the Norwegian and British gov-
ernments jointly truncated the season for blues and fins (from December 8 
to March 7), capped the number of catcher boats at seven per factory ship, 
and introduced production quotas.69
 Unfortunately, at the very moment when the Norwegian and British 
governments were finally beginning to rein in their own enterprises in the 
interest of genuine conservation, they began to lose their near monopoly 


































Figure 3.3  Global whale-oil production from 1936 to 1940 after the breakdown 





















Figure 3.3. Global whale-oil production from 1936 to 1940 after the breakdown of 
Norwegian-British domination. adapted from Committee for whaling Statistics, Inter-
national Whaling Statistics (oslo: Committeee for whaling Statistics, 1930–88), vols. 1–12.
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club in 1934–35 with the purchase of the aging factory ship Antarctica (re-
named Tonan Maru, or Southward aspiration) from a Norwegian firm. By 
the 1938–39 season, Japan had six factory ships operating in the antarctic, 
enough to capture about one-sixth (17.1 percent) of the world’s whale-oil 
market. whaling also fit into Nazi Germany’s “Fat Plan,” an effort to attain 
autarchy in the production of edible oils, announced shortly after adolf 
hitler came to power in 1933. In 1937–38, the Germans launched their first 
whaling ship, the Walter Rau, named after the country’s chief margarine 
magnate and whaling enthusiast. Germany’s ambitions came to an abrupt 
end with the outbreak of world war II, but for a brief moment, the coun-
try produced about one-eighth of the world’s whale oil (peaking at 13.2 
percent in 1938–39). More to the point, Japan and Germany collectively 
accounted for 84 percent of the production increase that occurred between 
the 1936–37 and 1937–38 seasons. Moreover, neither country had signed 
the 1931 Geneva Convention, and they were therefore not bound by the 
same hunting restrictions as their competitors.70 (the Soviet Union also 
emerged as a whaling power in the 1930s but did not begin antarctic pe-
lagic whaling until 1946–47, after seizing one of Germany’s factory ships.)
 once they realizing that bilateral negotiations no longer worked, Nor-
way and Britain decided to update and renew the 1931 Geneva Convention 
(which was set to expire at the end of the 1936–37 season), preferably with 
Germany and Japan as participants this time. the British agreed to host the 
conference and to draft the International agreement for the regulation of 
whaling (hereafter the 1937 London agreement), which was subsequently 
signed and ratified with few alterations to the draft text.71 By and large, the 
1937 London agreement was an amalgam of the 1931 Geneva Convention 
and the Production agreements. the preamble laid out two potentially 
contradictory goals: “to secure the prosperity of the whaling industry” and 
“to maintain the stock of whales.” articles 1 through 3 made it mandatory 
for all factory ships to have at least one government inspector on board 
at all times and outlined the methods of enforcement. article 4 reiterated 
the ban on hunting right whales and extended protection to grays for the 
first time. articles 5 and 6 established minimum lengths for the taking of 
blues (70 feet), fins (55 feet), humpbacks (35 feet), and sperms (35 feet) 
and reiterated the ban on killing mothers and calves.72 these lengths were 
adopted even though Bergersen, Norway’s delegate, pointed out that scien-
tists had recently established that the minimum length for sexual maturity 
in female blues was 78 feet and in female fins 66 feet.73
 article 7 established a closed season for pelagic whaling in the ant-
arctic region, stating in part: “It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a 
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whale catcher attached thereto for the purpose of taking or treating baleen 
whales in any waters south of 40º South Latitude, except during the period 
from the 8th day of December to the 7th day of March.” article 8 imposed 
a different set of restrictions on shore-based operations: “It is forbidden 
to use a land station or a whale catcher attached thereto for the purpose 
of taking or treating whales in any area or in any waters for more than six 
months in any period of twelve, such period of six months to be continu-
ous.” article 9 forbade the use of factory ships and whale catchers to cap-
ture baleens in four geographic regions: (1) in the atlantic ocean, north 
of 40º south latitude and in the Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, and Greenland 
Sea; (2) in the Pacific ocean east of 150º west longitude between 40º south 
latitude and 35º north latitude; (3) in the Pacific ocean west of 150º west 
longitude between 40º south latitude and 20º north latitude; and (4) in the 
Indian ocean north of 40º south latitude. this article was more symbolic 
than anything else, since almost all pelagic whaling took place in the two 
areas not covered by the treaty—the antarctic and the North Pacific. Fi-
nally, article 10 allowed each national government to take as many whales 
as it “thinks fit” for “purposes of scientific research.”74
 the remaining articles followed the 1931 Geneva Convention guide-
lines with only minor language changes, except in two regards. article 12 
made it mandatory that all whales be processed within thirty-six hours of 
being killed to ensure that the oil was of the highest quality. article 18 listed 
in great detail what was meant by the terms factory ship, whale catcher, 
land station, and baleen whale. It also identified the blue whale, fin whale, 
gray whale, humpback whale, right whale, and sperm whale, along with their 
common nicknames, for greater clarity and precision.75
 Norway, Great Britain, argentina, australia, Germany, Ireland, New 
Zealand, South africa, and the United States all signed the 1937 London 
agreement in time for the 1937–38 hunting season. these same countries 
then met again the following year in London, along with Canada, Den-
mark, France, and Japan, to sign the Protocol amending the International 
agreement of June 8, 1937 for the regulation of whaling (hereafter the 
1938 London Protocol). the main purpose of this follow-up meeting was 
to take up some issues that had proven too contentious in 1937. attitudes, 
however, had not softened, so there was little improvement and indeed 
some backtracking. a majority of the delegates still rejected a shortened 
hunting season. they still refused to limit the number of catchers that 
could operate in conjunction with a single factory ship or land station. 
they still would not accept a quota for each factory ship. they still would 
not cap the total antarctic catch. they voted down a plan to divide the 
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antarctic into distinct hunting areas (later established as areas I through 
VI), a major prerequisite for effective protection of still-untouched por-
tions of the antarctic. they even refused to give full protection to hump-
backs, despite the growing evidence that this species was as endangered as 
rights and grays, deciding instead to prohibit humpback hunting south of 
40º south latitude for the 1938–39 season only. worse yet, as a concession 
to Japan, they reduced the minimum lengths for blues, fins, and sperms by 
five feet for any whales delivered to land stations “for local consumption” 
as human or animal food.76 “It might have been nice to return home with 
a little bit more in the way of results,” Bergersen later admitted.77
 Progress was made in only one area. article 2 of the 1938 London Pro-
tocols established, for the first time, a whale sanctuary in the western ant-
arctic (south of 40º south latitude from 70º west longitude westward as far 
as 160º west longitude) for a period of two years beginning December 1938. 
this sanctuary lay in the Southern ocean between Cape horn and the 
ross Sea, in a part of the ocean that biologists knew contained numerous 
cetacean species but where commercial whaling had not yet commenced. 
here, the migratory bird treaties between the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico served as a model. “the North american populations of migratory 
waterfowl have been restored from the low point of 27 million individu-
als [in] about 1930 to a total of 125 million in 1945 in part by the operation 
of sanctuary areas,” a U.S. whaling negotiator noted in defense of whal-
ing sanctuaries. “without the sanctuaries it would have been very difficult, 
if not impossible, to protect adequate breeding stocks (treaties between 
U.S.a. and Canada, and U.S.a. and Mexico).”78
 the major whaling powers met one more time in London (in July 
1939), at which point they further watered down the regulations as a sop 
to Japan, but world war II began shortly thereafter, bringing an end to 
the annual meetings and to the 1937 London agreement. Its usefulness 
as a conservation treaty was, in any case, severely circumscribed. Dur-
ing the 1937–38 season, a record number of whales were legally killed—
50,769—the largest catch ever. this fact reflected the diplomats’ failure 
to establish an annual production cap or to limit the number of factory 
ships and whale catchers operating in the antarctic. Meanwhile, whal-
ers took record numbers of fins, a clear sign that blue populations had 
become depleted after decades of overfishing and that gunners were now 
targeting the next-largest species for decimation. Finally, Japan (which 
never ratified any of the London accords) allowed four of its expeditions 
to stay at sea for 125 days, nearly a month longer than the agreed-upon 
hunting season of 98 days. without a catch limit, a cap on whale catchers, 
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or Japanese participation, the 1937 London agreement and its follow-up 
protocols were doomed to failure.79
 None of these obvious problems with maintaining the whale stocks over 
the long haul, however, ever seemed to penetrate into the inner circles of the 
whaling industry or dampen the enthusiasm of global investors. “whaling 
is no longer the romantic and haphazard affair beloved of the writers of ad-
venture stories,” Financial News confidently proclaimed in December 1937: 
“It is now rationalized and highly mechanized, has boards of directors and 
shareholders, close seasons to regulate the slaughter of its victims and float-
ing commissions to enquire into their habits and ways of living. In short, the 
whale is now killed according to the rules of science.”80
 whales received a respite during world war II (a war in which millions 
of humans were also “killed according to the rules of science”), though 
the hunting hiatus was not long enough to replenish the global stocks to 
any substantial degree. Some whaling continued to take place during the 
war years, but yearly production rates fell to levels not seen since the first 
decade of the twentieth century, when antarctic whaling was still in its in-
fancy. whale diplomacy also came to a near standstill. Britain, the United 
States, and Norway met only once during the war, in January 1944, osten-
sibly to address the looming fat shortage in europe but in reality to plan 
for the resumption of whaling after the war. they decided to extend the 
hunting season to four months (November 24 to March 24), to establish 
an annual quota of 16,000 BwU, and to compose a new convention in 
1945 (later delayed to 1946). Unfortunately, the extended season worked 
against conservation without resolving the fat shortage: whales contain 
about 20 percent less blubber in November than they do in February, 
after they have gorged themselves on krill. It would have been wiser from 
an economic standpoint as well as a conservationist one to have stayed 
with a later starting date. the new quota figure, moreover, was based on 
speculation rather than science, for no one knew how many whales were 
still in the oceans, where they were concentrated, or how many could be 
killed each year on a sustainable basis. the three scientists who picked the 
figure—Bergersen (Norway), remington Kellogg (United States), and N. a. 
Mackintosh (Great Britain)—simply took the production rates for the two 
seasons prior to the outbreak of world war II (29,876 BwU and 24,830 
BwU) and reduced them by roughly 40 percent. Despite the guesswork, 
the 16,000 BwU figure was, from that moment on, wrapped in an aura 
of scientific soundness, and it remained the norm until the early 1960s, by 
which time the whale stocks were so depleted that the quota could not even 
be filled.81
The Antarctic Whale Massacre |  139
 at the end of world war II, the major whaling powers met once again 
to negotiate the International Convention for the regulation of whaling 
(hereafter the 1946 washington Convention), which they signed in wash-
ington, DC, on December 2, 1946. the United States organized the confer-
ence, composed the first draft (hereafter the U.S. Draft), and dominated 
the negotiations. only a handful of changes were made to the U.S. Draft; 
almost all of its most important features were accepted.82
 the preamble offered a candid rationale for an international treaty: 
“to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make 
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.” It optimisti-
cally noted that “whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases if whal-
ing is properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale stocks will 
permit increases in the number of whales which may be captured without 
endangering these natural resources.” It recognized that “whaling opera-
tions should be confined to those species best able to sustain exploitation 
in order to give an interval for recovery to certain species of whales now 
Figure 3.4. whale catches in the antarctic region since 1900. Note that from the 1920s 
onward, whalers targeted the largest readily available species first, starting with the 
gigantic blues, then the fins, and finally the seis, depleting each species in turn. the 
whaling business was stopped in the 1980s before the minkes, the smallest of the great 
whales, had been devastated. adapted from Peter G. h. evans, The Natural History of 
Whales and Dolphins (New york: Facts on File Publications, 1987), 257.
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depleted in numbers.” and it admitted that “the history of whaling has 
seen overfishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after 
another to such a degree that it essential to protect all species of whales 
from further overfishing.”83 the U.S. Draft was even more forthright in its 
declarations—“many whale fisheries may never recover,” “the few produc-
tive whaling areas now remaining are rapidly being depleted,” “the ultimate 
objective should be to achieve and to maintain the stocks at a level which 
will permit a sustained capture of the maximum number of whales”—but 
none of these phrases survived the negotiating process.84
 Much of the 1946 treaty merely reaffirmed (sometimes in slightly 
modified form) the verbiage that appeared in previous treaties. article I 
made clear that the convention (and the schedule that was attached to it) 
applied to all “factory ships,” “land stations,” and “whale catchers” under 
the jurisdiction of the “Contracting Governments,” and article II spelled 
out what was meant by these terms. articles IV, VII, and VIII laid out the 
ground rules for scientific research and data collection, and article IX dealt 
with labor issues and enforcement procedures. article X stipulated that at 
least six countries had to ratify the treaty before it went into effect and that 
Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the USSr had to be 
among those that ratified. It also stated that “any Government which has 
not signed this Convention may adhere thereto after it enters into force by 
a notification in writing to the Government of the United States.” (this 
mundane-sounding declaration would take on importance decades later 
when nonwhaling nations ratified the convention for the sole purpose of 
banning whaling.)85
 For the most part, the schedule attached to convention simply reiter-
ated the conservation measures of earlier treaties and agreements on closed 
seasons, sanctuaries, minimum sizes, and protection for endangered and 
immature whales. there were, however, some notable changes. each ship 
now had to maintain two inspectors, not one. Factory ships that operated 
exclusively within the territorial jurisdiction of certain african and austra-
lian regions were to be treated as if they were land stations. the BwU 
formula (1 blue whale equals 2 fins, 2.5 humpbacks, or 6 seis)—which had 
been an informal part of all whaling negotiations since 1931—was now for-
mally adopted. the total annual yield was set at 16,000 BwUs, the same 
number that had been in effect (but never reached) during the war.86
 articles III and V offered innovations not seen in previous whaling 
treaties. article III established the International whaling Commission 
(IwC), which remains the most important agency regulating whale hunt-
ing today. each country that ratified the treaty was allowed to have just one 
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member on the IwC and also just one vote. the IwC was allowed to rely 
on a simple majority for making most of its decisions, but changes to ar-
ticle V required the consent of three-quarters of the members (somewhat 
higher than the two-thirds majority called for in the U.S. Draft). article V 
allowed the IwC to “amend from time to time the provisions of the Sched-
ule by adopting regulations with respect to the conservation and utiliza-
tion of whale resources.” this provision gave the IwC the right to protect 
endangered species, establish closed seasons, designate sanctuaries, estab-
lish size limits, cap the annual catch, and ban hunting techniques without 
the need to secure a new treaty.87 originally, the United States wanted to 
place control over whaling in the hands of the UN’s Food and agriculture 
organisation, but Norway successfully championed a freestanding com-
mission outside the scope of the United Nations.
 after agreeing to the creation of the IwC, the contracting governments 
made sure that there were some strong checks on its regulatory power. 
article V prohibited the commissioners from placing “restrictions on the 
number or nationality of factory ships or land stations, nor allocate spe-
cific quotas to any factory ship or land station or to any group of factory 
ships or land stations.” this prohibition was designed to make it impossi-
ble for the IwC to favor the enterprises of one whaling nation over those of 
another, but it also made it impossible to halt the proliferation of whaling 
nations and enterprises. article V, moreover, also allowed the contracting 
governments to exempt themselves from the terms of any IwC amend-
ment simply by lodging an objection to it within ninety days. this mea-
sure effectively gave each whaling nation a unilateral veto over important 
IwC decisions, since no nation could be expected to adhere to a restriction 
when a rival nation did not. Finally, article XI allowed a government to 
withdraw from the convention for the next hunting season simply by an-
nouncing its attention on or before January 1.88 whaling nations used these 
powers to undermine the IwC’s effectiveness on numerous occasions.
 the British delegation wanted to create an article XII with two pas-
sages. the first would have required the contracting governments to “take 
all practicable steps to prohibit the sale, charter, transfer, loan or delivery of 
vessels, equipment or supplies designed especially for whaling operations or 
known to be intended for such operations, to any Government or any per-
son operating under the jurisdiction of any Government not a party to the 
Convention.” the second would have required them to “take all practicable 
steps to prohibit the import into territory under the jurisdiction of any of 
the Contracting Governments of whale oil or other products produced un-
der the flag of any non-Contracting Government.” these additions would 
142  | The Game of Conservation
have strengthen the treaty’s ability to thwart whaling by nonparty coun-
tries and pirate whaling by private persons. the U.S. delegation, however, 
successfully prevented the inclusion of article XII on the grounds that it 
“would constitute a violation by the United States of trade agreements to 
which the United States is a party” and because “coercive economic mea-
sures are not appropriate in connection with a long-range conservation 
agreement.”89
the 1946 washington Convention was the single most important cetacean 
treaty of the twentieth century. It went into effect for the 1948–49 season, 
and it has governed whaling affairs ever since. Unfortunately, it did little 
more than provide a legal framework for continuing the unsustainable ex-
ploitation of whales.
 article V contained the largest number of stumbling blocks to con-
servation. It prohibited any restrictions on the number or nationality of 
factory ships and land stations and made it impossible to introduce ship-
by-ship or country-by-country quotas. these prohibitions had the effect 
of encouraging the proliferation of whaling nations at a time when the 
stocks were already dangerously depleted. at the end of world war II, only 
Norway and Britain were still in a position to engage in pelagic whaling, 
but within a few years, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the Netherlands had 
joined (or rejoined) them. During the 1946–47 season, there were just fif-
teen expeditions using 129 catchers, but by 1961, there were twenty-one ex-
peditions using 261 catchers.90 Since the annual allowable catch remained 
steady at 16,000 BwU, an ever-increasing number of enterprises had to 
compete for the same amount of oil.
 article V’s noncompliance clause also contributed to the decline in 
whale stocks. In 1954, for instance, Canada, the United States, Japan, and 
the USSr objected when the IwC imposed a ban on the hunting of blue 
whales in the North Pacific. In 1981, Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the 
USSr objected to the ban on the use of the “cold grenade,” a cruel killing 
tool used on minkes. and in 1982, Peru and Chile objected to IwC restric-
tions on the killing of Bryde’s whales. In each case, the objections rendered 
the IwC’s efforts at regulation totally useless.91
 Cutthroat competition on the part of the whaling companies, together 
with a devil-may-care attitude among the whaling nations, made it politi-
cally impossible for the IwC to reduce the 16,000 BwU quota in the inter-
est of conservation: a smaller quota would translate into bankruptcy for 
one or more whaling enterprises, a situation that no government wanted 
to face. “the system of free competition for a fixed overall catch had almost 
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all the defects of a competitive system, with none of the advantages,” G. h. 
elliot noted in his postmortem analysis of the IwC: “each operator was 
fully exposed to the actions of its competitors; each invested more and 
more to obtain a larger share. the investments cancelled each other out, 
and resulted only in a shorter season, in which efficiency of processing and 
the development of by-products was sacrificed to catching and working up 
as many whales as possible before the catch limit was reached.”92
 enforcement presented an equally thorny problem. the treaty left it 
up to each member nation to ensure that the whaling firms flying under its 
flag followed the regulations. From 1946 to 1963, however, the USSr openly 
flouted the rules, taking whales of all sizes and species in and out of sea-
son. Soviet authorities finally agreed to accept international observers on 
their factory ships in 1963 but then failed to implement this arrangement 
until 1972, by which time many whale species were already endangered. 
even then, they worked out an arrangement whereby Japanese observers 
would be aboard Soviet ships and Soviet observers aboard Japanese ships, 
each side winking when the rules were violated.93 Pirate whaling exacerbated 
the problem. Between 1949 and 1956, for instance, aristotle onassis oper-
ated a factory ship, the Olympic Challenger, year-round, as did other less 
flamboyant entrepreneurs, usually flying the flag of Panama or some other 
country that was not party to the 1946 convention.94 the track records of 
Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands were much better, but it was an open 
secret that factory inspectors often turned a blind eye when gunners inad-
vertently killed an immature or protected whale.
 without effective enforcement mechanisms, the careful work of IwC 
scientists—organized first as the Scientific Committee and later as the 
Committee of Four—bore almost no positive results. In 1955, for instance, 
the Scientific Committee requested that the annual BwU be reduced each 
year by 500 BwU until it reached 12,000 BwU (itself an overly optimis-
tic figure) in order to guarantee sustainable yields. this recommendation, 
however, got nowhere due to the objections of the Netherlands, and as a 
result, the 16,000 BwU quota remained largely intact even as the stocks 
dwindled to the point that this quota could not even be filled. then, in 
1960, the Committee of Four recommended that the BwU system be aban-
doned entirely in favor of a species-by-species approach to whale manage-
ment, and it argued for a total ban on blue and humpback hunting as well 
as an annual cap on fins (nearly twenty-eight thousand fins were killed 
during the 1960–61 season alone). the IwC used this moment to reduce 
drastically the annual catch to 2,700 BwU but not to introduce a more sen-
sible, species-by-species approach.95 “almost all major actions or failures 
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to act,” the IwC commissioner for the United States, J. L. Mchugh, later 
noted, “were governed by short-range economic considerations rather 
than by the requirements of conservation.”96 a member of the IwC’s Sci-
entific Committee, Sidney holt, was even more blunt: “whaling is essen-
tially an extractive industry, akin to mining. targeted depletion of one 
whale ‘seam’ stops when it becomes uneconomic to extract more, and the 
industry moves on to other places and species.”97
 that the 1946 washington Convention did nothing to halt the kill-
ing spree can be seen from the official whaling statistics. Between 1905 
and 1965, roughly 1.25 million whales were slain in the antarctic. Just 
over half of these were killed in the forty-three-year period between 
1905 and 1948. the remainder were killed in the seventeen-year period 
between 1948 and 1965, when the treaty was in effect and the IwC op-
erational.98 By the mid-1960s, whaling companies had managed to de-
plete most of the remaining stocks of great whales almost as quickly 
as they would have without a treaty. Blue whales stood on the brink 
of extinction. Fin populations plummeted to record lows, and Bryde’s 
and seis were endangered. only the minke, the smallest rorqual, re-
mained plentiful worldwide. as the stocks dwindled, so did the number 
of pelagic nations. Great Britain largely abandoned whaling in 1963, the 
Netherlands in 1964, and Norway in 1968. others followed suit, and by 
the 1970s, there were only two major players left in the field—the USSr 
and Japan—and they were increasingly forced to hunt the minke, once 
considered too small to be worth the chase.
 the 1946 washington Convention was inadequate as a hunting treaty, 
let alone as a conservation treaty. hunting treaties aim to keep the stock 
of coveted species at the highest possible levels in order to maximize the 
hunters’ enjoyment. Game reserves, hunting seasons, protection for fe-
males and juveniles, and similar restrictions are among the most effective 
techniques for accomplishing this goal. Conservation treaties aim to keep 
the stock of all species, whether hunted or not, at the highest possible level 
in order to maintain a more balanced (and therefore less volatile) ecologi-
cal system. the 1946 washington Convention had the opposite impact: it 
promoted the decimation of one hunted species after the next, moving 
down the line in size, leaving only minke populations intact. the IwC did 
regularly step in to protect species once they had become too rare to hunt 
profitably, and these efforts certainly helped protect remnant whale popu-
lations from complete extinction. But a treaty that protects species only 
after they have been hunted to the brink of commercial extinction can 
hardly be held up as an example of sound international cooperation.
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 the 1946 washington Convention failed at a number of levels. It did 
not provide adequate protection to females and calves during the breed-
ing season; it did not set minimum size limits at the optimum level; it 
did not regulate the open season properly; it did not limit the number of 
hunters; and it did not establish adequate sanctuaries. these failures were 
in turn largely rooted in the fact that there was no international agency 
that could control the open seas to the same degree that the countries in-
volved in the african and North american treaties could control their land 
and skies. whales would have fared much better if the League of Nations 
had implemented the Suárez report, with all the safeguards that it envis-
aged. whales would have probably fared much better if Great Britain or 
the United States (or even Norway) had controlled the antarctic region 
because decades of domestic debate over a variety of conservation issues 
had made them attuned to the need for whale conservation. the antarctic 
convergence, however, did not belong to the League any more than it be-
longed to any individual country, and therefore, all attempts—meager as 
they were—to introduce conservation measures only encouraged prolif-
eration and evasion.
 the whaling companies, not the conservationists, held all the trump 
cards in the open seas, and they were more interested in today’s profits than 
tomorrow’s bounty. the treaties they helped craft and the commission they 
helped establish were therefore designed more to protect their industry than 
to protect the world’s stock of whales. “the whaling Commission,” polar 
biologist Bernard Stonehouse later observed, “faced the impossible task of 
controlling a powerful, profitable, highly capitalized, fiercely competitive, 
multinational industry—one which had no intention of accepting controls 
other than on its own terms.”99
 Ironically, the whaling enterprises doomed themselves even as they passed 
a death sentence on the whales, for their continued existence depended wholly 
on the existence of a sustainable harvest. a mere hundred years after Foyn in-
vented the exploding harpoon, commercial hunters had come perilously close 
to killing off the largest mammal ever known to exist. the situation was eerily 
presaged by herman Melville back in 1851, just before the advent of modern 
whaling: “the moot point is, whether Leviathan can long endure so wide a 
chase, and so remorseless a havoc; whether he must not at last be extermi-
nated from the waters, and the last whale, like the last man, smoke his last pipe, 
and then himself evaporate in the final puff.”100 Melville pictured the demise of 
whaling as a tragic romance. he would have been disappointed to learn that 
the story ended as a tragic farce and that the last whale smoked its last pipe and 
then evaporated in the margarine vats of Unilever.
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Time Line of Whale Protection
1868 Svend Foyn initiated “modern whaling” in the Varanger fjord of Finnmark in 
northeastern Norway.
1904 whaling commenced in South Georgia, opening up the Southern ocean around 
the antarctic Continent.
1909 the first hydrogenation factory was built (based on technology developed in 
1903), spurring the demand for whale oil.
1925 the era of  “pelagic whaling” began in antarctica’s ross Sea.
1929 the Norwegian whaling act (the 1929 Norwegian act) was passed by Nor-
way’s parliament. It was the first attempt to establish international rules for pe-
lagic whaling.
1931 the Convention for the regulation of whaling (the 1931 Geneva Convention) 
was signed in Geneva on September 24. It was first attempt to regulate the killing 
of baleen whales. a record number of whales were killed in 1931, mostly in the 
antarctic.
1937 the International agreement for the regulation of whaling (the 1937 London 
Convention) was signed in London on June 8.
1938 the Protocol amending the International agreement of June 8, 1937 for the 
regulation of whaling (the 1938 London Protocol) was signed in London on 
June 24.
1944 the Protocol amending in Certain Particulars the International agreement of 
June 8, 1937 for the regulation of whaling (as amended by the Protocol of June 
24, 1938) was signed in London on February 7. Because Ireland did not ratify, this 
protocol never came into force.
1945 the Supplementary Protocol Concerning whaling was signed in London on 
october 5. It made the provisions of the 1944 protocol applicable to the 1945–46 
season for those countries that signed, thus circumventing Ireland’s failure to 
ratify the agreement.
1945 the Protocol amending the agreement of June 8, 1937 for the regulation of 
whaling (as amended by the Protocol of June 24, 1938) was signed in London on 
November 26. It applied only to the 1946–47 season but was renewed in modified 
form for the 1947–48 season.
1946 the International Convention for the regulation of whaling (the 1946 washing-
ton Convention) was signed in washington, DC, on December 2. It established 
the International whaling Commission (IwC) and set up a permanent regime 
for regulating whale hunting.
1972 the United Nations Conference on the human environment, meeting in Stock-
holm, called for a ten-year moratorium on whaling.
1973 the Convention on International trade in endangered Species (CIteS) 
was signed in washington, D.C. Most whale species would later receive CIteS 
protection.
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1982 the IwC accepted a ten-year moratorium on whaling, though not all whaling 
nations agreed to adhere to the decision. as of 2009, this moratorium was 
still in effect.
Conclusion
“Conservation,” aldo leopold once quipped, “is a bird that flies faster 
than the shot we aim at it.”1 Mobility was once one of the main advantages 
that animals had over the humans who hunted them for food and profit, 
and few animals were faster and more elusive than those that undertook long 
migrations each year. snares, traps, arrows, harpoons, stampedes, mus-
kets, and the like certainly took their toll, but the vast majority of species 
were nimble enough to survive and reproduce, despite some glaring cases 
of extinction over the centuries. For the past 150 years, however, animals 
have found themselves staring down the barrel of the modern scientific-
industrial revolution. High-powered rifles can strike even the fastest afri-
can mammals, just as double-barreled shotguns can devastate entire bird 
flocks and grenade-tipped harpoons can wipe out entire whale herds. land 
usurpation for urban and agricultural development has often proved even 
more deadly than the weaponry, especially for migratory species, which 
depend on multiple habitats at various locations during different seasons 
of the year for their survival. nothing seems to offer wildlife protection any 
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longer—not the dense forests and vast savannas of africa, not the wide-
open prairies and remote regions of north america, not even the treacher-
ous and frigid polar waters of antarctica.
 during the first half of the twentieth century, animal conservation was 
all but synonymous with game cropping, multilateral hunting regulations, 
and nature parks. diplomatic negotiations were largely in the hands of the 
major industrial and colonial powers, which responded in ad hoc ways to 
the problems that arose inside and outside their jurisdiction, be they the 
overharvesting of ivory, horn, and skins (in africa); the wanton destruc-
tiveness of the meatpacking and millinery industries (in north america); 
or the exterminationist impulses of the whaling business (in antarctica). 
treaties emerged in piecemeal fashion after one or more governments real-
ized that national regulations did not suffice, and the agreements tended 
to remain regional in scope, even if many conservationists dreamed of ex-
panding their geographic domains at some point in the future.
 things began to change after World War ii, when the United nations 
and other international organizations assumed the task of nature protec-
tion worldwide. the new treaties have tended to be global in scope and 
to codify general rules of conduct for all countries to follow regardless of 
their geographic circumstances and economic positions. the new treaties 
also have been far more likely to focus on the protection and restoration of 
entire ecosystems rather than on the preservation of certain game species 
and favorite hunting grounds. three treaties in particular acted as harbin-
gers of a new approach: the 171 Convention on Wetlands of international 
importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, signed in ramsar, iran (the 
ramsar Convention), the first treaty to focus above all on wetland restora-
tion around the globe (even if the term waterfowl in its title was a throw-
back to the old hunting treaties); the 173 Convention on international 
trade in endangered species (Cites), signed in Washington, dC, the first 
treaty designed to rein in the global trade in live animals and animal parts; 
and the 17 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory species of Wild 
animals, signed in Bonn (the Bonn Convention), the first treaty devoted 
solely to the protection of migratory animals and their habitats worldwide.
 the old approach to animal protection did not, of course, disappear 
overnight. the 168 african Convention largely reiterated the 133 lon-
don Convention, even if it also extended a protective net to endangered 
native flora (an area of conservation that was almost wholly absent from 
the earlier discussions, since plants were nonmigratory and not a target 
for hunters). the United states, meanwhile, continued to favor a bilateral 
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approach to bird protection well into the 170s, signing separate trea-
ties with Japan (172) and the soviet Union (176) that were remarkably 
similar to the ones signed earlier with Canada and Mexico. likewise, the 
iWC has remained the most important agency overseeing the world’s 
whale stocks, even though most whaling enterprises went belly up decades 
ago for lack of cetaceans to hunt. the new approach to environmental 
diplomacy did not emerge immediately. the first major conference de-
voted solely to global environmental issues—the United nations Confer-
ence on the Human environment, held in stockholm (the stockholm 
Conference)—did not take place until 172. and the first global environ-
mental agency—the United nations environment Programme (UneP), 
headquartered in nairobi, Kenya—was not formally established until a 
year later. the new diplomacy was born somewhere between the time the 
last whaling treaty was signed in 16 and the establishment of UneP in 173.
 that these newer treaties are, in most respects, superior to the older 
ones can hardly be denied. British diplomats often casually referred to the 
100 london Convention as the elephant treaty, but in reality, it did vir-
tually nothing to protect elephants from ivory predators. the 133 lon-
don Convention also attempted to regulate the african ivory trade, but 
enforcement in the colonies was far too lax and corruption among colonial 
officials far too widespread for it to offer much in the way of genuine pro-
tection. (even the much-vaunted British wardens were deeply complicit in 
the illicit ivory trade, as ian Parker discovered when he joined the Kenya 
Game department in 156).2 the novelty of Cites lay in the fact that it 
placed controls not only on the export of tusks and ivory from africa but 
also on the import of those products into other countries around the globe. 
in addition, it allowed for a total trade ban if and when a species became 
endangered, a feature that was missing from the earlier agreements. rhinos 
were given comprehensive Cites protection in 176, elephants in 18—an 
accomplishment no earlier treaty was able to achieve.
 the ramsar and Bonn conventions addressed many of the weaknesses 
that had hampered the 116 and 136 bird treaties of north america. the 
U.s. government’s bilateral arrangements were simply too limited in ter-
ritorial scope to offer comprehensive protection to all of the bird species 
that migrated across the Western Hemisphere. in practice, the treaties of-
fered more protection to game birds (especially waterfowl) than to other 
birds, to those that stayed within north america than to those that mi-
grated to Central and south america, and to those that used the Pacific 
flyway than to those that flew along the atlantic coast. Both treaties, more-
over, lacked effective habitat-protection clauses, and subsequent efforts to 
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rectify this deficiency through the creation of wildlife refuges were never 
able to keep pace with urban and agricultural development even within 
north america, let alone elsewhere. the ramsar Convention dispensed 
with the bilateral approach altogether in favor of a more global perspec-
tive. it focused on identifying and protecting the world’s premier wetlands, 
with the goal of providing all species with adequate feeding and breeding 
sites. as of 2007, Canada had thirty-seven ramsar sites covering 150,200 
square miles, Mexico had sixty-five sites covering 20,500 square miles, and 
the United states had twenty-one sites covering 5,020 square miles. Peru 
had eleven ramsar sites (26,300 square miles), Bolivia eight (25,100 square 
miles), Brazil eight (2,700 square miles), argentina fifteen (13,00 square 
miles), and Cuba six (,600 square miles).3 the Bonn Convention has had 
a similar impact: it requires countries to set aside sufficient space to ac-
commodate the entire range of an animal’s annual movements.
 Better protection for whales came in fits and starts, not least because 
the global commons problem on the high seas had made it difficult even 
for the United nations to act effectively. in the early 160s, the iWC dras-
tically reduced its annual catch quota from 16,000 BWU to 2,700 BWU, 
a tacit acknowledgment that it had been allowing overharvesting for the 
previous decade and a half. then, in 172, the overwhelming majority of 
delegates to the stockholm Conference voted in favor of a complete mora-
torium on whale hunting for a ten-year period in order to allow the stocks 
to recover (a recommendation that the iWC temporarily chose to ignore). 
shortly thereafter, Greenpeace—an international environmental organiza-
tion founded in 171 to halt nuclear testing—began a high-profile cam-
paign against the whaling industry that included film footage of whalers 
flagrantly violating the terms of the 16 Washington Convention. at the 
same time, many nonwhaling nations began to join the iWC (as permit-
ted by article X of the 16 treaty) for the sole purpose of putting a com-
plete stop to commercial whaling. they accomplished this mission in 182, 
when more than three-fourths of the iWC membership voted to amend 
the schedule to read: “Catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes 
of whales from all stocks for the 186 coastal and the 185–86 pelagic sea-
sons and thereafter shall be zero.”4 By 186, Cites protection had been ex-
tended to many cetacean species, further ensuring the prospect of a long-
term ban on the hunting of the great whales, regardless of what the iWC 
might decide in the future.
 a century ago, governments would have found it politically impossi-
ble to impose a total trade ban on elephant ivory and whale oil, so strong 
was the faith in free enterprise, free trade, and the “free goods” of nature. 
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But profit-oriented enterprises overharvested these products to such an 
extent that it is now all but impossible to find diplomats and conserva-
tionists willing to sanction even a modicum of trade. african govern-
ments with large and stable elephant herds, for instance, have failed in 
their repeated efforts to revive the ivory trade, even though it makes 
sense both economically and ecologically to harvest tusks on a sustainable 
basis. thus far, Cites members have refused to lift the ivory ban out of 
fear that it would just reinvigorate the illicit trade in tusks (though in 
2002, they did allow south africa, Botswana, and namibia to sell sixty 
tons of ivory from elephants that had died of natural causes). similarly, 
Japan, norway, and the soviet Union (russia) officially objected to the 
iWC’s zero quota; under the terms of the 16 Washington Convention, 
these objections allow them to ignore the restrictions. the glare of world 
opinion, however, has so far kept them from resuming full-scale whaling, 
even though minkes (the smallest of the great whales) are still plentiful 
in the ocean and several other species have begun to make a rebound. as 
with ivory, the iWC and Cites members have refused to lift the whaling 
restriction, largely for fear that doing so would just encourage pirate 
enterprises. the earlier treaties failed so miserably in their efforts to rein 
in the elephant-ivory and whale-oil trade that few statespeople are will-
ing to risk a new attempt at game cropping.
 to dwell on the weaknesses of the older treaties, however, is to risk los-
ing sight of their many positive features. africa’s national parks and nature 
reserves are, in many ways, the envy of the world today: they are larger, 
more conservation-oriented, and more profitable than many of the parks 
and reserves that were later established in asia and latin america, where 
multilateral agreements were largely lacking. ivory poaching continues to 
be a problem, both inside and outside africa’s parks, but here too there is a 
silver lining: there is no longer much demand for tusks in europe and the 
United states, the two regions that once dominated the world’s ivory trade. 
similarly, north american governments monitor and protect their bird 
populations better than most other nations of the world, while sustaining 
the harvesting of millions of game birds each year by recreational hunters. 
even the selection of ramsar sites in north america was facilitated by the 
fact that many of the prime wetland locations were already under national 
protection as wildlife and bird refuges. the whaling agreements were 
far less successful in offering protection to cetaceans, but it is nonethe-
less worth remembering that they granted protection to the great whales 
once they became endangered and that all of them survived—no small feat 
given the rapacious behavior of whaling enterprises (and the continued 
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behavior of Japanese whalers, who invoke the scientific-research clause of 
the 16 Washington Convention to justify their annual expeditions).
 For all their weaknesses, the treaties discussed in this book helped 
codify the “rules of the game” that offered many species a sporting chance 
of survival against the techno-onslaught of the modern era. these trea-
ties marked the beginning point, not the end point, of a long-term diplo-
matic effort to address the enormous threat that the unrestrained pursuit 
of profit and the development of ever more efficient killing technologies 
have posed to the survival of the world’s migratory species. although they 
did not always provide sustainable long-range solutions, they did at least 
postpone the day of reckoning long enough for subsequent generations to 
find more permanent and effective solutions. sometimes, all that stood be-
tween precarious survival and complete extermination was a flawed multi-
national convention.
Appendix A
Texts of African Treaties
Convention for the Preservation of Wild 
Animals, Birds, and Fish in Africa.  
Signed at London, May 19, 1900  
(The “1900 London Convention”)
Being desirous of saving from indiscriminate slaughter, and of insuring the 
preservation throughout their possessions in Africa of the various forms of 
animal life existing in a wild state which are either useful to man or are harmless, 
[the parties hereto] have resolved, on the invitation addressed to them by 
the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, in accord with the Government of His 
Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, to assemble with this object a 
Conference at London . . . [which has] adopted the following provisions:
Article I
The zone within which the provisions of the present Convention shall ap-
ply is bounded as follows: On the north by the 20th parallel of north lati-
tude, on the west by the Atlantic Ocean, on the east by the Red Sea and by 
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the Indian Ocean, on the south by a line following the northern boundary 
of the German possessions in South-Western Africa, from its western ex-
tremity to its junction with the River Zambesi, and thence running along 
the right bank of that river as far as the Indian Ocean.
Article II
The High Contracting Powers declare that the most effective means of pre-
serving the various forms of animal life existing in a wild state within the 
zone defined in Article I are the following:
.  Prohibition of the hunting and destruction of the animals mentioned 
in Schedule I attached to the present Convention, and also of any 
other animals whose protection, whether owing to their usefulness 
or to their rarity and threatened extermination, may be considered 
necessary by each Local Government.
2.  Prohibition of the hunting and destruction of young animals of the 
species mentioned in Schedule II attached to the present Convention.
3. Prohibition of the hunting and destruction of females of the spe-
cies mentioned in Schedule III attached to the present Convention 
when accompanied by their young. The prohibition, to a certain 
extent, of the destruction of any females, when they can be recog-
nized as such, with the exception of those of the species mentioned 
in Schedule V attached to the present Convention.
4. Prohibition of the hunting and destruction, except in limited num-
bers, of animals of the species mentioned in Schedule IV attached to 
the present Convention.
. Establishment, as far as it is possible, of reserves within which it 
shall be unlawful to hunt, capture, or kill any bird or other wild ani-
mal except those which shall be specially exempted from protection 
by the local authorities. By the term “reserves” are to be understood 
sufficiently large tracts of land which have all the qualifications nec-
essary as regards food, water, and, if possible, salt, for preserving 
birds or other wild animals, and for affording them the necessary 
quiet during the breeding time.
6. Establishment of close seasons with a view to facilitate the rearing 
of young.
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7. Prohibition of the hunting of wild animals by any persons except 
holders of licences issued by the Local Government, such licences to 
be revocable in case of any breach of the provisions of the present 
Convention.
8. Restriction of the use of nets and pitfalls for taking animals.
9. Prohibition of the use of dynamite or other explosives, and of poi-
son, for the purpose of taking fish in rivers, streams, brooks, lakes, 
ponds, or lagoons.
0. Imposition of export duties on the hides and skins of giraffes, an-
telopes, zebras, rhinoceroses, and hippopotami, on rhinoceros and 
antelope horns, and on hippopotamus tusks.
. Prohibition of hunting or killing young elephants, and, in order to 
insure the efficacy of this measure, establishment of severe penal-
ties against the hunters, and the confiscation in every case, by the 
Local Governments, of all elephant tusks weighing less than  kilo-
grammes. The confiscation shall not be enforced when it shall be 
duly proved that the possession of the tusks weighing less than  
kilogrammes was anterior to the date of the coming into force of 
the present Convention. No such proof shall be accepted a year after 
that date.
2. Application of measures, such as the supervision of sick cattle, &c., 
for preventing the transmission of contagious diseases from do-
mestic animals to wild animals.
3. Application of measures for effecting the sufficient reduction of the 
numbers of the animals of the species mentioned in Schedule V at-
tached to the present Convention.
4. Application of measures for insuring the protection of the eggs of 
ostriches.
. Destruction of the eggs of crocodiles, of those of poisonous snakes, 
and of those of pythons.
Article III
The Contracting Parties undertake to promulgate, within a year from the 
date on which the present Convention comes into force, unless they al-
ready exist, provisions applying in their respective possessions within the 
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zone defined in Article I the principles and measures laid down in Article 
II, and to communicate to one another, as soon as possible after issue, the 
text of such provisions, and, within eighteen months, information as to the 
areas which may be established as reserves.
 It is, however, understood that the principles laid down in paragraphs 
, 2, 3, , and 9 of Article II may be relaxed, either in order to permit the col-
lection of specimens for museums or zoological gardens, or for any other 
scientific purpose, or in cases where such relaxation is desirable for impor-
tant administrative reasons, or necessitated by temporary difficulties in the 
administrative organization of certain territories.
Article IV
The Contracting Parties undertake to apply, as far as possible, each in their 
respective possessions, measures for encouraging the domestication of ze-
bras, of elephants, of ostriches, &c.
Article V
The Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to introduce into 
the present Convention, by common accord, such modifications or im-
provements as experience may show to be useful.
Article VI
The Powers having territories or possessions within the zone defined in 
Article I, who have not signed the present Convention, shall be permitted 
to accede to it. With this object, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty 
is charged to communicate the present Convention to them before the ex-
change of ratifications.
 The accession of each Power shall be notified through the diplomatic 
channel to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and by that Govern-
ment to all the signatory or acceding States.
 Such accession shall of itself carry with it acceptance of all the obliga-
tions stipulated in the present Convention.
Article VII
The Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to introduce, or to 
propose to the Legislatures of their self-governing Colonies, the necessary 
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measures for carrying out the stipulations of the present Convention in 
their possessions and Colonies contiguous to the zone defined by Article I.
Article VIII
The present Convention shall be ratified.
 The ratifications shall be deposited in London as soon as possible, and 
shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of Her Britannic 
Majesty.
 As soon as all the ratifications shall have been produced, a Protocol of 
deposit shall be drawn up which shall be signed by the Representatives in 
London of the Powers who shall have ratified.
 A certified copy of this Protocol shall be forwarded to each of the Pow-
ers interested.
Article IX
The present Convention shall come into force one month after the date of 
the signature of the Protocol of deposit of the ratifications provided for in 
Article VIII.
Article X
The present Convention shall remain in force for fifteen years, and in the event 
of none of the Contracting Parties having notified, twelve months before the ex-
piration of the said period of fifteen years, its intention of terminating its opera-
tion, it shall continue to remain in force for a year, and so on from year to year.
 In case one of the signatory or acceding Powers shall denounce the Con-
vention, such denunciation shall only affect the Power in question.
 In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the pres-
ent Convention, and have thereto affixed their seals.
 Done at London, in septuplicate, one copy for each Party, the nineteenth 
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Animals referred to in paragraph  of Article II, whose preservation it is 
desired to ensure:




4. Rhinoceros-birds or Beef-eaters (Buphaga).




4. The Mountain Zebra.
. Wild Asses.
6. The White-tailed Gnu (Connochaetes gnu).
7. Elands (Taurotragus).
8. The little Liberian Hippopotamus.
Schedule II.
Animals referred to in paragraph 2 of Article II, of which it is desired to 




4. Zebras of the species not referred to in Schedule I.
. Buffaloes.
6. Antelopes and Gazelles, especially species of the genera Bubalis, Da-
maliscus, Connochaetes, Cephalophus, Oreotragus, Oribia, Rhaphice-
ros, Nesotragus, Madoqua, Cobus, Cervicapra, Pelea, Aepyceros, 
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Antidorcas, Gazella, Ammodorcas, Lithocranius, Dorcotragus, Oryx, 




Animals referred to in paragraph 3 of Article II, the killing of the females of 




4. Zebras of the species not referred to in Schedule I.
. Buffaloes.
6. Antelopes and Gazelles, especially species of the genera Buba-
lis, Damaliscus, Connochaetes, Cephalophus, Oreotragus, Oribia, 
Rhaphiceros, Nesotragus, Madoqua, Cobus, Cervicapra, Pelea, Aepyc-
eros, Antidorcas, Gazella, Ammodorcas, Lithocranius, Dorcotragus, 




Animals referred to in paragraph 4 of Article II, of which only limited 




4. Zebras of the species not referred to in Schedule I.
. Buffaloes.
6. Antelopes and Gazelles, especially species of the genera Buba-
lis, Damaliscus, Connochaetes, Cephalophus, Oreotragus, Oribia, 
Rhaphiceros, Nesotragus, Madoqua, Cobus, Cervicapra, Pelea, Aepyc-
eros, Antidorcas, Gazella, Ammodorcas, Lithocranius, Dorcotragus, 
Oryx, Addax, Hippotragus, Taurotragus, Strepsiceros, Tragelaphus.
7. Ibex.
8. Chevrotains (Tragulus).
9. The various Pigs.
0. Colobi and all the fur-Monkeys.
. Aard-Varks (genus Orycteropus).
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2. Dugongs (genus Halicore).
3. Manatees (genus Manatus).
4. The small Cats.
. The Serval.
6. The Cheetah (Cynalurus).
7. Jackals.






24. Francolins, Guinea-fowl and other “Game” birds.
2. Large Tortoises.
Schedule V.
Harmful animals referred to in paragraphs 3 and 3 of Article II, of which 




4. The Hunting Dog (Lycaon pictus).
. The Otter (Lutra).
6. Baboons (Cynocephalus) and other harmful Monkeys.




Convention Relative to the Preservation of  
Fauna and Flora in their Natural State.  
Signed in London on November 8, 1933  
(The “1933 London Convention”)
The Governments of the Union of South Africa, Belgium, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Egypt, Spain, France, 
Italy, Portugal, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan:
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 Considering that the natural fauna and flora of certain parts of the 
world, and in particular of Africa, are in danger, in present conditions, of 
extinction or permanent injury;
 Desiring to institute a special régime for the preservation of fauna 
and flora;
 Considering that such preservation can best be achieved (i) by the 
constitution of national parks, strict natural reserves, and other reserves 
within which the hunting, killing or capturing of fauna, and the collection 
or destruction of flora shall be limited or prohibited, (ii) by the institution 
of regulations concerning the hunting, killing and capturing of fauna out-
side such areas, (iii) by the regulation of the traffic in trophies, and (iv) by 
the prohibition of certain methods of and weapons for the hunting, killing 
and capturing of fauna;
 Have decided to conclude a Convention for these purposes . . . and 
have agreed on the following provisions:
Article 1
. Save as regard the territories mentioned in paragraph 3 (i) of the 
present Article, any Contracting Government shall be at liberty, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 3, to assume, in respect 
of any of its territories (including metropolitan territories, colo-
nies, overseas territories, or territories under suzerainty, protection, 
or mandate), only those obligations of the present Convention 
which are set out in Article 9, paragraphs 3, 8 and 9. The term “in 
part” in the present Convention shall be deemed to refer to those 
obligations.
2. The expression “territory” or “territories” in relation to any 
Contracting Government shall, for the purposes of Articles 2–2 of 
the present Convention, denote the territory or territories of that 
Government to which the Convention is applicable in full; and, 
subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph and of Article 
3, the obligations arising under Articles 2–2 shall relate only to 
such territories.
3. The present Convention shall apply and shall be applicable in full to 
(i) all the territories (i.e., metropolitan territories, colonies, overseas 
territories, or territories under suzerainty, protection, or mandate) 
of any Contracting Government which are situated in the continent 
of Africa, including Madagascar and Zanzibar; (ii) any other terri-
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tory in respect of which a Contracting Government shall have as-
sumed all the obligations of the present Convention in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 3.
4. For the purposes of the present Convention the British High Commis-
sion Territories in South Africa shall be regarded as a single territory.
. The present Convention shall not have any application, either in 
full or in part, to any metropolitan territory not situated in the con-
tinent of Africa, except where and to the extent to which a declara-
tion effecting such application is made under Article 3.
Article 2
For the purposes of the present Convention:
. The expression “national park” shall denote an area (a) placed un-
der public control, the boundaries of which shall not be altered or 
any portion be capable of alienation except by the competent leg-
islative authority, (b) set aside for the propagation, protection and 
preservation of wild animal life and wild vegetation, and for the 
preservation of objects of esthetic, geological, prehistoric, historical, 
archaeological, or other scientific interest for the benefit, advantage, 
and enjoyment of the general public, (c) in which the hunting, kill-
ing or capturing of fauna and the destruction or collection of flora 
is prohibited except by or under the direction or control of the park 
authorities.
 In accordance with the above provisions facilities shall, so far as 
possible, be given to the general public for observing the fauna and 
flora in national parks.
2. The term “strict natural reserve” shall denote an area placed under 
public control, throughout which any form of hunting or fishing, 
any undertakings connected with forestry, agriculture, or mining, 
any excavations or prospecting, drilling, levelling of the ground, or 
construction, any work involving the alteration of the configura-
tion of the soil or the character of the vegetation, any act likely to 
harm or disturb the fauna or flora, and the introduction of any 
species of fauna and flora, whether indigenous or imported, wild or 
domesticated, shall be strictly forbidden; which it shall be forbid-
den to enter, traverse, or camp in without a special written permit 
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from the competent authorities; and in which scientific investiga-
tions may only be undertaken by permission of those authorities.
3. The expression “animal” or “species” shall denote all vertebrates 
and invertebrates (including non-edible fish, but not including ed-
ible fish except in a national park or strict natural reserve), their 
nests, eggs, egg-shells, skins, and plumage.
Article 3
. The Contracting Governments will explore forthwith the possibil-
ity of establishing in their territories national parks and strict natu-
ral reserves as defined in the preceding Article. In all cases where the 
establishment of such parks or reserves is possible, the necessary 
work shall be commenced within two years from the date of the 
entry into force of the present Convention.
2. If in any territory the establishment of a national park or strict natu-
ral reserve is found to be impracticable at present, suitable areas 
shall be selected as early as possible in the development of the terri-
tory concerned, and the areas so selected shall be transformed into 
national parks or strict natural reserves so soon as, in the opinion 
of the authorities of the territory, circumstances will permit.
Article 4
The Contracting Governments will give consideration in respect of each of 
their territories to the following administrative arrangements:
. The control of all white or native settlements in national parks with 
a view to ensuring that as little disturbance as possible is occasioned 
to the natural fauna and flora.
2. The establishment round the borders of national parks and strict 
natural reserves of intermediate zones within which the hunting, 
killing and capturing of animals may take place under the control 
of the authorities of the park or reserve; but in which no person 
who becomes an owner, tenant, or occupier after a date to be de-
termined by the authority of the territory concerned shall have any 
claim in respect of depredations caused by animals.
3. The choice in respect of all national parks of areas sufficient in extent to 
cover, so far as possible, the migrations of the fauna preserved therein.
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Article 5
. The Contracting Governments shall notify the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the es-
tablishment of any national parks or strict natural reserves (defining 
the area of the parks or reserves), and of the legislation, including 
the methods of administration and control, adopted in connexion 
therewith.
2. They shall similarly notify any information relevant to the purposes 
of the present Convention and communicated to them by any na-
tional museums or by any societies, national or international, estab-
lished within their jurisdiction and interested in those purposes.
3. The Government of the United Kingdom will communicate the in-
formation so received to the other Governments which have signed 
or acceded to the present Convention whether in full or in part.
Article 6
In all cases in which it is proposed to establish in any territory of a Con-
tracting Government a national park or strict natural reserve contiguous 
to a park or reserve situated in another territory (whether of that Gov-
ernment or of another Contracting Government), or to the boundary of 
such territory, there shall be prior consultation between the competent au-
thorities of the territories concerned. Similarly, there shall be co-operation 
between those authorities subsequent to the establishment of the park or 
reserve, or where such a park or reserve is already established.
Article 7
Irrespective of any action which may be taken under Article 3 of the pres-
ent Convention, the Contracting Governments shall, as measures prelimi-
nary and supplementary to the establishment of national parks or strict 
natural reserves:
. Set aside in each of their territories suitable areas (to be known as 
reserves) within which the hunting, killing, or capturing of any part 
of the natural fauna (exclusive of fish) shall be prohibited save (a) 
by the permission, given for scientific or administrative purposes in 
exceptional cases by the authorities of the territory or by the cen-
tral authorities under whom the reserves are placed or (b) for the 
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protection of life and property. Licences granted under Article 8, 
paragraphs  and 3, shall not extend to reserves.
2. Extend in these areas, so far as may be practicable, a similar degree 
of protection to the natural flora.
3. Consider the possibility of establishing in each of their territories 
special reserves for the preservation of species of fauna and flora 
which it is desired to preserve, but which are not otherwise ade-
quately protected, with special reference to the species mentioned 
in the Annex to the present Convention.
4. Furnish information regarding the reserves established in accor-
dance with the preceding paragraphs to the Government of the 
United Kingdom, which will communicate such information to all 
the Governments mentioned in Article , paragraph 2.
. Take, so far as in their power lies, all necessary measures to ensure 
in each of their territories a sufficient degree of forest country and 
the preservation of the best native indigenous forest species, and, 
without prejudice to the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 2, give 
consideration to the desirability of preventing the introduction of 
exotic trees or plants into national parks or reserves.
6. Establish as close a degree of co-operation as possible between the 
competent authorities of their respective territories with the object 
of facilitating the solution of forestry problems in those territories.
7. Take the necessary measures to control and regulate so far as pos-
sible the practice of firing the bush on the borders of forests.
8. Encourage the domestication of wild animals susceptible of eco-
nomic utilisation.
Article 8
. The protection of the species mentioned in the Annex to the 
present Convention is declared to be of special urgency and im-
portance. Animals belonging to the species mentioned in Class A 
shall, in each of the territories of the Contracting Governments, 
be protected as completely as possible, and the hunting, killing, or 
capturing of them shall only take place by special permission of the 
highest authority in the territory, which shall be given only under 
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special circumstances, solely in order to further important scientific 
purposes, or when essential for the administration of the territory. 
Animals belonging to the species mentioned in Class B, whilst not 
requiring such rigorous protection as those mentioned in Class A, 
shall not be hunted, killed, or captured, even by natives, except un-
der special licence granted by the competent authorities. For this 
purpose a special licence shall denote a licence other than an ordi-
nary game licence, granted at the discretion of the competent au-
thority, and giving permission to hunt, kill, or capture one or more 
specimens of a specified animal or animals. Every such licence shall 
be limited as regards the period and the area within which hunting, 
killing, or capturing may take place.
2. No hunting or other rights already possessed by native chiefs or 
tribes or any other persons or bodies, by treaty, concession, or spe-
cific agreement, or by administrative permission in those areas in 
which such rights have already been definitely recognised by the 
authorities of the territory are to be considered as being in any way 
prejudiced by the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
3. In each of the territories of the Contracting Governments the com-
petent authorities shall consider whether it is necessary to apply the 
provisions of paragraph  of the present Article to any species not 
mentioned in the Annex, in order to preserve the indigenous fauna 
or flora in each area, and, if they deem it necessary, shall apply those 
provisions to any such species to the extent which they consider 
desirable. They shall similarly consider whether it is necessary in 
the territory concerned to accord to any of the species mentioned 
in Class B of the Annex the special protection accorded to the spe-
cies mentioned in Class A.
4. The competent authorities shall also give consideration to the ques-
tion of protecting species of animals or plants which by general 
admission are useful to man or of special scientific interest.
. Nothing in the present Article shall (i) prejudice any right which 
may exist under the local law of any territory to kill animals with-
out a licence in defence of life or property, or (ii) affect the right 
of the authorities of the territory to permit the hunting, killing, or 
capturing of any species (a) in time of famine, (b) for the protec-
tion of human life, public health, or domestic stock, (c) for any 
requirement relating to public order.
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6. Each Contracting Government shall furnish to the Government of 
the United Kingdom information on the subject of the measures 
adopted in each of its territories in regard to the grant of licences, 
and in regard to the animals, the destruction or capture of which is, 
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, not permitted except 
under licence. The Government of the United Kingdom will com-
municate any such information to all the Governments mentioned 
in Article , paragraph 2.
Article 9
. Each Contracting Government shall take the necessary measures 
to control and regulate in each of its territories the internal, and 
the import and export, traffic in, and the manufacture of articles 
from, trophies as defined in paragraph 8 of the present Article, with 
a view to preventing the import or export of, or any dealing in, 
trophies other than such as have been originally killed, captured or 
collected in accordance with the laws and regulations of the terri-
tory concerned.
2. The export of trophies to any destination whatsoever shall be pro-
hibited unless the exporter has been granted a certificate permit-
ting export and issued by a competent authority. Such certificate 
shall only be issued where the trophies have been lawfully imported 
or lawfully obtained. In the event of an attempted export without 
any certificate having been granted, the authorities of the territory 
where this attempt takes place shall apply such penalties as they 
may think necessary.
3. The import of trophies which have been exported from any territory 
to which the present Convention is applicable in full, whether a terri-
tory of another Contracting Government or not, shall be prohibited 
except on production of a certificate of lawful export, failing which 
the trophy shall be confiscated, but without prejudice to the applica-
tion of the penalties mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
4. The import and export of trophies, except at places where there is a 
Customs station, shall be prohibited.
. (a) Every trophy consisting of ivory and rhinoceros horn exported 
in accordance with the provisions of the present Article shall be 
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identified by marks which, together with the weight of the trophy, 
shall be recorded in the certificate of lawful export.
 (b) Every other trophy shall, if possible, be similarly marked and 
recorded but shall in any event be described in the certificate so as 
to identify it with as much certainty as possible.
 (c) The Contracting Governments shall take such measures as may 
be possible by the preparation and circulation of appropriate il-
lustrations or otherwise to instruct their Customs officers in the 
methods of identifying the species mentioned in the Annex to the 
present Convention and the trophies derived therefrom.
6. The measures contemplated in paragraph  of the present Article 
shall include provisions that found ivory, rhinoceros horn and all 
trophies of animals found dead, or accidentally killed, or killed in 
defence of any person, shall, in principle, be the property of the 
Government of the territory concerned, and shall be disposed of 
according to regulations introduced by that Government, due re-
gard being had to the native rights and customs reserved in the suc-
ceeding paragraph.
7. No rights of the kind specified in paragraph 2 of Article 8 are to be 
considered as being prejudiced by the provisions of the preceding 
paragraphs.
8. For the purposes of the present Article the expression “trophy” shall 
denote any animal, dead or alive, mentioned in the Annex to the 
Convention, or anything part of or produced from any such animal 
when dead, or the eggs, egg-shells, nest or plumage of any bird so 
mentioned. The expression “trophy” shall not, however, include any 
trophy or part of a trophy which by a process of bona fide manufac-
ture, as contemplated in paragraph  of the present Article, has lost 
its original identity.
9. Each Contracting Government shall furnish to the Government of 
the United Kingdom information as to the measures taken in order 
to carry out the obligations of the present Article or any part of 
them. The Government of the United Kingdom will communicate 
any information so received to all the Governments mentioned in 
Article , paragraph 2.
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Article 10
. The use of motor vehicles or aircraft (including aircraft lighter than 
air) shall be prohibited in the territories of the Contracting Gov-
ernments, both (i) for the purpose of hunting, killing, or capturing 
animals, and (ii) in such manner as to drive, stampede, or disturb 
them for any purpose whatsoever, including that of filming or pho-
tographing; provided, however, that nothing in the present para-
graph shall affect the right of occupiers in respect of land occupied 
by them, or of Governments in respect of land utilised for public 
purposes, to use motor vehicles or aircraft for the purpose of driv-
ing away, capturing, or destroying animals found on such land in all 
cases where such ejection, capture, or destruction is not prohibited 
by any other provision of the present Convention.
2. The Contracting Governments shall prohibit in their territories the 
surrounding of animals by fires for hunting purposes. Wherever 
possible, the under-mentioned methods of capturing or destroying 
animals shall also be generally prohibited:
 (a) The use of poison, or explosives for killing fish;
 (b) The use of dazzling lights, flares, poison, or poisoned weapons 
for hunting animals;
 (c) The use of nets, pits or enclosures, gins, traps or snares, or of set 
guns and missiles containing explosives for hunting animals.
Article 11
It is understood that upon signature, ratification, or accession any Con-
tracting Government may make such express reservations in regard to 
Articles 3–0 of the present Convention as may be considered essential.
Article 12
. Each Contracting Government shall furnish to the Government of 
the United Kingdom information as to the measures taken for the 
purpose of carrying out the provisions of the preceding Articles. 
The Government of the United Kingdom will communicate all the 
information so furnished to the Governments mentioned in Article 
, paragraph 2.
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2. The Contracting Governments shall, wherever necessary, co-operate 
between themselves for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of 
the preceding Articles and to prevent the extinction of fauna and flora.
3. All the Governments which sign or accede to the present Conven-
tion shall be deemed to be Parties to the Protocol bearing this day’s 
date, drawn up to facilitate the co-operation mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph.
Article 13
. Any Contracting Government may, at the time of signature, rati-
fication, or accession, or thereafter, make a declaration assuming 
in respect of any one or more of its territories (including metro-
politan territories, colonies, overseas territories, or territories under 
suzerainty, protection, or mandate) other than those mentioned in 
paragraph 3 (i) of Article , either all the obligations of the present 
Convention, or only those contained in Article 9, paragraphs 3, 8 
and 9. If such declaration is made subsequent to ratification or ac-
cession it shall be effected by means of a notification in writing ad-
dressed to the Government of the United Kingdom, and shall take 
effect on the entry into force of the Convention or, if the Conven-
tion is already in force, three months after the date of the receipt of 
the notification by the Government of the United Kingdom.
2. It is understood that any Contracting Government may, by a single 
declaration made under the preceding paragraph, assume, in respect of 
some of its territories mentioned in that paragraph, all the obligations 
of the present Convention, and in respect of other such territories 
only the obligations contained in Article 9, paragraphs 3, 8 and 9.
3. Any Contracting Government which has made a declaration under the 
preceding paragraph, assuming, in respect of any territory, only the ob-
ligations contained in Article 9, paragraphs 3, 8 and 9, may, at any sub-
sequent time, by a notification in writing addressed to the Government 
of the United Kingdom, declare that such previous declaration shall 
henceforth be deemed to relate to all the obligations of the Convention 
in respect of the territory concerned; and such subsequent declaration 
shall take effect on the entry into force of the Convention or, if the 
Convention is already in force, three months after the date of the re-
ceipt of the notification by the Government of the United Kingdom.
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4. Any Contracting Government may at any time, by a notification 
in writing addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom, 
determine the application of the Convention to any territory or 
territories which have been the subject of a declaration under 
paragraphs  and 3 of the present Article, and the Convention shall 
thereupon cease to apply to the territory or territories mentioned 
in the notification one year after the date of its receipt by the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom, provided that such notification 
shall in no case take effect until the expiry of the period of five years 
mentioned in Article 9, paragraph .
. It is understood that if, as the result of a notification made under the pre-
ceding paragraph, there would remain no territories of the Contracting 
Government concerned to which the Convention would be applicable 
either in full or in part, such Government shall, instead of making the 
notification, proceed by way of denunciation under Article 9.
6. It is further understood that no notification made under para-
graph 4 of the present Article, or otherwise, may purport to ap-
ply only the provisions of Article 9, paragraphs 3, 8 and 9, to any 
territory to which, at the time of the notification, the Convention 
applies in full.
7. The Government of the United Kingdom will inform all the Gov-
ernments mentioned in Article , paragraph 2, of any notifications 
received under the preceding paragraphs of the present Article, of 
the date of their receipt and of their terms.
Article 14
It is understood that no Government will sign, ratify, or accede to the 
present Convention unless it either has territories covered by Article , 
paragraph 3 (i), or makes or has made a declaration under Article 3 as-
suming in respect of one or more territories the obligations of the Conven-
tion either in full or in part.
Article 15
The present Convention, of which the French and English texts shall both 
be equally authentic, shall bear this day’s date and shall be open for signa-
ture until the 3st March, 934.
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Article 16
The present Convention shall be subject to ratification. The instruments 
of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United 
Kingdom, which will notify their receipt and the date thereof, and their 
terms and terms of any accompanying declarations or reservations to all 
Governments mentioned in Article , paragraph 2.
Article 17
At any time after the 3st March, 934, the present Convention shall be 
open to accession by any Government of a metropolitan territory, by 
which it has not been signed, whether it has territories covered by Article 
, paragraph 3 (i), or not. Accessions shall be notified to the Government 
of the United Kingdom, which will inform all the Governments men-
tioned in Article , paragraph 2, of all notifications received, their terms 
and the terms of any accompanying declarations or reservations, and the 
date of their receipt.
Article 18
. After the deposit or notification of not less than four ratifications 
or accessions on the part of Contracting Governments having terri-
tories covered by Article , paragraph 3 (i), the present Convention 
shall come into force three months after the deposit or notification 
of the last of such ratifications or accessions, as between the Gov-
ernments concerned. The Government of the United Kingdom will 
notify all the Governments mentioned in Article , paragraph 2, of 
the date of the coming into force of the Convention.
2. Any ratifications or accessions received after the date of the entry 
into force of the Convention shall take effect three months after the 
date of their receipt by the Government of the United Kingdom.
Article 19
. Any Contracting Government may at any time denounce the pres-
ent Convention by a notification in writing addressed to the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom. Such denunciation shall take 
effect, as regards the Government making it, and in respect of all 
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the territories of that Government to which the Convention shall 
then apply, either in full or in part, one year after the receipt of the 
notification by the Government of the United Kingdom; provided, 
however, that no denunciation shall take effect until the expiry of 
five years from the date of the entry into force of the Convention.
2. If, as the result of simultaneous or successive denunciations, the 
number of Contracting Governments bound, in respect of one or 
more of their territories, by all the obligations of the present Con-
vention is reduced to less than four, the Convention shall cease to 
be in force as from the date on which the last of such denunciations 
shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the preceding 
paragraph.
3. The Government of the United Kingdom will notify all the other 
Governments mentioned in Article , paragraph 2, of any denun-
ciations so received and the date on which they take effect. The 
Government of the United Kingdom will also, if occasion arises, 
similarly notify the date on which the Convention ceases to be in 
force under the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
 In witness whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the present Convention.
 Done in London, this eighth day of November, 933, in a single copy, 
which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which 
will transmit certified true copies thereof to all the Governments 
attending the Conference at which the present Convention has 
been drawn up, whether as participators or observers, as well as 
to any other Government to which the Government of the United 
Kingdom may deem it desirable to communicate a copy.
Union of South Africa
Belgium

























Northern Hartebeest or Bubal
Abyssinian Ibex or Wali
African Elephant (with tusks under  kilograms)
Water Chevrotain
Whale-headed Stork or Shoe-bill
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Beira
Dibatag or Clarke’s Gazelle
Bontebok
Black Rhinoceros












Texts of Bird Treaties
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds 
Signed between the United States and Great Britain. 
Signed in Washington, DC on August 16, 1916 
(The “1916 Convention”)
Whereas, Many species of birds in the course of their annual migra-
tions traverse certain parts of the United States and the Dominion of 
Canada; and
 Whereas, Many of these species are of great value as a source of food or 
in destroying insects which are injurious to forests and forage plants on the 
public domain, as well as to agricultural crops, in both the United States 
and Canada, but are nevertheless in danger of extermination through lack 
of adequate protection during the nesting season or while on their way to 
and from their breeding grounds;
 The United States of America and His Majesty the King of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions be-
yond the Seas, Emperor of India, being desirous of saving from indiscrimi-
nate slaughter and of insuring the preservation of such migratory birds as 
are either useful to man or are harmless, have resolved to adopt some uni-
form system of protection which shall effectively accomplish such objects 
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and to the end of concluding a convention for this purpose have appointed 
as their respective Plenipotentiaries:
 The President of the United States of America, Robert Lansing, Secre-
tary of State of the United States; and
 His Britannic Majesty, the Right Honorable Sir Cecil Arthur Spring 
Rice, G. C. V. O., K. C. M. G., etc., His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary at Washington;
 Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full 
powers which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to and 
adopted the following articles:
Article I
The High Contracting Powers declare that the migratory birds included in 
the terms of this Convention shall be as follows:
. Migratory Game Birds:
(a) Anatidae or waterfowl, including brant, wild ducks, geese, and 
swans.
(b) Gruidae or cranes, including little brown, sandhill, and whoop-
ing cranes.
(c) Rallidae or rails, including coots, gallinules and sora and other 
rails.
(d) Limicolae or shorebirds, including avocets, curlew, dowitchers, 
godwits, knots, oyster catchers, phalaropes, plovers, sandpipers, snipe, 
stilts, surf birds, turnstones, willet, woodcock and yellowlegs.
(e) Columbidae or pigeons, including doves and wild pigeons.
2. Migratory Insectivorous Birds:
Bobolinks, catbirds, chicadees, cuckoos, flickers, flycatchers, gros-
beaks, humming birds, kinglets, martins, meadowlarks, night-
hawks or bull bats, nut-hatches, orioles, robins, shrikes, swallows, 
swifts, tanagers, titmice, thrushes, vireos, warblers, wax-wings, 
whippoorwills, woodpeckers and wrens, and all other perching 
birds which feed entirely or chiefly on insects.
3. Other Migratory Nongame Birds:
Auks, auklets, bitterns, fulmars, gannets, grebes, guillemots, gulls, 
herons, jaegers, loons, murres, petrels, puffins, shearwaters, and 
terns.
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Article II
The High Contracting Powers agree that, as an effective means of preserv-
ing migratory birds there shall be established the following close seasons 
during which no hunting shall be done except for scientific or propagating 
purposes under permits issued by proper authorities.
. The close season on migratory game birds shall be between March 
0 and September , except that the close season on the Limicolae 
or shorebirds in the Maritime Provinces of Canada and in those 
States of the United States bordering on the Atlantic Ocean which 
are situated wholly or in part north of Chesapeake Bay shall be be-
tween February  and August 5, and that Indians may take at any 
time scoters for food but not for sale. The season for hunting shall 
be further restricted to such period not exceeding three and one-
half months as the High Contracting Powers may severally deem 
appropriate and define by law or regulation.
2. The close season on migratory insectivorous birds shall continue 
throughout the year.
3. The close season on other migratory nongame birds shall continue 
throughout the year, except that Eskimos and Indians may take at 
any season auks, auklets, guillemots, murres and puffins, and their 
eggs for food and their skins for clothing, but the birds and eggs so 
taken shall not be sold or offered for sale.
Article III
The High Contracting Powers agree that during the period of ten years 
next following the going into effect of this Convention there shall be a con-
tinuous close season on the following migratory game birds, to wit:
 Band-tailed pigeons, little brown, sandhill and whooping cranes, 
swans, curlew and all shorebirds (except the black-breasted and golden 
plover, Wilson or jack snipe, woodcock, and the greater and lesser yellow-
legs); provided that during such ten years the close seasons on cranes, 
swans and curlew in the Province of British Columbia shall be made by 
the proper authorities of that Province within the general dates and limita-
tions elsewhere prescribed in this Convention for the respective groups to 
which these birds belong.
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Article IV
The High Contracting Powers agree that special protection shall be given 
the wood duck and the eider duck either () by a close season extending 
over a period of at least five years, or (2) by the establishment of refuges, or 
(3) by such other regulations as may be deemed appropriate.
Article V
The taking of nests or eggs of migratory game or insectivorous or non-
game birds shall be prohibited, except for scientific or propagating purposes 
under such laws or regulations as the High Contracting Powers may sever-
ally deem appropriate.
Article VI
The High Contracting Powers agree that the shipment or export of 
migratory birds or their eggs from any State or Province, during the 
continuance of the close season in such State or Province, shall be pro-
hibited except for scientific or propagating purposes, and the interna-
tional traffic in any birds or eggs at such time captured, killed, taken, 
or shipped at any time contrary to the laws of the State or Province in 
which the same were captured, killed, taken, or shipped shall be like-
wise prohibited. Every package containing migratory birds or any parts 
thereof or any eggs of migratory birds transported, or offered for trans-
portation from the United States into the Dominion of Canada into 
the United States, shall have the name and address of the shipper and 
an accurate statement of the contents clearly marked on the outside of 
such package.
Article VII
Permits to kill any of the above-named birds which, under extraordinary 
conditions, may become seriously injurious to the agricultural or other 
interests in any particular community, may be issued by the proper au-
thorities of the High Contracting Powers under suitable regulations pre-
scribed therefor by them respectively, but such permits shall lapse, or may 
be cancelled, at any time when, in the opinion of said authorities, the par-
ticular exigency has passed, and no birds killed under this article shall be 
shipped, sold or offered for sale.
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Article VIII
The High Contracting Powers agree themselves to take, or propose to their 
respecting appropriate law-making bodies, the necessary measures for in-
suring the execution of the present Convention.
Article IX
The present Convention shall be ratified by the President of the United 
States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, 
and by His Britannic Majesty. The ratifications shall be exchanged at Wash-
ington as soon as possible and the Convention shall take effect on the date 
of the exchange of the ratifications. It shall remain in force for fifteen years 
and in the event of neither of the High Contracting Powers having given 
notification, twelve months before the expiration of said period of fifteen 
years, of its intention of terminating its operation, the Convention shall 
continue to remain in force for one year and so on from year to year.
 In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Convention in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals.




Convention between the United States of America 
and the United States of Mexico for the Protection 
of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals.  
Signed in Mexico City on February 7, 1936  
(The “1936 Convention”)
Whereas, some of the birds denominated migratory, in their movements 
cross the United States of America and the United Mexican States, in which 
countries they live temporarily;
 Whereas, it is right and proper to protect the said migratory birds, 
whatever may be their origin, in the United States of America and the 
United Mexican States, in order that the species may not be exterminated;
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 Whereas, for this purpose it is necessary to employ adequate measures 
which will permit a rational utilization of migratory birds for the purposes 
of sport as well as for food, commerce and industry;
 The Governments of the two countries have agreed to conclude a Con-
vention which will satisfy the above-mentioned need and to that end have 
appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:
 The Honorable Josephus Daniels, representing the President of the 
United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and
 The Honorable Eduardo Hay, representing the President of the United 
Mexican States, General Lázaro Cárdenas,
 Who, having exhibited to each other and found satisfactory their re-
spective full powers, conclude the following Convention:
Article I
In order that the species may not be exterminated, the high contracting 
parties declare that it is right and proper to protect birds denominated 
as migratory, whatever may be their origin, which in their movements 
live temporarily in the United States of America and the United Mexican 
States, by means of adequate methods which will permit, in so far as the 
respective high contracting parties may see fit, the utilization of said birds 
rationally for purposes of sport, food, commerce and industry.
Article II
The high contracting parties agree to establish laws, regulations and provi-
sions to satisfy the need set forth in the preceding Article, including:
 (A) The establishment of close seasons, which will prohibit in cer-
tain periods of the year the taking of migratory birds, their nests 
or eggs, as well as their transportation or sale, alive or dead, their 
products or parts, except when proceeding, with appropriate au-
thorization, from private game farms or when used for scientific 
purposes, for propagation or for museums.
 (B) The establishment of refuge zones in which the taking of such 
birds will be prohibited.
 (C) The limitation of their hunting to four months in each year, as 
a maximum, under permits issued by the respective authorities in 
each case.
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 (D) The establishment of a close season for wild ducks from the 
tenth of March to the first of September.
 (E) The prohibition of the killing of migratory insectivorous birds, 
except when they become injurious to agriculture and constitute 
plagues, as well as when they come from reserves or game farms: 
provided, however, that such birds may be captured alive and used 
in conformity with the laws of each contracting country.
 (F) The prohibition of hunting from aircraft.
Article III
The high contracting parties respectively agree, in addition, not to permit 
the transportation over the American-Mexican border of migratory birds, 
dead or alive, their parts or products, without a permit of authorization 
provided for that purpose by the Government of each country, with the un-
derstanding that in the case that the said birds, their parts or products are 
transported from one country to the other without the stipulated authori-
zation, they will be considered as contraband and treated accordingly.
Article IV
The high contracting parties declare that for the purposes of the present 
Convention the following birds shall be considered migratory:
Migratory Game Birds.
Familia Anatidae. Familia Scolopacidae.
Familia Gruidae.  Familia Recurvirostridae.
Familia Rallidae.  Familia Phalaropodidae.
Familia Charadriidae. Familia Columbidae.
Migratory Non-game Birds.
Familia Cuculidae. Familia Mimidae.
Familia Caprimulgidae. Familia Sylviidae.
Familia Micropodidae. Familia Motacillidae.
Familia Trochilidae. Familia Bombycillidae.
Familia Picidae.  Familia Ptilogonatidae.
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Familia Tyrannidae. Familia Laniidae.
Familia Alaudidae. Familia Vireonidae.
Familia Hirundinidae. Familia Compsothlypidae.
Familia Paridae.  Familia Icteridae.
Familia Certhiidae. Familia Thraupidae.
Familia Troglodytidae. Familia Fringillidae.
Familia Turdidae.
Others which the Presidents of the United States of America and the United 
Mexican States may determine by common agreement.
Article V
The high contracting parties agree to apply the stipulations set forth in 
Article III with respect to the game mammals which live in their respective 
countries.
Article VI
This Convention shall be ratified by the high contracting parties in ac-
cordance with their constitutional methods and shall remain in force for 
fifteen years and shall be understood to be extended from year to year if the 
high contracting parties have not indicated twelve months in advance their 
intention to terminate it.
 The respective plenipotentiaries sign the present Convention in du-
plicate in English and Spanish, affixing thereto their respective seals, in the 
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Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.  
Signed in Geneva on September 24, 1931  
(The “1931 Geneva Convention”)
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties agree to take, within the limits of their re-
spective jurisdictions, appropriate measures to ensure the application of 
the provisions of the present Convention and the punishment of infrac-
tions of the said provisions.
Article 2
The present Convention applies only to baleens or whalebone whales.
Article 3
The present Convention does not apply to aborigines dwelling on the 
coasts of the territories of the High Contracting Parties provided that:
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 () They only use canoes, pirogues or other exclusively native craft 
propelled by oars or sails;
 (2) They do not carry firearms;
 (3) They are not in the employment of persons other than aborigines;
 (4) They are not under contract to deliver the products of their whal-
ing to any third person.
Article 4
The taking or killing of right whales, which shall be deemed to include 
North-Cape whales, Greenland whales, southern right whales, Pacific right 
whales and southern pigmy right whales, is prohibited.
Article 5
The taking or killing of calves or suckling whales, immature whales, and 
female whales which are accompanied by calves (or suckling whales) is 
prohibited.
Article 6
The fullest possible use shall be made of the carcases of whales taken. In 
particular:
 () There shall be extracted by boiling or otherwise the oil from all 
blubber and from the head and the tongue and, in addition, from the tail 
as far forward as the outer opening of the lower intestine.
 The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall apply only to such carcases 
or parts of carcases as are not intended to be used for human food.
 (2) Every factory, whether on shore or afloat, used for treating the car-
cases of whales shall be equipped with adequate apparatus for the extrac-
tion of oil from the blubber, flesh and bones.
 (3) In the case of whales brought on shore, adequate arrangements 
shall be made for utilising the residues after the oil has been extracted.
Article 7
Gunners and crews of whaling vessels shall be engaged on terms such that their 
remuneration shall depend to a considerable extent upon such factors as the 
size, species, value and yield of oil of whales taken, and not merely upon the 
number of whales taken, in so far as payment is made dependent on results.
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Article 8
No vessel of any of the High Contracting Parties shall engage in taking or 
treating whales unless a licence authorising such vessel to engage therein 
shall have been granted in respect of such vessel by the High Contracting 
Party, whose flag she flies, or unless her owner or charterer has notified the 
Government of the said High Contracting Party of his intention to employ 
her in whaling and has received a certificate of notification from the said 
Government.
 Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the right of any High Contract-
ing Party to require that, in addition, a licence shall be required from his 
own authorities by every vessel desirous of using his territory or territorial 
waters for the purposes of taking, landing or treating whales, and such 
licence may be refused or may be made subject to such conditions as may 
be deemed by such High Contracting Party to be necessary or desirable, 
whatever the nationality of the vessel may be.
Article 9
The geographical limits within which the Articles of this Convention are to 
be applied shall include all the waters of the world, including both the high 
seas and territorial and national waters.
Article 10
. The High Contracting Parties shall obtain, with regard to the vessels 
flying their flags and engaged in the taking of whales, the most 
complete biological information practicable with regard to each 
whale taken, and in any case on the following points:
 (a) Date of taking;
 (b) Place of taking;
 (c) Species;
 (d) Sex;
 (e) Length; measured, when taken out of water; estimated, if cut up 
in water;
 (f) When foetus is present, length and sex if ascertainable;
 (g) When practicable, information as to stomach contents.
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2. The length referred to in sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of this Article 
shall be the length of a straight line taken from the tip of the snout 
to the notch between the flukes of the tail.
Article 11
Each High Contracting Party shall obtain from all factories, on land or 
afloat, under his jurisdiction, returns of the number of whales of each spe-
cies treated at each factory and of the amounts of oil of each grade and the 
quantities of meal, guano and other products derived from them.
Article 12
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate statistical infor-
mation regarding all whaling operations under their jurisdiction to the 
International Bureau for Whaling Statistics at Oslo. The information given 
shall comprise at least the particulars mentioned in Article 0 and: () the 
name and tonnage of each floating factory; (2) the number and aggregate 
tonnage of the whale catchers; (3) a list of the land stations which were in 
operation during the period concerned. Such information shall be given at 
convenient intervals not longer than one year.
Article 13
The obligation of a High Contracting Party to take measures to ensure the 
observance of the conditions of the present Convention in his own terri-
tories and territorial waters, and by his vessels, shall not apply to those of 
his territories to which the Convention does not apply, and the territorial 
waters adjacent thereto, or to vessels registered in such territories.
Article 14
The present Convention, the French and English texts of which shall both 
be authoritative, shall remain open until the thirty-first of March 932 for 
signature on behalf of any Member of the League of Nations or of any 
non-member State.
Article 15
The present Convention shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 
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who shall notify their receipt to all Members of the League of Nations and 
non-member States indicating the dates of their deposit.
Article 16
As from the first of April 932, any Member of the League of Nations and 
any non-member State, on whose behalf the Convention has not been 
signed before that date, may accede thereto.
 The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations, who shall notify all the Members of the 
League of Nations and non-member States of their deposit and the date 
thereof.
Article 17
The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day fol-
lowing the receipt by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of 
ratifications or accessions on behalf of not less than eight Members of the 
League or non-member States, including the Kingdom of Norway and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
 As regards any Member of the League or non-member State on whose 
behalf an instrument of ratification or accession is subsequently deposited, 
the Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of 
the deposit of such instrument.
Article 18
If after the coming into force of the present Convention the Council of the 
League of Nations, at the request of any two Members of the League or non-
member States with regard to which the Convention is then in force, shall 
convene a Conference for the revision of the Convention, the High Con-
tracting Parties agree to be represented at any Conference so convened.
Article 19
. The present Convention may be denounced after the expiration of 
three years from the date of its coming into force.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed 
to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who shall inform 
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all the Members of the League and the non-member States of each 
notification received and of the date of its receipt.
3. Each denunciation shall take effect six months after the receipt of 
its notification.
Article 20
. Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of signature, ratifica-
tion or accession, declare that, in accepting the present Convention, 
he does not assume any obligations in respect of all or any of his 
colonies, protectorates, overseas territories or territories under su-
zerainty or mandate; and the present Convention shall not apply to 
any territories named in such declaration.
2. Any High Contracting Party may give notice to the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations at any time subsequently that he 
desires that the Convention shall apply to all or any of his territo-
ries which have been made the subject of a declaration under the 
preceding paragraph, and the Convention shall apply to all the ter-
ritories named in such notice ninety days after its receipt by the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
3. Any High Contracting Party may, at any time after the expiration 
of the period of three years mentioned in Article 9, declare that 
he desires that the present Convention shall cease to apply to all 
or any of his colonies, protectorates, overseas territories or ter-
ritories under suzerainty or mandate and the Convention shall 
cease to apply to the territories named in such declaration six 
months after its receipt by the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations.
4. The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall communicate 
to all the Members of the League of Nations and the non-member 
States all declarations and notices received in virtue of this Article 
and the dates of their receipt.
Article 21
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the 
League of Nations as soon as it has entered into force.
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 In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the present Convention.
 Done at Geneva, on the twenty-fourth day of September one thousand 
nine hundred and thirty-one, in a single copy which shall be kept in the 
archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations and of which certified 
true copies shall be delivered to all the Members of the League of Nations 
and to the non-member States.
Albania    Finland
Germany    France
United States of America  Greece
Belgium    Italy
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Mexico
Canada    Norway
Commonwealth of Australia  The Netherlands
New Zealand    Poland
Union of South Africa   Roumania
India    Switzerland
Colombia    Czechoslovakia
Denmark    Turkey
Spain    Yugoslavia
International Agreement for the Regulation of 
Whaling. Signed in London on June 8, 1937  
(The “1937 London Convention”)
The Governments of the Union of South Africa, the United States of 
America, the Argentine Republic, the Commonwealth of Australia, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
Irish Free State, New Zealand and Norway, desiring to secure the prosper-
ity of the whaling industry and, for that purpose, to maintain the stock of 
whales, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The contracting Governments will take appropriate measures to en-
sure the application of the provisions of the present Agreement and the 
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punishment of infractions against the said provisions, and, in particu-
lar, will maintain at least one inspector of whaling on each factory ship 
under their jurisdiction. The inspectors shall be appointed and paid by 
Governments.
Article 2
The present Agreement applies to factory ships and whale catchers and to 
land stations as defined in Article  under the jurisdiction of the contract-
ing Governments, and to all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such 
factory ships and/or whale catchers.
Article 3
Prosecutions for infractions against or contraventions of the present 
Agreement and the regulations made thereunder shall be instituted by the 
Government or a Department of the Government.
Article 4
It is forbidden to take or kill Grey Whales and/or Right Whales.
Article 5
It is forbidden to take or kill any Blue, Fin, Humpback or Sperm whales 
below the following lengths, viz.:
(a) Blue whales  0 feet,
(b) Fin whales  55 feet,
(c) Humpback whales 35 feet,
(d) Sperm whales 35 feet.
Article 6
It is forbidden to take or kill calves, or suckling whales or female whales 
which are accompanied by calves or suckling whales.
Article 7
It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached thereto for 
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the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in any waters south of 40º 
South Latitude, except during the period from the th day of December to 
the th day of March following, both days inclusive, provided that in the 
whaling season 93–3 the period shall extend to the 5th day of March, 
93, inclusive.
Article 8
It is forbidden to use a land station or a whale catcher attached thereto for 
the purpose of taking or treating whales in any area or in any waters for 
more than six months in any period of twelve months, such period of six 
months to be continuous.
Article 9
It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached thereto 
for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in any of the following 
areas, viz.:
 (a) In the Atlantic Ocean north of 40º South Latitude and in the 
Davis Strait, Baffin Bay and Greenland Sea;
 (b) In the Pacific Ocean east of 50º West Longitude between 40º 
South Latitude and 35º North Latitude;
 (c) In the Pacific Ocean west of 50º West Longitude between 40º 
South Latitude and 20º North Latitude;
 (d) In the Indian Ocean north of 40º South Latitude.
Article 10
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, any contracting 
Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authoris-
ing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific 
research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other 
conditions as the contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, 
taking and treating of whales in accordance with the terms in force under 
this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Agreement.
 Any contracting Government may at any time revoke a permit granted 
by it under this Article.
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Article 11
The fullest possible use shall be made of all whales taken. Except in the 
case of whales or parts of whales intended for human food or for feeding 
animals, the oil shall be extracted by boiling or otherwise for all blubber, 
meat (except the meat of sperm whales) and bones other than the internal 
organs, whale bone and flippers, of all whales delivered to the factory ship 
or land station.
Article 12
There shall not at any time be taken for delivery to any factory ship or 
land station a greater number of whales than can be treated efficiently and 
in accordance with Article  of the present Agreement by the plant and 
personnel therein within a period of thirty-six hours from the time of the 
killing of each whale.
Article 13
Gunners and crews of factory ships, land stations and whale catchers shall 
be engaged on terms such that their remuneration shall depend to a con-
siderable extent upon such factors as the species, size and yield of whales 
taken, and not merely upon the number of the whales taken, and no bonus 
or other remuneration, calculated by reference to the results of their work, 
shall be paid to the gunners and crews of whale catchers in respect of any 
whales the taking of which is forbidden by this Agreement.
Article 14
With a view to the enforcement of the preceding Article, each contracting Gov-
ernment shall obtain, in respect of every whale catcher under its jurisdiction, 
an account showing the total emolument of each gunner and member of the 
crew and the manner in which the emolument of each of them is calculated.
Article 15
Articles 5, 9, 3 and 4 of the present Agreement, in so far as they impose ob-
ligations not already in force, shall not until the st day of December, 93, 
apply to factory ships, land stations or catchers attached thereto which are 
at present operating or which have already taken practical measures with 
a view to whaling operations during the period before the said date. In 
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respect of such factory ships, land stations and whale catchers, the Agree-
ment shall in any event come into force on the said date.
Article 16
The contracting Governments shall obtain with regard to all factory 
ships and land stations under their jurisdiction records of the number 
of whales of each species treated at each factory ship or land station 
and as to the aggregate amounts of oil of each grade and quantities 
of meal, guano and other products derived from them, together with 
particulars with respect to each whale treated in the factory ship or 
land station as to the date and place of taking, the species and sex of 
the whale, its length and, if it contains a foetus, the length and sex, if 
ascertainable, of the foetus.
Article 17
The contracting Governments shall, with regard to all whaling opera-
tions under their jurisdiction, communicate to the International Bureau 
for Whaling Statistics at Sandefjord in Norway the statistical information 
specified in Article  of the present Agreement together with any informa-
tion which may be collected or obtained by them in regard to the calving 
grounds and migration routes of whales.
 In communicating this information the Governments shall specify:
 (a) The name and tonnage of each factory ship;
 (b) The number and aggregate tonnage of the whale catchers;
 (c) A list of the land stations which were in operation during the 
period concerned.
Article 18
In the present Agreement the following expressions have the meanings re-
spectively assigned to them, that is to say:
 “Factory ship” means a ship in which or on which whales are treated 
whether wholly or in part;
 “Whale catcher” means a ship used for the purpose of hunting, taking, 
towing, holding on to, or scouting for whales;
 “Land station” means a factory on the land, or in the territorial waters adja-
cent thereto, in which or at which whales are treated whether wholly or in part;
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 “Baleen whale” means any whale other than a toothed whale;
 “Blue whale” means any whale known by the name of blue whale, Sib-
bald’s rorqual or sulphur bottom;
 “Fin whale” means any whale known by the name of common finback, 
common finner, common rorqual, finback, fin whale, herring whale, razor-
back, or true fin whale;
 “Grey whale” means any whale known by the name of grey whale, 
California grey, devil fish, hard head, mussel digger, grey back, rip sack;
 “Humpback whale” means any whale known by the name of bunch, 
humpback, humpback whale, humpbacked whale, hump whale or hunch-
backed whale;
 “Right whale” means any whale known by the name of Atlantic right 
whale, Arctic right whale, Biscayan right whale, bowhead, great polar 
whale, Greenland right whale, Greenland whale, Nordkaper, North At-
lantic right whale, North Cape whale, Pacific right whale, pigmy right 
whale, Southern pigmy right whale or Southern right whale;
 “Sperm whale” means any whale known by the name of sperm whale, 
spermacet whale, cachalot or pot whale;
 “Length” in relation to any whale means the distance measured on 
the level in a straight line between the tip of the upper jaw and the notch 
between the flukes of the tail.
Article 19
The present Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratifica-
tion shall be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland as soon as possible. It shall come into 
force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of 
the signatory Governments, which shall include the Governments of the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Norway; and for any other Government 
not included in such majority on the date of the deposit of its instrument 
of ratification.
 The Government of the United Kingdom will inform the other Gov-
ernments of the date on which the Agreement thus comes into force and 
the date of any ratification received subsequently.
Article 20
The present Agreement shall come into force provisionally on the st day of 
July, 93, to the extent to which the signatory Governments are respectively 
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able to enforce it; provided that if any Government within two months of 
the signature of the Agreement informs the Government of the United 
Kingdom that it is unwilling to ratify it the provisional application of the 
Agreement in respect of that Government shall thereupon cease.
 The Government of the United Kingdom will communicate the name of 
any Government which has signified that it is unwilling to ratify the Agreement 
to the other Governments, any of whom may within one month of such com-
munication withdraw its ratification or accession or signify its unwillingness 
to ratify as the case may be, and the provisional application of the Agreement 
in respect of that Government shall thereupon cease. Any such withdrawal or 
communication shall be notified to the Government of the United Kingdom, 
by whom it will be transmitted to the other Governments.
Article 21
The present Agreement shall, subject to the preceding Article, remain in 
force until the 30th day of June, 93, and thereafter if, before that date, a ma-
jority of the contracting Governments, which shall include the Governments 
of the United Kingdom, Germany and Norway, shall have agreed to extend 
its duration. In the event of such extension it shall remain in force until the 
contracting Governments agree to modify it, provided that any contracting 
Government may, at any time after the 30th day of June, 93, by giving no-
tice on or before the st day of January in any year to the Government of the 
United Kingdom (who on receipt of such notice shall at once communicate 
it to the other contracting Governments) withdraw from the Agreement, so 
that it shall cease to be in force in respect of that Government after the 30th 
day of June following, and that any other contracting Government may, by 
giving notice in the like manner within one month of the receipt of such 
communication, withdraw also from the Agreement, so that it shall cease to 
be in force respecting it after the same date.
Article 22
Any Government which has not signed the present Agreement may accede 
thereto at any time after it has come into force. Accession shall be effected by 
means of a notification in writing addressed to the Government of the United 
Kingdom and shall take effect immediately after the date of its receipt.
 The Government of the United Kingdom will inform all the Govern-
ments which have signed or acceded to the present Agreement of all acces-
sions received and the date of their receipt.
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 In faith whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised, have signed 
the present Agreement.
 Done in London the th day of June, 93, in a single copy, which shall 
remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by whom certified copies will 
be transmitted to all the other contracting Governments.
Union of South Africa








Protocol Amending the International Agreement 
of June 8th, 1937, for the Regulation of Whaling. 
Signed in London on June 24, 1938  
(The “1938 London Protocol”)
The Governments of the Union of South Africa, the United States of 
America, the Argentine Republic, the Commonwealth of Australia, Can-
ada, Eire, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, New Zealand and Norway, desiring to introduce certain amend-
ments into the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, 
signed in London on the th June, 93 (hereinafter referred to as the Prin-
cipal Agreement) in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 thereof, 
have agreed as follows:
Article 1
With reference to the provisions of Articles 5 and  of the Principal Agree-
ment, it is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached 
thereto for the purpose of taking or treating humpback whales in any wa-
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ters south of 40º South Latitude during the period from the st October, 
93, to the 30th September, 939.
Article 2
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article  of the Principal Agreement, 
it is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached thereto 
for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in the waters south of 
40º South Latitude from 0º West Longitude westwards as far as 0º West 
Longitude for a period of two years from the th day of December, 93.
Article 3
. No factory ship which has been used for the purpose of treating ba-
leen whales south of 40º South Latitude shall be used for that pur-
pose elsewhere within a period of twelve months from the end of the 
open season prescribed in Article  of the Principal Agreement.
2. Only such factory ships as have operated during the year 93 within 
the territorial waters of any signatory Government shall, after the 
signature of this Protocol, so operate, and any such ships so operat-
ing shall be treated as land stations and remain moored in territo-
rial waters in one position during the season and shall operate for 
not more than six months in any period of twelve months, such 
period of six months to be continuous.
Article 4
To Article 5 of the Principal Agreement there shall be added the following:
 “Except that blue whales of not less than 5 feet, fin whales of not less 
than 50 feet and sperm whales of not less than 30 feet in length may be 
taken for delivery to land stations provided that the meat of such whales is 
to be used for local consumption as human or animal food.”
Article 5
To Article  of the Principal Agreement there shall be added the following:
 “Notwithstanding the above prohibition of treatment during a close 
season, the treatment of whales which have been taken during the open 
season may be completed after the end of the open season.”
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Article 6
In Article  of the Principal Agreement the word “baleen” shall be inserted 
after the word “treating.”
Article 7
For the areas specified in (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Article 9 of the Principal 
Agreement there shall be substituted the following areas, viz.:
 (a) In the waters north of º North Latitude, except that from 50º 
East Longitude eastwards as far as 40º West Longitude the taking 
or killing of whales by such ship or catcher shall be permitted be-
tween º North Latitude and 2º North Latitude;
 (b) In the Atlantic Ocean and its dependent waters north of 40º 
South Latitude;
 (c) In the Pacific Ocean and its dependent waters east of 50º West 
Longitude between 40º South Latitude and 35º North Latitude;
 (d) In the Pacific Ocean and its dependent waters west of 50º West 
Longitude between 40º South Latitude and 20º North Latitude;
 (e) In the Indian Ocean and its dependent waters north of 40º 
South Latitude.
Article 8
For Article 2 of the Principal Agreement there shall be substituted the fol-
lowing, viz.:
 The taking of whales for delivery to a factory ship shall be so regulated 
or restricted by the master or person in charge of the factory ship that no 
whale carcase shall remain in the sea for a longer period than 33 hours from 
the time of killing to the time when it is taken up on to the deck of the fac-
tory ship for treatment.
Article 9
The present Protocol shall come into force provisionally on the first day 
of July, 93, to the extent to which the signatory Governments are respec-
tively able to enforce it.
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Article 10
 (i) The present Protocol shall be ratified and the instruments of rati-
fication shall be deposited with the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as soon as possible.
 (ii) It shall come into force definitively upon the deposit of the in-
struments of ratification by the Governments of the United King-
dom, Germany and Norway.
 (iii) For any other Government which is a Party to the Principal Agree-
ment, the present Protocol shall come into force on the date of the 
deposit of its instrument of ratification or notification of accession.
 (iv) The Government of the United Kingdom will inform the other 
Governments of the date on which the Protocol comes into force 
and the date of any ratification or accession received subsequently.
Article 11
 (i) The present Protocol shall be open to accession by any Govern-
ment which has not signed it and which accedes to the principal 
Agreement before the definitive entry into force of the Protocol.
 (ii) Accession shall be effected by means of a notification in writing 
addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom and shall take 
effect immediately after the date of its receipt.
 (iii) The Government of the United Kingdom will inform all the 
Governments which have signed or acceded to the present Protocol 
of all accessions received and the date of their receipt.
Article 12
Any ratification of or accession to the Principal Agreement which may be 
deposited or notified after the date of definitive coming into force of the 
present Protocol shall be deemed to relate to the Principal Agreement as 
amended by the present Protocol.
 In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have 
signed the present Protocol.
 Done in London the twenty-fourth day of June, 93, in a single copy, 
which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United 
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Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by whom certified copies 
shall be communicated to all the signatory Governments.
Union of South Africa






United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
New Zealand
Norway
International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling. Signed in Washington on December 2, 
1946 (The “1946 Washington Convention”)
The Governments whose duly authorized representatives have subscribed 
hereto,
 Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding 
for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale 
stocks;
 Considering that the history of whaling has seen overfishing of one 
area after another and of one species of whale after another to such a degree 
that it essential to protect all species of whales from further overfishing;
 Recognizing that the whale stocks are susceptible of natural increases 
if whaling is properly regulated, and that increases in the size of whale 
stocks will permit increases in the number of whales which may be cap-
tured without endangering these natural resources;
 Recognizing that it is in the common interest to achieve the optimum 
level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing wide-spread 
economic and nutritional distress;
 Recognizing that in the course of achieving these objectives, whaling 
operations should be confined to those species best able to sustain exploi-
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tation in order to give an interval for recovery to certain species of whales 
now depleted in numbers;
 Desiring to establish a system of international regulation for the whale 
fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and development of 
whale stocks on the basis of the principles embodied in the provisions of 
the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed in Lon-
don on June , 93 and the protocols to that Agreement signed in London 
on June 24, 93 and November 2, 945; and
 Having decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper 
conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly develop-
ment of the whaling industry;
 Have agreed as follows:
Article I
. This Convention includes the Schedule attached thereto which forms 
an integral part thereof. All references to “Convention” shall be un-
derstood as including the said Schedule either in its present terms or 
as amended in accordance with the provisions of Article V.
2. The Convention applies to factory ships, land stations, and whale 
catchers under the jurisdiction of the Contracting Governments, 
and to all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such factory 
ships, land stations, and whale catchers.
Article II
As used in this Convention
. “factory ship” means a ship in which or on which whales are treated 
whether wholly or in part;
2. “land station” means a factory on the land at which whales are 
treated whether wholly or in part;
3. “whale catcher” means a ship used for the purpose of hunting, tak-
ing, towing, holding on to, or scouting for whales;
4. “Contracting Government” means any Government which has de-
posited an instrument of ratification or has given notice of adher-
ence to this Convention.
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Article III
. The Contracting Governments agree to establish an International 
Whaling Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, 
to be composed of one member from each Contracting Govern-
ment. Each member shall have one vote and may be accompanied 
by one or more experts and advisers.
2. The Commission shall elect from its own members a Chairman and 
Vice Chairman and shall determine its own Rules of Procedure. De-
cisions of the Commission shall be taken by a simple majority of 
those members voting except that a three-fourths majority of those 
members voting shall be required for action in pursuance of Article 
V. The Rules of Procedure may provide for decisions otherwise than 
at meetings of the Commission.
3. The Commission may appoint its own Secretary and staff.
4. The Commission may set up, from among its own members and 
experts or advisers, such committees as it considers desirable to 
perform such functions as it may authorize.
5. The expenses of each member of the Commission and of his 
experts and advisers shall be determined and paid by his own 
Government.
. Recognizing that specialized agencies related to the United Na-
tions will be concerned with the conservation and development of 
whale fisheries and the products arising therefrom and desiring to 
avoid duplication of functions, the Contracting Governments will 
consult among themselves within two years after the coming into 
force of this Convention to decide whether the Commission shall 
be brought within the framework of a specialized agency related to 
the United Nations.
. In the meantime the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland shall arrange, in consultation with 
the other Contracting Governments, to convene the first meeting 
of the Commission, and shall initiate the consultation referred to 
in paragraph  above.
. Subsequent meetings of the Commission shall be convened as the 
Commission may determine.
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Article IV
. The Commission may either in collaboration with or through indepen-
dent agencies of the Contracting Governments or other public or pri-
vate agencies, establishments, or organizations, or independently
 (a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize studies and 
investigations relating to whales and whaling;
 (b) collect and analyze statistical information concerning the cur-
rent condition and trend of the whale stocks and the effects of 
whaling activities thereon;
 (c) study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods 
of maintaining and increasing the populations of whale stocks.
2. The Commission shall arrange for the publication of reports of 
its activities, and it may publish independently or in collaboration 
with the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics at Sandefjord 
in Norway and other organizations and agencies such reports as it 
deems appropriate, as well as statistical, scientific, and other perti-
nent information relating to whales and whaling.
Article V
. The Commission may amend from time to time the provisions of 
the Schedule by adopting regulations with respect to the conserva-
tion and utilization of whale resources, fixing (a) protected and 
unprotected species; (b) open and closed seasons; (c) open and 
closed waters, including the designation of sanctuary areas; (d) size 
limits for each species; (e) time, methods, and intensity of whaling 
(including the maximum catch of whales to be taken in any one 
season); (f) types and specifications of gear and apparatus and 
appliances which may be used; (g) methods of measurement; and 
(h) catch returns and other statistical and biological records.
2. These amendments of the Schedule (a) shall be such as are neces-
sary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention 
and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum 
utilization of the whale resources; (b) shall be based on scientific 
findings; (c) shall not involve restrictions on the number or nation-
ality of factory ships or land stations, nor allocate specific quotas to 
20  | The Game of Conservation
any factory ship or land station or to any group of factory ships or 
land stations; and (d) shall take into consideration the interests of 
the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry.
3. Each of such amendments shall become effective with respect to 
the Contracting Governments ninety days following notification 
of the amendment by the Commission to each of the Contracting 
Governments, except that (a) if any Government presents to the 
Commission objection to any amendment prior to the expiration 
of this ninety-day period, the amendment shall not become ef-
fective with respect to any of the Governments for an additional 
ninety days; (b) thereupon, any other Contracting Government 
may present objection to the amendment at any time prior to the 
expiration of the additional ninety-day period, or before the expi-
ration of thirty days from the date of receipt of the last objection 
received during such additional ninety-day period, whichever date 
shall be the later; and (c) thereafter, the amendment shall become 
effective with respect to all Contracting Governments which have 
not presented objection but shall not become effective with re-
spect to any Government which has so objected until such date 
as the objection is withdrawn. The Commission shall notify each 
Contracting Government immediately upon receipt of each ob-
jection and withdrawal and each Contracting Government shall 
acknowledge receipt of all notifications of amendments, objec-
tions, and withdrawals.
4. No amendments shall become effective before July , 949.
Article VI
The Commission may from time to time make recommendations to any 
or all Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or 
whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention.
Article VII
The Contracting Governments shall ensure prompt transmission to the 
International Bureau for Whaling Statistics at Sandefjord in Norway, or to 
such other body as the Commission may designate, of notifications and 
statistical and other information required by this Convention in such form 
and manner as may be prescribed by the Commission.
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Article VIII
. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any Con-
tracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special 
permit authorizing that national to kill, take, and treat whales 
for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as 
to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contract-
ing Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of 
whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be 
exempt from the operation of this Convention. Each Contracting 
Government shall report at once to the Commission all such autho-
rizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may 
at any time revoke any such special permit which it has granted.
2. Any whales taken under these special permits shall so far as prac-
ticable be processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in ac-
cordance with directions issued by the Government by which the 
permit was granted.
3. Each Contracting Government shall transmit to such body as may 
be designated by the Commission, in so far as practicable, and at 
intervals of not more than one year, scientific information available 
to that Government with respect to whales and whaling, including 
the results of research conducted pursuant to paragraph  of this 
Article and to Article IV.
4. Recognizing that continuous collection and analysis of biological 
data in connection with the operations of factory ships and land 
stations are indispensable to sound and constructive management 
of the whale fisheries, the Contracting Governments will take all 
practicable measures to obtain such data.
Article IX
. Each Contracting Government shall take appropriate measures to 
ensure the application of the provisions of this Convention and the 
punishment of infractions against the said provisions in operations 
carried out by persons or by vessels under its jurisdiction.
2. No bonus or other remuneration calculated with relation to the re-
sults of their work shall be paid to the gunners and crews of whale 
catchers in respect of any whales the taking of which is forbidden 
by this Convention.
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3. Prosecution for infractions against or contraventions of this Con-
vention shall be instituted by the Government having jurisdiction 
over the offense.
4. Each Contracting Government shall transmit to the Commission full 
details of each infraction of the provisions of this Convention by per-
sons or vessels under the jurisdiction of that Government as reported 
by its inspectors. This information shall include a statement of mea-
sures taken for dealing with the infraction and of penalties imposed.
Article X
. This Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratifica-
tion shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of 
America.
2. Any Government which has not signed this Convention may ad-
here thereto after it enters into force by a notification in writing to 
the Government of the United States of America.
3. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all 
other signatory Governments and all adhering Governments of all 
ratifications deposited and adherences received.
4. The Convention shall, when instruments of ratification have been 
deposited by at least six signatory Governments, which shall in-
clude the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, enter into 
force with respect to those Governments and shall enter into force 
with respect to each Government which subsequently ratifies or ad-
heres on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or 
the receipt of its notification of adherence.
5. The provisions of the Schedule shall not apply prior to July , 94. 
Amendments to the Schedule adopted pursuant to Article V shall 
not apply prior to July , 949.
Article XI
Any Contracting Government may withdraw from this Convention on 
June thirtieth of any year by giving notice on or before January first of 
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the same year to the depositary Government, which upon receipt of such 
a notice shall at once communicate it to the other Contracting Govern-
ments. Any other Contracting Government may, in like manner, within 
one month of the receipt of a copy of such a notice from the depositary 
Government, give notice of withdrawal, so that the Convention shall cease 
to be in force on June thirtieth of the same year with respect to the Govern-
ment giving such notice of withdrawal.
 This Convention shall bear the date on which it is opened for sig-
nature and shall remain open for signature for a period of fourteen days 
thereafter.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, 
have signed this Convention.
 DONE in Washington this second day of December 94, in the Eng-
lish language, the original of which shall be deposited in the archives of 
the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the 
United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the 
other signatory and adhering Governments.
Argentina  New Zealand
Australia  Norway
Brazil  Peru
Canada  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Chile  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Denmark  United States of America
France  Union of South Africa
The Netherlands
Schedule
. (a) There shall be maintained on each factory ship at least two in-
spectors of whaling for the purpose of maintaining twenty-four 
hour inspection. These inspectors shall be appointed and paid by 
the Government having jurisdiction over the factory ship.
 (b) Adequate inspection shall be maintained at each land station. 
The inspectors serving at each land station shall be appointed and 
paid by the Government having jurisdiction over the land station.
2. It is forbidden to take or kill gray whales or right whales, except 
when the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclu-
sively for local consumption by the aborigines.
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3. It is forbidden to take or kill calves or suckling whales or female 
whales which are accompanied by calves or suckling whales.
4. It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached 
thereto for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in any of 
the following areas:
 (a) in the waters north of º North Latitude except that from 50º 
East Longitude eastward as far as 40º West Longitude the taking or 
killing of baleen whales by a factory ship or whale catcher shall be 
permitted between º North Latitude and 2º North Latitude;
 (b) in the Atlantic Ocean and its dependent waters north of 40º 
South Latitude;
 (c) in the Pacific Ocean and its dependent waters east of 50º West 
Longitude between 40º South Latitude and 35º North Latitude;
 (d) in the Pacific Ocean and its dependent waters west of 50º West 
Longitude between 40º South Latitude and 20º North Latitude;
 (e) in the Indian Ocean and its dependent waters north of 40º South 
Latitude.
5. It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached 
thereto for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in the 
waters south of 40º South Latitude from 0º West Longitude west-
ward as far as 0º West Longitude.
. It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached 
thereto for the purpose of taking or treating humpback whales in 
any waters south of 40º South Latitude.
. (a) It is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale catcher attached 
thereto for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in any 
waters south of 40º South Latitude, except during the period from 
December 5 to April  following, both days inclusive.
 (b) Notwithstanding the above prohibition of treatment during a 
closed season, the treatment of whales which have been taken during 
the open season may be completed after the end of the open season.
. (a) The number of baleen whales taken during the open season 
caught in any waters south of 40º South Latitude by whale catchers 
attached to factory ships under the jurisdiction of the Contracting 
Governments shall not exceed sixteen thousand blue-whale units.
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 (b) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, blue-
whale units shall be calculated on the basis that one blue whale 
equals:
  () two fin whales or
  (2) two and a half humpback whales or
  (3) six sei whales.
 (c) Notification shall be given in accordance with the provisions of 
Article VII of the Convention, within two days after the end of each 
calendar week, of data on the number of blue-whale units taken 
in any waters south of 40º South Latitude by all whale catchers at-
tached to factory ships under the jurisdiction of each Contracting 
Government.
 (d) If it should appear that the maximum catch of whales permitted 
by subparagraph (a) of this paragraph may be reached before April  
of any year, the Commission, or such other body as the Commission 
may designate, shall determine, on the basis of the data provided, the 
date on which the maximum catch of whales shall be deemed to have 
been reached and shall notify each Contracting Government of that 
date not less than two weeks in advance thereof. The taking of baleen 
whales by whale catchers attached to factory ships shall be illegal in 
any waters south of 40º South Latitude after the date so determined.
 (e) Notification shall be given in accordance with the provisions 
of Article VII of the Convention of each factory ship intending 
to engage in whaling operations in any waters south of 40º South 
Latitude.
9. It is forbidden to take or kill any blue, fin, sei, humpback, or sperm 
whales below the following lengths:
 (a) blue whales  0 feet (2.3 meters)
 (b) fin whales  55 feet (. meters)
 (c) sei whales  40 feet (2.2 meters)
 (d) humpback whales 35 feet (0. meters)
 (e) sperm whales  35 feet (0. meters)
 except that blue whales of not less than 5 feet (9. meters), fin 
whales of not less than 50 feet (5.2 meters), and sei whales of not 
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less than 35 feet (0. meters) in length may be taken for delivery to 
land stations provided that the meat of such whales is to be used for 
local consumption as human or animal food.
 Whales must be measured when at rest on deck or platform, as ac-
curately as possible by means of a steel tape measure fitted at the zero 
end with a spiked handle which can be stuck into the deck planking 
abreast of one end of the whale. The tape measure shall be stretched 
in a straight line parallel with the whale’s body and read abreast the 
other end of the whale. The ends of the whale, for measurement 
purposes, shall be the point of the upper jaw and the notch between 
the tail flukes. Measurements, after being accurately read on the tape 
measure, shall be logged to the nearest foot: that is to say, any whale 
between 5'" and '" shall be logged as ', and any whale between 
'" and '" shall be logged as '. The measurement of any whale 
which falls on an exact half foot shall be logged at the next half foot, 
e.g. '" precisely, shall be logged as '.
0. It is forbidden to use a land station or a whale catcher attached 
thereto for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales in any 
area or in any waters for more than six months in any period of 
twelve months, such period of six months to be continuous.
. It is forbidden to use a factory ship, which has been used during a 
season in any waters south of 40º South Latitude for the purpose 
of treating baleen whales, in any other area for the same purpose 
within a period of one year from the termination of that season.
2. (a) All whales taken shall be delivered to the factory ship or land 
station and all parts of such whales shall be processed by boiling or 
otherwise, except the internal organs, whale bone and flippers of all 
whales, the meat of sperm whales and of parts of whales intended 
for human food or feeding animals.
 (b) Complete treatment of the carcasses of “Dauhval” and of whales 
used as fenders will not be required in cases where the meat or bone 
of such whales is in bad condition.
3. The taking of whales for delivery to a factory ship shall be so regu-
lated or restricted by the master or person in charge of the factory 
ship that no whale carcass (except of a whale used as a fender) shall 
remain in the sea for a longer period than thirty-three hours from 
the time of killing to the time when it is taken up on to the deck of 
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the factory ship for treatment. All whale catchers engaged in taking 
whales must report by radio to the factory ship the time when each 
whale is caught.
4. Gunners and crews of factory ships, land stations, and whale catch-
ers shall be engaged on such terms that their remuneration shall 
depend to a considerable extent upon such factors as the species, 
size, and yield of whales taken, and not merely upon the number of 
the whales taken. No bonus or other remuneration shall be paid to 
the gunners or crews of whale catchers in respect of the taking of 
milk-filled or lactating whales.
5. Copies of all official laws and regulations relating to whales and 
whaling and changes in such laws and regulations shall be transmit-
ted to the Commission.
. Notification shall be given in accordance with the provisions of 
Article VII of the Convention with regard to all factory ships and 
land stations of statistical information (a) concerning the number 
of whales of each species taken, the number thereof lost, and the 
number treated at each factory ship or land station, and (b) as to 
the aggregate amounts of oil of each grade and quantities of meal, 
fertilizer (guano), and other products derived from them, together 
with (c) particulars with respect to each whale treated in the factory 
ship or land station as to the date and approximate latitude and lon-
gitude of taking, the species and sex of the whale, its length and, if it 
contains a foetus, the length and sex, if ascertainable, of the foetus. 
The data referred to in (a) and (c) above shall be verified at the time 
of the tally and there shall also be notification to the Commission of 
any information which may be collected or obtained concerning the 
calving grounds and migration routes of whales.
 In communicating this information there shall be specified:
 (a) the name and gross tonnage of each factory ship;
 (b) the number and aggregate gross tonnage of the whale catchers;
 (c) a list of the land stations which were in operation during the 
period concerned.
. Notwithstanding the definition of land station contained in Article 
II of the Convention, a factory ship operating under the jurisdiction of 
a Contracting Government, and the movements of which are con-
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fined solely to the territorial waters of that Government, shall be 
subject to the regulations governing the operation of land stations 
within the following areas:
 (a) on the coast of Madagascar and its dependencies, and on the 
west coasts of French Africa;
 (b) on the west coast of Australia in the area known as Shark Bay 
and northward to Northwest Cape and including Exmouth Gulf 
and King George’s Sound, including the port of Albany; and on the 
east coast of Australia, in Twofold Bay and Jervis Bay.
. The following expressions have the meanings respectively assigned 
to them, that is to say:
 “baleen whale” means any whale other than a toothed whale;
 “blue whale” means any whale known by the name of blue whale, 
Sibbald’s rorqual, or sulphur bottom;
 “fin whale” means any whale known by the name of common fin-
back, common rorqual, finback, finner, fin whale, herring whale, 
razorback, or true fin whale;
 “sei whale” means any whale known by the name of Balaenoptera 
borealis, sei whale, Rudolphi’s rorqual, pollack whale, or coalfish 
whale, and shall be taken to include Balaenoptera brydei, Bryde’s 
whale;
 “gray whale” means any whale known by the name of gray whale, Cali-
fornia gray, devil fish, hard head, mussel digger, gray back, rip sack;
 “humpback whale” means any whale known by the name of bunch, 
humpback, humpback whale, hum[p]backed whale, hump whale, 
or hunchbacked whale;
 “right whale” means any whale known by the name of Atlantic right 
whale, Arctic right whale, Biscayan right whale, bowhead, great polar 
whale, Greenland right whale, Greenland whale, Nordkaper, North 
Atlantic right whale, North Cape whale, Pacific right whale, pigmy 
right whale, Southern pigmy right whale, or Southern right whale;
 “sperm whale” means any whale known by the name of sperm 
whale, spermacet whale, cachalot, or pot whale;
 “Dauhval” means any unclaimed dead whale found floating.
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